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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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

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Do We Need a New Grand Strategy?

Edward N. Luttwak

SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1944, or at the very latest the spring of 1948, the dominant purpose of U.S. foreign policy, the chief ambition of U.S. defense policy, and constant preoccupation of U.S. national policy has been to resist the successive manifestations of Soviet aggrandizement.

During four decades and more, therefore, the strategic virtue most required of Americans and their government has been sheer tenacity. To resist the varied forms of Soviet subversion and overt pressure; to uphold the military balance in the bewildering circumstances of the nuclear age, when the effort could too easily appear pointless—it is that unimaginative quality so close to mere stubbornness that has been needed above all.

By contrast, flexibility, normally the highest strategic virtue, has been largely denied to the United States; indeed, for most of the postwar era, it has been only a delusive temptation. As the revisionist power striving to change the status quo, the Soviet Union has always held the initiative. The constancy of Soviet aggrandizement has made futile or dangerous any attempt to exercise flexibility by recasting U.S. foreign policy.

Today, however, the increasingly radical innovations of the Gorbachev regime suggest at least the *possibility* of a drastic change in Soviet external policies as well—change drastic enough to alter the premises of U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, in all circumstances except dissolution the Soviet Union would still remain a (very) Great Power, determined to secure what it has, and eager for more if opportunities arise. The political motives behind Gorbachev's moves—such as the need to contain his own domestic opposition—are thus largely beside the point. What matters to us is that Soviet conduct so far has *not* been the normal conduct of a normal Great Power; it has resembled, rather, that of a Great Power at war.[1]

Thus if the Kremlin were now to abandon its characteristic pursuit of aggrandizement at almost all costs and by almost all means, and to adopt instead the normal conduct of a Great Power subject to normal internal priorities and restrained by normal inhibitions, the external environment of U.S. foreign policy would be drastically changed.

True, the United States would still have to remain vigilant and it would still have to uphold the military balance. But the task of coping with a Soviet Union transformed into a normal Great Power would unquestionably

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[1]Obliquely, if inadvertently, recognized by those who equated the interception of KAL 007 with that of the Iran Air airbus. The U.S. Navy was of course at war with Iran in the Persian Gulf, itself a war zone.

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be less onerous than it is today. A transformed Soviet Union would be less costly in the military realm, less demanding of policy attention, and—not least—much less likely to force the United States to subordinate its other purposes and interests to the urgencies of the U.S.-Soviet struggle. At the same time, of course, a Soviet Union thus transformed would weaken the solidarity that security needs have imposed on the West, thus bringing intra-Western rivalries—particularly economic ones—to the fore.

So far, the idea of such a change in Soviet external conduct, and the implications of that change, for better or for worse, remain hypothetical. It is all the more important, therefore, to review the long record of Soviet aggrandizement and the consequent U.S. reactions which form the grand strategy we have today. Only then can we try to discern the new foreign policy preoccupations which might become salient if the Soviet Union does change in a radical way.

One Bear, Many Woods

SOVIET AGGRANDIZEMENT began with a straightforward territorial expansion. Its primary purpose before 1941 was to add protective depth against possible invasion—the classic goal of continental empires. But expansion continued opportunistically thereafter. The brutal wartime events helped to mask even outright annexations, minimizing their costs and risks. Thus Finnish Karelia, the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Koenigsberg district of East Prussia, the eastern provinces of Poland, Czechoslovakia's sub-Carparthian Ruthenia, Romania's northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands—all were added to the USSR between 1939 and 1945.

Soviet territorial expansion came to an end in 1946. But aggrandizement continued nevertheless into a second phase. The means used included the subversion of coalition governments where client-regimes were not simply imposed by naked force. Poland, the Soviet zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and (more dubiously) Outer Mongolia, were all subjected to the Soviet empire without actually being absorbed in it. (In much the same way, British colonial territory once coexisted with a great many protectorates under indirect rule, and Roman provinces were once shielded by an outer belt of client principalities.) Soviet imperial control was thereby advantageously combined with a nominal independence, which left the burdens of administration to subservient native rulers.

In the third phase of aggrandizement, manifest from the middle 1950s, the Soviet Union faced stiff resistance almost everywhere around its perimeter. By then, the United States had found allies large and small that could be protected, assisted, and led under the policy of containment. Though stronger and more self-confident, the Soviets were careful not to collide with the immovable object of the nuclear-guaranteed perimeters of containment. Instead, the Soviet Union established clientelistic alliances with Nasser's Egypt, Sukarno's Indonesia, and later Castro's Cuba, as well as a number of lesser regimes. In this manner the Soviets effectively leapt over the wall of containment.

In each case, the supply of military equipment was supplemented by the services of military advisers, sometimes by the thousand. And with the standard aid packages of steel mills, cement works, fishing boats, central printing houses and such, there came more advisers, also in large numbers. Within these populations of Soviet expatriates the presence of political operatives and covert agents was only natural. In almost every case, Moscow more or less openly promoted the rise of a local "vanguard" party organized on Leninist lines, even while cooperating as necessary with existing bourgeois-nationalist regimes.

During this third phase of "out of area" aggrandizement, the Soviet Union did not always passively await the invitations of well-disposed rulers. In almost any Third World

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country, if the local regime was uncooperative, Moscow was ready to take the initiative by actively supporting the local Communist party if it had any substance, or the nearest equivalent, or indeed any source of opposition that showed promise, including dissident ethnics and regional secessionists. Soviet support always included overt propaganda by the entire world-wide chorus orchestrated from Moscow, but it often extended to covert means as well; and if an internal guerilla movement was in being, the Soviet Union would provide training and equipment, directly or by way of its clients.

During the fourth and final phase of aggrandizement, which was well underway by the 1970s, Soviet military strength became less a means of foreign policy and more an end in itself. The Soviet quest for allies and clients did not end, but the chief expression of aggrandizement was, so to speak, "vertical." That is, its aim was to increase the military power of the Soviet Union rather than to extend its presence "horizontally" through clientelistic alliances. It was symptomatic of this shift that the Soviet Union began to demand military basing facilities from clients, even though such demands complicated and in some cases undermined its clientelistic relationships (to say nothing of impeding the quest for more clients). Soviet diplomacy and political action now had to serve the military instrument, instead of being served by it as in the past.

Over the years, varied explanations have been offered for the historically unprecedented Soviet military build-up that accelerated from the mid-1960s. Some have seen it as a response to the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brutally exposed both the inferiority of Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces and the limited reach of Soviet military strength beyond the Eurasian land mass. Others have stressed the fact that a fast-growing Soviet economy provided increasing resources which could be put to military use. Still others have argued that much of the build-up was explained by the felt Soviet need to form an "eastern front" vis-à-vis a steadily more unfriendly China. Some specialists insisted on a bureaucratic explanation, seeing the entire build-up as a reaction to Khrushchevian "bigger bang for the ruble" all-nuclear military policies, which naturally took the form of a quest for war-fighting capabilities in the main Eurasian theaters that would no longer require nuclear use at all. My own view is that the Soviets were responding to the apparent post-Vietnam exhaustion of the United States, which made the goal of outright military supremacy seem attainable to Soviet leaders, and therefore worth striving for.

Perhaps each of these explanations has merit in regard to some periods or some aspect of the Soviet military build-up. Certainly the influence of the increasing resources was manifest both in the acceleration of military investment during the 1960s and the deceleration of the later 1970s, when the rate of increase began to diminish. The impact of the "Chinese" factor would have been felt in the expansion of the Soviet army especially, and not beyond the mid-1970s. The "Cuban-humiliation" factor, though, would have waned long before then. My own theory about Vietnam's role in the build-up only becomes plausible after 1968, Tet, and the rise of neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States.

BUT WHATEVER the motives behind this fourth phase of aggrandizement, there is no doubt that the results were spectacular. One was the emergence of a navy capable of oceanic deployments with increasingly more powerful ships. Another was the development of offensive tactical airpower on a large scale, as more and more fighter-bombers and interdiction aircraft were added to the interceptors that used to make up the bulk of Soviet frontal aviation.

Even more important—though less visible and much less dramatic—was the restoration of the full artillery strength of Soviet ground forces. This build-up effectively ended Soviet dependence on battlefield nuclear weapons—and that vast effort was concurrent

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with the Soviet army's full mechanization[2], *and* its very substantial expansion[3], *and* its logistic enhancement.[4] The resulting capabilities would have been formidable in any case. They were made more daunting still by the addition of an entire superstructure of higher-echelon formations[5] and theater-level commands, structured to execute non-nuclear operations on a continental scale. In other words, they acquired a new, specifically offensive, dimension.

Finally, there was the military growth that attracted the greatest attention—the rapid expansion of Soviet long-range nuclear forces both land-based and sea-based, of both intermediate and intercontinental range. This expansion overturned American numerical superiorities in every category of weapon.

What made the Soviet build-up so spectacular was the sum of its manifold parts. Any one of its dimensions—naval, tactical-air, or strategic-nuclear—would have been very demanding on its own. Worse, all were concurrent with the vast expansion and upgrading of the ground forces, which alone absorbed a much larger share of Soviet resources than the United States devoted to all its armed forces of every kind.

A Cumulative Response

THE AMERICAN REACTION to these various phases began rather inauspiciously. During the first, annexationist, period, misgivings about Soviet intentions were deflected by wartime vicissitudes and by an intense solidarity transposed from suffering peoples to Stalin's regime. Thus, the official U.S. response was largely confined to more or less perfunctory diplomatic protests.[6] The subsequent phases, however, did evoke energetic (though usually belated) countervailing efforts, and also some rather ambitious preventive measures.

The United States acquired its present grand strategy through an accumulation of ad hoc reactions to the successive manifestations of Soviet aggrandizement. That strategy is not constituted by declaratory policies alone, but rather by an accumulation of substantive measures—with none more original and more successful, by all historical standards, than the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with all its headquarters and infrastructures.

The present array of U.S. military forces itself suggests the cumulative character of our grand strategy. It embodies both the second-phase response of continental counter-invasion capabilities, originally designed to support containment, and the third-phase response of intervention forces, specifically designed to resist Soviet-supported opponents in the Third World. The overall quality of equipment and infrastructures, on the other hand, reflects the post-1979 response to the Soviet Union's "vertical" aggrandizement, which took the form of qualitative enhancement rather than numerical expansion (the

[2]The newly-added artillery being self-propelled, while the infantry of tank divisions was equipped with armed combat carriers (in lieu of "armored box" troop carriers), and the infantry of "motor rifle" divisions with 8-wheel combat carriers (in lieu of armored trucks).

[3]The number of active and reserve divisions increased from less than 150 in the mid-1960s to about 200 by the early 1980s; at the same time, the troop levels of both tank and "motor rifle" divisions also increased by about 20 percent.

[4]By the expansion of supply and maintenance units at every echelon above battalion, the addition of some 200,000 trucks, and the formation of specialized pipeline units—essential to keep armored forces rolling after the first twenty-four hours or so of vehicle autonomy.

[5]"Army" echelons above division, with their own organic artillery (and tank force) as well as a congerie of anti-aircraft, NBC defense, signal and engineer units; and "Front" echelons, wherein the organic artillery amounts to a full division and all other support elements are expanded pro rata.

[6]But the refusal of U.S. recognition of the Soviet annexations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may yet have practical effect.

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exception, of course, is the U.S. Navy).

The American diplomatic response to Soviet aggrandizement is manifest in the bureaucratic orientation of the State Department, with its emphases on alliance-maintenance and on diplomatic vigilance against Soviet activities world-wide. In the case of many Third World countries, especially, the scale of the U.S. diplomatic presence would not otherwise be justified.

Finally, there is the often-neglected intellectual dimension of U.S. grand strategy. This includes the institutionalized authority of certain key ideas, whose continued validity in the shaping of day to day policies is almost unquestioned. Yesterday's means have thereby solidified into today's ends. For example, because the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan was once the best defense against second-phase Soviet subversion, U.S. grand strategy still prescribes a uniformly favorable attitude to whatever will contribute to their prosperity. Most notably, our diplomacy champions market integration in Europe, even though the United States itself is excluded from that process.

Possible Soviet Futures

WITH THAT BACKDROP in mind, we may now try to imagine the sorts of circumstances that would render our present grand strategy obsolete. It is of course impossible to predict the further evolution of the Gorbachev regime, let alone the future of the Soviet Union with or without Gorbachev as its leader. But it *is* possible to categorize a variety of alternative Soviet futures and to ask which of these might be compatible with the dynamic military growth and the aggressive forms of external Soviet activism that have given rise to the strategy we have today.

A *regime-reformist* Soviet Union, whose outlines are suggested in current official pronouncements, would have a more decentralized economy (with many cooperatives, widespread leasehold farming, and locally-controlled enterprises). This decentralization would occur within the limits of continuing central control of its "commanding heights." A stringently qualified restoration of civil society has been recognized as a necessary concomitant. What is now seemingly offered is a gradual evolution from direct Party control of all collective activities[7] to authoritarian rule by Party-selected leaders through state organs. These organs in turn would be influenced by limited forms of representation in a hierarchy of assemblies culminating in the all-Union Supreme Soviet. As Gorbachev himself must know, the defect of this scheme is that it gives no specific remedy for the predicament of the Soviet Union as a multinational state with many lively nationalisms, whose official trans-national ideology continues to decay.

Such a Soviet future would still be compatible with a great deal of external activism, including Third World adventures, but not with the costly upkeep of Soviet military forces at anywhere near their present levels. The resources needed to provide consumer goods and services as work-incentives for a decentralized economy would have to come from somewhere. In theory, they might be transferred from such domestic expenses as health and welfare, or perhaps public investment. But the former are already miserably low (death rates have actually increased, notoriously, while pensions are minimal). And investment must actually increase if the state is to avert stagnation. That leaves only one option: a drastic reallocation of resources from military to civil purposes.

A *liberal-reformist* Soviet future, along the lines hoped for by Sakharov and others, may seem more far-fetched. But it is nevertheless worth considering because some of its aspects may be included at any time in the officially-favored future as well. In such a Soviet Union, the Russian nation would be reduced to the role of a *primus inter pares* in order to combine reform with continued unity. Republics that

[7]Whereby there are no voluntary associations to form the structures of civil society.

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reject cohabitation[8] might then secede, leaving both all-Union and republic-level governance to evolve towards increasingly genuine forms of representation. In that case, the reallocation of military resources to civil purposes would have to be more drastic, in order to satisfy demands made compelling by real political participation. Moreover, a more open society would impose much stricter limits on the state's external activism. A democratizing Soviet Union could not, for example, continue to subsidize Fidel Castro's fidelity to the Stalinist model.

A third possibility, which we might call a *regime-conservative* Soviet future, would be marked by abandonment of any genuine economic decentralization,[9] and by a reversion to neo-Stalinism, complete with strict censorship and fully restored police controls.[10] A neo-Stalinist regime would once again invoke a hostile outside world to justify repression at home. It would be likely to engage in renewed external activism, including Third World adventures, and would no doubt maintain large military forces, perhaps even larger than today's. A neo-Stalinist restoration, however, is bound to perpetuate economic and technological stagnation, which would prejudice the regime's ability to keep upgrading the technical quality of its military forces. That in turn must cause a progressive *relative* decline in Soviet military power—unless the West were to treat a neo-Stalinist Soviet Union as if it were reformist, and fail to uphold its own end of the military balance.

Alongside schematic suggestions like these, one may also imagine a *non-linear* future which would include the fragmentation of the Soviet Union along national lines. For years, the Soviet peoples have seen their national self-determination denied in the name of "class solidarity." Today the ideology that denied their national rights appears to be in irreversible decline. Thus fragmentation would seem the logical outcome of political liberalization—so long as liberalization is unaccompanied by dramatic economic success.

Each of these scenarios for the Soviet state shares a single common denominator: the decline of the relative military power of the Soviet Union. In some cases, that decline might follow from deliberate policy, perhaps quite quickly; in others, it might result from economic stagnation and its eventual technological consequences.[11] Whatever the cause, however, we must bear in mind that the Soviets will decline militarily *only if Western military efforts are sustained.* If, by contrast, reformist intentions or conservative stagnation are overanticipated in Western military policies, the ability of the Soviet armed forces to carry out offensive operations could actually *increase*—independent of the desires of the Soviet rulers of the day, and possibly even against their preferences.

Nothing would be more dangerous than a situation in which the Soviet Union would both be failing in domestic reform, and at the

[8]Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania most likely, and possibly Moldavia—if Romania should ever escape from the grip of tyranny to acquire the allure that a Hungarian-like Romania could project. In spite of current agitations, Armenia is much less likely to demand secession because its land-locked state would leave it at the mercy of Turkey or the USSR itself. Elsewhere, secessionist sentiment is impossible to gauge.

[9]But not reforms as such. The Soviet economy was kept on a treadmill of administrative reforms throughout the Khrushchev-Brezhnev decades, all futile because detailed central planning persisted.

[10]"Administrative measures," an instinctual Soviet response to ordinary political contestation, as shown by Gorbachev's outburst in Armenia during his December 1988 visit.

[11]But long delayed in many sectors: it was a "stagnating" Soviet Union after all that built the world's only titanium submarine (capable of out-diving its U.S. counterparts), which has done quite well in space exploration, hardly a low-tech sector, and whose ground weapons remain as advanced as any in most categories. But the gap between the fine aerodynamics and prosaic avionics of the Soviet MiG-29 jet fighter is a portent of things to come in the increasingly determinant electronic sector.

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same time find itself in a position of relative military advantage thanks to over-eager reductions by the Western powers. It is interesting to note that such a conjunction would not only pose unforeseen dangers to the West; it would also undercut Soviet reformers, by retroactively validating the last and "vertical" phase of Soviet aggrandizement.

A Threatening Configuration

ACCORDING TO today's authoritative accounts, Soviet military production continues to increase;[12] only the rate of increase is no longer increasing. Meanwhile, the announced adoption of a new doctrine of "sufficiency"—which would represent a radical break with past Soviet thought—has yet to be manifest in the character and deployment of Soviet military forces. So it is worth recalling that it was not only the sheer dimensions of Soviet "vertical" aggrandizement that surprised and alarmed the world from the late 1960s onwards, but also its specific operational content.

The vast increase of Soviet elite airborne, air-assault, and commando forces, for example, was alarming for the simple reason that their absorption of quality manpower could only have been justified if those forces could be harnessed to surprise actions in support of full-scale offensives. Elite forces ordinarily have other uses as well, but not on the Soviet scale. Besides, any doubts are resolved by the Soviet army's "operational maneuver group" deep-penetration doctrine, which is specifically developed to exploit *strategic* surprise,[13] and which explicitly relies on airborne, air-assault, and commando precursors.

Concern is also justified by the organization of "Army" and "Front" higher echelons. These are provided with the combat-support and ancillary units required to execute offensive operations on a continental scale, and implied corresponding plans. Interestingly, the announced doctrinal change itself tacitly affirms the offensive orientation of this particular initiative.[14] Finally, in the nuclear sphere, there remains the Soviet emphasis on large-throwweight ballistic missiles, which are less efficient for deterrence strike-back, but more effective for would-be disarming "counterforce" attacks.

It is their specific character that makes Soviet forces destabilizing, and not merely doctrines that may now be repudiated. Neither percentage reductions in the active strength[15] nor even the withdrawal of some forces to the east will alleviate the long-term threat implied by the present configuration of Soviet might. So long as the array of Soviet military capabilities is not made *structurally* less threatening, it would be most imprudent to abandon the ideas, priorities, and institutions that constitute U.S. grand strategy at present.

Nor does the Soviet liberalization so far justify the abandonment of our current stance. The "regime-reformist" changes now underway remain entirely reversible because they have not been accompanied by any institutionalized devolution of political power. In fact, the regime is now more centralized

[12]Not quantitatively in the case of major weapons, but in value, because of the very sharp qualitative enhancement of successor systems: a MiG-29 is three times the aircraft the MiG-23 was (in cost as well); a Typhoon submarine is worth two Deltas, and even a T-80 is at least 150 percent of a T-72.

[13]OMG ground penetrations are only feasible if the NATO frontage is not yet formed, i.e. if NATO forces are still unmobilized or in transit to their deployment sectors.

[14]Not the echelons as such of course, but rather the provision of organic elements for them.

[15]As recently announced. But unlike nuclear-armed missiles which can be destroyed when "withdrawn," army and manned air forces can only be de-activated, thereafter remaining in the reserves. A Soviet reserve division is less immediately threatening than an active division, not less threatening *tout court.*

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than it has been for decades.[16] Enlightened despotism is far better than its more cruel predecessor, but does not ensure a less threatening Soviet Union. If the cruel pattern of Russian history reasserts itself, then Gorbachev the autocrat, embittered by the failure of his own liberalization, is the likeliest successor of Gorbachev the reformer.

The Soviet external policy of today cannot be divorced from its military and political context. Conciliatory declarations, disengagement from costly regional conflicts as well as from Afghanistan, a more forthcoming attitude in arms control negotiations—are all worthy of praise. But so long as there is no institutionalized political devolution within the Soviet state, such measures too remain quickly reversible.

The Scope for Flexibility

FOR ALL THESE reasons, the U.S. and its allies must keep up their present rate of military innovation even in the long term. They must do so in order to ensure that any regression to neo-Stalinism would result in the Soviet Union's progressive military decline. *Such a policy is necessary not only to Western security, but to the prospects of Soviet reformers themselves.* Regardless of current Soviet intentions, the present military balance prohibits, as imprudent and dangerous, any relaxation of military efforts across the board, in the shorter term at least.

Is there any scope, then, for a redirection of U.S. grand strategy? The generic answer, of course, is that there is much more scope for flexibility in U.S. foreign policy, which can and should react to changes in expressed Soviet intentions. Defense policy by contrast must contend with both current Soviet capabilities and the long-term need to keep up military innovation. Even in defense policy, however, there is more scope for flexibility than is usually believed.

So far, then, the answer to the question of whether we need a new grand strategy would appear to be: not yet. But this does not mean that the analysis which any new strategy would require is premature. It would be most harmful to remain fixated on the East-West confrontation should it indeed decline, for as soon as a new stance is feasible it will also be urgently necessary. The possibility that resisting Soviet aggrandizement may cease to be the dominant purpose of U.S. foreign policy thus already warrants earnest consideration.

If a new era does materialize in which Soviet and Soviet-sponsored security threats are much less central than they have been for more than four decades, then the relative position of the United States in the world will decline as its own military power and alliance diplomacy become devalued. To avoid that decline, we must have a grand strategy that can change quickly enough to emphasize new abilities, relevant to new conditions. And the lead time of conversion is bound to be long, beginning with the necessary intellectual preparation—the only task that is not premature.

No particular intellectual preparation is needed to further reduce defense expenditures. They are already modest, and already in decline. But just as the precondition to the Marshall Plan, NATO and all that followed was a purposeful definition of the Soviet challenge and of desirable Western responses, followed by the extensive popularization of both through the public media of the day, now also analysis and its dissemination are the preconditions of action.

To redirect American foreign policy from the upkeep of collective security to the promotion of collective prosperity, with emphasis on U.S. economic rather than security interests; to develop new leadership roles for the United States in such realms as global environmental management and world-wide information linkages; and to preserve both the

[16]Between Stalin and Gorbachev the devolution of power to the Republics was substantial, under Khrushchev's economic policy and the post-Khrushchev toleration of local satrapies. The next stage of state-socialism, it seemed, would have been bureaucratic feudalism.

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long-term vitality of the armed forces and secure their continued innovation, while at the same time reducing their day-to-day cost—all these would require first of all the deconstruction of ideas and priorities authoritative for decades, and of deeply-ingrained bureaucratic proclivities. Only then could the formulation of new ideas, methods and priorities properly begin.

If Soviet aggrandizement does indeed wane, our actual policy implementation will require substantive change in the relevant institutions. This implies an always difficult change of mental habits. Even an adjustment as minor as the elevation of economic specialists within the diplomatic career would entail painful adjustments. And this is but a small step toward the overall reorientation of the foreign-policy establishment, from the present security emphasis to a new emphasis on economic problems and solutions. Expertise in management of alliances acquired over the decades could serve us very well if it were refocused on economic matters, but very ill if it were to become the cause of inertia. The creativity in institution-building exemplified by NATO could be renewed to build new U.S.-led international institutions, or could keep us preoccupied, mistakenly, with yesterday's concerns.

Profound change would also be required within the armed forces. Here reform is already overdue. For various reasons, the upkeep of current day-to-day capabilities ("readiness") is now commonly perceived as a good in itself, rather than as a means to an end. Indeed, the instantaneous ability to carry out military operations is even confused with military power as such. Actually, of course, immediate capabilities are *competitive* with the ability to field larger forces upon mobilization. (The Soviet army is itself as large as it is only because it is so largely unready.)

Within the military profession today, the emphasis on the day-to-day activities of unit command, the sailing of ships, and the flying of aircraft, has come about for different reasons. This partly reflects the natural proclivity of enthusiastic activists (by far the most precious commodity of any military force). It also reflects an unquestioned but nevertheless questionable preference for on-the-job training of manpower within operating units, as opposed to more intense individual training as practiced, for example, in the British forces.

In the meantime, the United States continues to keep a very high proportion of its forces immediately ready for combat, and their "readiness" is purchased day by day at great cost—roughly a third of the entire defense budget. That is tantamount to purchasing cut flowers, at the expense of more enduring items, the furniture of defense, so to speak. Weapon development, production capacities, infrastructures of all kinds, and the education of the all-important professional cadre—all are sacrificed to our emphasis on readiness per se.

The very high operating expenses of the armed forces are now sometimes justified on the grounds of their imputed deterrent effect—though many aspects of "readiness" are arguably less valuable for deterrence *or* defense than larger, somewhat less ready forces would be. In any case, if the Soviet armed forces are indeed both substantially reduced in scale *and* restructured to diminish greatly their offensive potential, the time will have come for us to save on cut flowers in order to buy furniture. That is, we must then be ready to reallocate resources to long-term innovation and to the upkeep of professional cadres and the modernization of weapon-production capacity. This will give us the necessary insurance against future threats, Soviet or otherwise.

Some forces, of course, would have to remain at least as ready as they are now. But total operating and maintenance costs would still be smaller than is currently the case, when Army and Marines strive to keep many more formations instantly ready for action than there is airlift to deploy them, when the Navy operates its task forces around the clock and around the world, and when the Air Force too seeks high readiness in all its active forces, forward-deployed or not. Continuous activity is so costly that a greater reliance on

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reserves (but with larger active cadres in them) would yield a larger mobilization capacity, and also release more funds for innovation.

Should the Soviet threat truly wane and the moment of change in fact arrive, patience and imagination would be needed to preserve talent and enthusiasm in the officer cadre for a new military structure that would offer different satisfactions—more intense individual training, a far greater role in upkeep of reserve units, an even stronger emphasis on professional education, and much more demanding if less frequent full-scale exercises, rather than the continuous, high-tempo but largely routine activities of today.

A word of caution, meanwhile, about the continuation of the status quo. Unless our own defense budgets actually rise, we face not only the starving of innovation and a further erosion in weapon-production capacity, but also, and more immediately, the disruptions and pervasive demoralization of *unplanned* unreadiness. Some of this trouble was already evident in the 1970s, when ships on operational missions would break down because of maintenance too-long deferred, when many aircraft were immobilized by parts shortages, and when the Army was made "hollow" by shortages of critical personnel in units nominally active.

Societal Change?

FINALLY, we might speculate about the broader, less tangible changes that a new era of cohabitation with the Soviets might imply. Such an era might require far broader changes, not merely in governmental structures and activities, but in American society as a whole.

To retain its primacy, the United States would need to increase drastically its ability to generate capital and to enhance the quality of its labor. But policy directives and legislation alone are not enough to overcome fundamental problems of public and private finance. Nor can they solve all the problems of an educational structure which now actually degrades the supply of labor.[17] Profound changes of attitude would also be required—as profound as the post-1941 transformation that led to the broad public acceptance of permanent U.S. activism in world affairs.

Because attitudes will not change without sustained debate as well as strong and consistent leadership, these questions would have to become the subject of purposeful debate. It is the great strength of American society that even the most fundamental attitudes can change in this manner.[18] But no such debates can be imagined unless and until elite and public attention is first focused on the hypothetical circumstances here examined.

Thus, just as any *action* will be premature so long as the Soviet threat remains undiminished, the intellectual preparation for a new grand strategy is already overdue.

During the 1920s—the last "threatless" era—the sharp decline in the importance of military power quite naturally increased the importance of economic power—specifically the ability to export capital, and to offer access to profitable markets. That in turn naturally altered the relative standing of the powers of the day. It greatly diminished the chief victors in the war just ended—Britain and France—while enhancing the primacy of the United

[17]It is doubtful, for example, that the skills needed for a more competitive future could still be obtained by the present striving to reward all comers with high-school diplomas and college degrees. But if a new system of differentiated academic, technological and service-sector education is deemed economically desirable, it would first have to be made socially acceptable (cf. the status of pre-war vocational schooling with that of Swiss hotel-school, or German technical education). That is the precondition of political acceptance in terms of values (equality of opportunity, etc.) themselves beyond debate.

[18]The country that overcame institutional racism in one generation ought to be able to confront the question of saving propensities, to make second-mortgage discretionary consumption as disreputable as overt racism now is.

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States and the position of both the Netherlands and Japan (among other states which had not devoted their best energies to the conduct of war).

The other consequence of the abrupt change from war to economic competition was that attitudes shaped by the former greatly intruded into the latter. There was a direct non-military equivalent of attack and counter-attack in tariff wars; blockade was transmuted into the imposition of quotas if not outright import denials; military pacts were replicated by blocked-account trading; and the camouflage and deceptions of war found an equivalent in undeclared non-tariff barriers. More generally, warlike practices were manifest in a pervasive unilateralism, which stood in sharp contrast to the pre-1914 emphasis on trade treaties and tariff negotiations.

The good news is that many things have changed since the 1920s, and it would be surprising if the bitter experience of those years were to be repeated. In the first place, we now face no abrupt transition from outright war to economic competition, and therefore no backdrop of bellicosity. Second, American institution-building has for decades extended to the international economy, creating norm-setting, mediating, and adjustment agencies, notably the GATT and the IMF. Third, in more than forty years of alliance participation the principal trade partners and potential trade antagonists have learned habits of communication, consultation, and compromise.

It must be recognized, however, that if the East-West confrontation does wane to an important degree, Western strategic cooperation would no longer prohibit the transformation of economic rivalries into political rivalries.

THEREIN lies a particular danger. During the decades of enforced strategic harmony, all concerned have become used to forms of economic brinkmanship that were quite safe under the circumstances, but which may no longer be so in the future. In the looming presence of a dangerous Soviet Union, sundry chicken wars, microchip skirmishes, and monetary-policy disputes were fated to remain in a distinct category of their own, from which overall political relations—i.e. alliance relations—were strictly insulated. Both sides could approach the very edge of the chasm of a retaliatory cycle without falling in, because the imperative of strategic cooperation would always reassert itself before it was too late.

Similarly, some governments have indulged in underhand practices (especially in regard to non-tariff barriers), conscious misrepresentations of intent (for example, on work shares in public projects), and outright deception (on how agreements were being implemented). In so doing, these governments were operating on the correct assumption that even if their misdeeds were exposed, no serious harm would ensue to broader trade relations, let alone overall political relations. Similarly, private-sector groups have felt free to express their opposition to whatever imports they disliked in the harshest terms (as lately in Korea), without fear of broader consequences, and without always evoking (as also in Korea) corrective action by the government.

The danger, obviously, is that all such habits may persist beyond the security imperative that made them safe.

The United States may come to face a momentous choice between a collective-prosperity strategy that would promote further trade liberalization, and a trading-bloc strategy that would "sell" access to the U.S. market by competitive bidding, as it were, mainly between East Asians and Europeans.

Economists will disagree on the strictly economic merits of the two strategies. Some are unmoved by the promised optimalities of free-trade theory when they contemplate the success of European and Japanese trading-bloc strategies. But from a *political* point of view, the obvious advantage of a collective-prosperity grand strategy is its congruence with global cooperation in many functional areas (global environmental protection, telecommunications, etc.), wherein the United States would find new and rewarding lead-

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ership roles. The equally obvious political advantage of a trading-bloc strategy is that it would not demand a drastic and accelerated recapitalization of the U.S. economy which is *the* pre-condition for a collective-prosperity strategy.

The most prosaic of contingencies—revolt in Poland followed by a Soviet invasion with its cruelties and repercussions, preceded or followed by a reversion to Stalinist methods in Moscow—could easily reduce all such thoughts to idle speculation. Moreover, even if an eventual decline in the East-West conflict is considered certain, U.S. *policy* will have to contend with the continuing reality of Soviet strength, not with the hypothesis of its technological-determined decline in the long term. Hence caution must restrain our anticipation of an alternative grand strategy, so as not to erode the security ensured by the grand strategy we already have.

Remembering Khrushchev

FOLLOWING Mikhail Gorbachev's U.N. speech promising to demobilize 500,000 Soviet soldiers, it is worth recalling that 29 years ago, party boss Nikita Khrushchev planned big cuts as well—and apparently paid the price for them. Moreover, Khrushchev's reductions were even more considerable than Gorbachev's—both in the absolute number of soldiers demobilized (1,200,000 as against 500,000) and the proportion of total Soviet strength they made up (one-third, compared with one-tenth).

The 1960 context was more favorable to career military officers, for the 1960 reductions were accompanied by a shift to modern technologies and all-out reliance on nuclear weapons. Missiles of all types—produced on assembly lines "like sausage," as Khrushchev put it—were reaching Soviet arsenals at a brisk pace.

Yet the armed forces—especially the officers—were deeply unhappy with the 1960 cuts. In Sergei Khrushchev's recently published memoir of his father's 1964 downfall, he reports that Nikolai Ignatov, one of those who conspired against the party leader, said that the soldiers, too, "were fed up with [Khrushchev]. The cut-backs in the military stuck in their throats."

Ignatov, notes Sergei Khrushchev, had good relations with Marshal Ivan Konev, a World War II hero and then commander of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, Konev was removed from that post in April, 1960, but then reappeared the next year, right in the middle of the crisis that followed the Soviet decision to build the Berlin Wall. This crisis, though fomented by Khrushchev, buried his plans for military detente.

The conditions are different today, but the Khrushchev precedent is still instructive, especially since Gorbachev has no solid compensation to offer his military. On the contrary, the Soviet nuclear arsenal is already being cut back, and the planned demobilization is to go hand in hand with a radical reorganization affecting all the remaining personnel, so as to give the Soviet military a "defensive posture."

The military is now bearing the brunt of the general secretary's reform policies, with not only the troop reductions but also the many times they have had to maintain order in the face of nationalist tendencies. It is little wonder that they are raising questions—and defending their rights and privileges.

Michael Tatu, *Le Monde*

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Terrorism: the Syrian Connection

Daniel Pipes

Terrorism is ordinary diplomatic language in the Middle East.

—Josette Alia, *Le Nouvel Observateur*

THE BEST introduction to Syrian terrorism is the story of a single incident, the near-successful destruction of an El Al plane in April 1986. Nizar Hindawi's attempt reveals a great deal about the Syrian government's methods; it also says something about its goals.

Nizar Nawwaf al-Mansur al-Hindawi is a Jordanian of Palestinian origins. Born in 1954 in Baqura, a village near the east side of the Jordan River, he worked as a journalist in Amman before arriving in London in 1979. He initially hoped to write for the Arabic press but failed to land a steady position, partly because of a drinking problem. His extreme anti-Hashemite views also got him in trouble with the Jordanian authorities, who refused to renew his passport. Despondent, Hindawi hired himself out in the early 1980s to the Syrian government to make quick money. The Syrian ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Lutfallah Haydar, may have been personally involved in Hindawi's recruitment.

Hindawi began by writing puff pieces on Syria. Then, in late 1985 or so, he went to Syria for two months' military training. He stayed in a camp maintained by Abu Nidal near Dahir, a town of 15,000 east of Damascus. In January 1986, Hindawi went to Damascus where he met Brigadier General Muhammad al-Khuli, the chief of air force intelligence, the head of secret operations, and a man said to have an office just down the hall from Syrian President Hafez el-Assad. He also met Khuli's three assistants: Lieutenant Colonels Haytham Sa'id, Mufid Akhur, and Samir Kukash. A deal was cut: Hindawi would attack an El Al plane and in return the Syrians would help him in his efforts against the Jordanian government. Colonel Sa'id was designated Hindawi's control officer.

At a subsequent meeting on February 9, 1986, Sa'id provided a first payment of $12,000 (the full amount for a successful operation was scheduled to be $250,000) and a Syrian "service" passport (an official passport good for only one trip at a time) made out in the name of 'Isam Sha'r. Hindawi then used this passport, rather than his original Jordanian one, to travel on two occasions to the United Kingdom. The Syrian Foreign Ministry backed each of Hindawi's visa applications to the British government with an official note of endorsement. According to *The Times* of Lon-

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don, the visas were granted in part through the connivance of a Syrian agent in the British embassy in Damascus. Hindawi made a dummy run to London in February, posing as a defense procurement officer wanting to buy spare parts for British Leyland Range Rovers, then returned to Damascus.

Back in Damascus he met again with Sa'id, who showed him how to prepare a suitcase bomb by placing the detonator near the main charge in a false bottom; the explosive would then combust sympathetically. In other words, neither wires nor technical competence was needed. If caught, Sa'id told him, Hindawi should not mention his Syrian connection but portray himself as a drug runner. Violation of this rule would lead to the elimination of a quarter of Hindawi's family the very next day. Lastly, Sa'id gave Hindawi his telephone number, Damascus 336–068.

Before setting out on his London business, Hindawi appears to have proven his abilities by organizing the March 29, 1986 bombing of the Berlin-based German-Arab Friendship Society, an operation carried out primarily by his brother Ahmad. Hindawi arrived in London on his new passport for a second time on April 5, on this occasion posing as a Syrian foreign ministry accountant vacationing in Great Britain. Haytham Sa'id's brother, Ghasim, accompanied him and both posed as members of the Syrian Arab Airlines flight crew.[1] Hindawi stayed his first two nights with the crew at the Royal Garden Hotel, in a room paid for by the airline. On April 6, he took delivery of the detonator and travel bag he was to use.

Sa'id had instructed Hindawi to use a female carrier. This was no problem, for Hindawi had already been involved since late 1984, probably under orders from Syrian intelligence, with Ann-Marie Murphy. Murphy, a tall, slim woman Hindawi's own age, was described aptly by the court prosecutor as a "simple, unsophisticated Irish lass and a Catholic." Newly arrived from Sallynoggin in South Dublin, she was working as a maid in the Hilton Hotel when she met Hindawi. Hindawi made her pregnant twice. The first pregnancy, which occurred early in 1985, ended in miscarriage. He then disappeared between April and September 1985. She became pregnant a second time in November 1985. But before she discovered her condition, Hindawi had left the country again. When Hindawi called from Berlin in January 1986 and learned what had happened, he wanted nothing to do with it. He pressed her, rather, to abort the fetus. This she refused to do. Instead, she began making plans to return to Ireland.

Then, to her surprise, Hindawi turned up on April 7, 1986. Full of enthusiasm, he declared his love for her. The next day, he insisted on their immediately getting married and taking a honeymoon. He made plans for them to travel to "the Holy Land" and then cross to Jordan where, three days later, the ceremony would take place. But Hindawi insisted on traveling separately, saying that his employer had paid for him on a later flight. Murphy accepted all these plans unquestioningly (even that a Jordanian would return home through Israel). Hindawi demanded that she not tell anyone about their plans and got unreasonably angry on learning that she had informed two of her sisters.

He helped her prepare for the trip by paying for her passport, buying her new clothes, and giving her a ticket to fly to Israel on El Al for Thursday, April 17. (The day may have been picked because of its proximity to Passover and the greater likelihood of a full flight.) On the evening of the 16th, he brought her a wheeled suitcase, courtesy of the Syrian embassy. It contained a false bottom containing a half-inch thick sheet with 3.25 pounds of Semtex, a powerful Czech-made plastic explosive. Being almost wire-free, it was virtually undetectable by airport X-rays. According to Scotland Yard, the sophistication of this bomb almost certainly indicates it was put together in Damascus.

As he helped Murphy pack, Hindawi in-

[1]That is to say, Hindawi wore a different identity for each visa application; and a third one on the second entry to Great Britain.

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serted a small device in the suitcase, saying it was a calculator for a friend in Israel. In fact, while this mechanism looked like a calculator on the outside and in an X-ray inspection, it was the trigger for the suitcase bomb. The next morning, in a taxi on the way to the airport, Hindawi took the batteries out of this device and replaced them with a detonator set to go off five hours later, 1:04 p.m., GMT. He dropped Murphy at the terminal, quickly kissed her on both cheeks, and headed back for the Royal Garden Hotel, intending to pose again as a crew member on that afternoon's 2 p.m. flight back to Syria.

It was no accident that Murphy was caught. Hindawi had been under around-the-clock surveillance since March, when the British had intercepted a Syrian embassy request for more assistance for the Hindawi operation. In addition, her ticket had been rebooked, and Murphy had answered in the negative to the question of whether she had packed her bags by herself. Both of these actions trigger automatic scrutiny by El Al.

Had the bombing been successful, Hindawi would have been out of Britain that afternoon. But news of the failed attempt got out in the morning, so his intelligence escort dispatched him to the Syrian embassy. There Ambassador Lutfallah Haydar met him and complimented him on his "good work." After telephoning Damascus, Haydar had Hindawi taken out the back door to a private apartment at 19 Stonor Road in West Kensington. At the apartment, an embassy guard cut and dyed his hair; then Hindawi spent the night there. The next day, as two men were taking him back to the Syrian embassy, he bolted—preferring not to trust his fate to the tender mercies of the regime in Damascus. He fled to the London Visitors Hotel, where he knew the proprietor, who convinced Hindawi to turn himself in.

He gave the police a forthright confession. According to one account, he testified that President Assad had personally ordered the attack on the El Al plane. Hindawi then explained how Syrian Arab Airline crews brought explosives, guns, and drugs into the United Kingdom. To prove his *bona fides*, Hindawi supplied Khuli's telephone number. Hindawi claimed he worked for the Syrians to make money and to win places for Jordanians at Syrian universities. Hindawi subsequently recanted his confession, perhaps remembering Sa'id's threat against his family.

Although Hindawi recanted, the information he gave was subsequently confirmed. Further, his capture implicated his brother and cousin. The police found the Berlin telephone number of his brother, Ahmad Nawwaf al-Mansur al-Hasi, in Hindawi's apartment. A West German court later found Hasi guilty of the March 29, 1986 explosion at the German-Arab Friendship in West Berlin that killed two. He was also implicated in the bombing a week later of La Belle Discotheque in Berlin. Hasi too worked for the Syrians: he admitted to having picked up explosives in the kitchen of the Syrian embassy in East Berlin. Then a letter Hindawi sent from jail to his cousin in Genoa, 'Awni al-Hindawi, asking him to "get the Syrians to take hostages and get him out of prison," was intercepted. 'Awni was arrested for complicity in the Berlin bombing.

It should be noted that the Assad regime was involved at every step of the operation, having trained Hindawi in Syria, provided him with a passport, supported his visa applications, disguised him as a Syrian Arab Airlines crew member, given him explosives and the bag with a false bottom, and helped him after the effort had failed. Hindawi further implicated the government by asking it to capture British hostages on his behalf. Direct participation by Damascus is somewhat unusual, but the Hindawi case typifies the Syrian use of terror in other ways—the use of a non-Syrian national; the brazen exploitation of diplomatic immunity; the use of a high technology explosive; reliance on a local female; and the operative's fear of his handlers.

There are several reasons to believe that Hafez al-Assad oversaw the London operation: in addition to Hindawi's possible testimony to this effect, it seems inconceivable that Assad would let underlings take steps which

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could well have precipitated war with Israel. Muhammad al-Khuli is one of Assad's closest aides. And if the attempted bombing had been a rogue operation, would not Khuli and the others would have paid some price for having botched it? In fact, they seem to have been punished not at all.

Terrorism in the Context of a Foreign Policy

WHY DOES the Syrian government sponsor activities like Hindawi's? How do such operations forward the state's interests? How can Damascus be induced to stop its support of terrorism?

These are complex questions, but the place to start is with a description of the Assad regime and its priorities. Since coming to power in November 1970, Assad's first goal has been to retain power. This is no easy matter, for the regime's top positions are staffed primarily by 'Alawis, members of a small and despised religious minority much resented by the Sunni Muslim majority. Because they benefit disproportionately from Assad's rule, 'Alawis fear what would happen should they lose control to the Sunnis. This fear goes far to explain the bellicose nature of Syrian foreign policy. The effort to eliminate Israel appeals to the displaced Sunnis and gives them something in common with the regime. Damascus's attempts to control the region known as Greater Syria (which includes Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan) are broadly popular. And alignment with the Soviet Union makes it easier to repress the Sunnis whenever they get out of line.

Each of these policies also implies a need for covert warfare. The Israelis are too strong to attack by conventional means, so irregular methods take their place. Greater Syria calls on irredentist efforts against Lebanon and Jordan, as well as against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Soviet connection leads to campaigns of sabotage against Turkey and the West. Given this aggressiveness, terrorism—rather than conventional forms of military violence—becomes a useful instrument of statecraft. It is inexpensive; it permits actions of a sort which a state could not possibly back openly; and it intimidates opponents.

In Assad's hands, terrorism has often influenced the actions of foreign states. In Lebanon, it pushed out Western and Israeli troops in 1982–84, and it helped Damascus gain and keep control over most of the country's territory. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is instrumental in preventing Arab states from adopting more accommodating policies toward Israel; specifically, it blocked King Hussein of Jordan from entering peace negotiations with Israel. In the Persian Gulf it keeps the money coming. It boosts an otherwise frail alliance with Libya and Iran. And it enhances Assad's utility as an ally of the Soviet Union.

Terror also serves more specific goals. On one occasion, in September 1986, Syrian officials offered to do what they could to curb terrorism in France—but only in return for economic aid. The spate of Syrian-backed incidents between April and September had, according to Israeli analyst Moshe Zak, two purposes: to prevent an Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian dialogue and to eliminate Israeli influence over southern Lebanon. Further, he argues, the two are related: "Syrian intelligence seems to believe that the explosions in Paris are a good background for softening France's position on Lebanon, and for making the Elysée Palace exert pressure on Israel" to leave Lebanon.

State-sponsored terror became a significant factor a few years after Assad came to power in November 1970, and the judicious use of terrorism has been a key instrument of state ever since. Accordingly, the Syrian regime relies on this kind of warfare more than any other government. Its activities extend farther and their impact is greater than those of any other state. What is especially striking is that the regime has done all this without attracting the kind of opprobrium that attaches to the PLO, Libya, or Iran.

Syrian use of terrorism under Assad has gone through four distinct periods:

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Early 1970s–1982. Syrian nationals participated in Damascus's operations, most of which were directed either against Israeli and Jewish targets or against Arabs. The latter included such enemies of the Syrian state as Syrian dissidents and pro-Arafat Palestinians; it also included officials of states which Damascus wanted to intimidate (such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait).

1983–85. Two major changes in the *modus operandi* took place in 1983, both connected to the 1982 war in Lebanon. First, the Syrian government became the international fulcrum for terrorism, having taken over this role from the PLO. In all, an estimated 3,500 desperados moved from Beirut to Damascus after late 1983. Second, the Syrian authorities began taking great pains not to use Syrian nationals in their terrorism campaigns; Syrians acted only as supervisors, while non-Syrians did the dirty work.

1986. During a brief period, especially in the spring of 1986, Assad directly involved his own intelligence services. At one point, one of the highest intelligence officials, Colonel Haytham Sa'id, even traveled to Berlin to oversee an operation. Despite an elaborate and cunning network, Syrian involvement was repeatedly discovered—at one point late that year, trials dealing with Syrian-sponsored terror were pending in London, Madrid, Paris, West Berlin, Genoa, Vienna, Istanbul, and Karachi. The regime became internationally notorious and eventually seems to have found the price too high. Bombs in Beirut are one thing; in Paris, quite another. Smarting from the uproar, Assad retreated to the Middle East.

1987 to date. Syrian activity reverted to a mix of the first and second periods. As in the first period, terror is mainly deployed in the Middle East (in Turkey and Lebanon, against Palestinians and Israelis); this keeps Damascus out of the headlines and lowers political costs. As in the second period, the regime relies mainly on proxies. After the ambitious experimentation of 1983–86, this blend seems to offer the Syrians a stable long-term approach to terrorism.

Patrons and Partners

THE USSR has a major, though nonspecific, role in encouraging Syrian terrorism. Soviet bloc support gives Assad the confidence to take risks, knowing that his enemies will think long and hard before taking on the missile batteries around Damascus or provoking Soviet anger. The tie with Moscow also explains such Syrian activities as its efforts to destabilize Turkey.[2] East German and Bulgarian "security advisers" work in some camps, while some of the leaders go to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe to receive specialized instruction; some even know Russian or other East bloc languages.

Regionally, Damascus is affiliated with the Iranian and Libyan governments. The Iranian connection has particular importance in Lebanon. Boeing 747s belonging to the Iranian Air Force fly to Damascus carrying men, arms, and funds for Iran's operations in Lebanon. These are then taken by convoys of trucks, using military roads to avoid custom checks and border searches, to the Biqa' Valley in Lebanon. Radical fundamentalist Muslim groups such as Islamic Jihad, Islamic Amal, and Hizbullah depend on this arrangement for nearly all their supplies. In return for permitting this access and providing help of its own, the Syrian government exercises a large measure of control over Iran's Lebanese allies.

Thus, in early October 1983, about three weeks before the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut were blown up, a special flight is reported to have arrived in Damascus from Tehran with fifty Iranian operatives aboard. They were immediately taken to Baalbek in Syrian-controlled Lebanon and from there found their way to Beirut. Actual planning for the attack involved both Syrian and Iranian agents. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger summed up the alliance by noting that those responsible for the Marine barracks ex-

[2]On this, see Adam Garfinkle, "Turkey Confronts the Syrian-Soviet Threat," *The World & I,* August 1987, pp. 95–101.

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plosion were "basically Iranians with sponsorship and knowledge and authority of the Syrian government."

As for three-way cooperation, it appears that Damascus cooperates with both the Libyan and Iranian governments in backing the Abu Nidal organization. According to a pro-Syrian Palestinian, the three states find it mutually advantageous to help this group because it "provides them with an Arab force that distances them from any public responsibility."[3] According to an Israeli expert on terrorism, "Libya buys, stores, and distributes weapons through its pouch; Syria provides the logistical intelligence and training needed for such an attack; Iran provides the suicide commandos and some funding."[4]

Cooperation can be even more broadly based: some leading terrorists have a mysterious stamp on the sixth page of their passports; it shows an airplane, the date "30 Nov. 1984" and the word "Casa-Nouasseur." According to one report, this gets them in, no questions asked, to many states in the Middle East and North Africa.[5]

While such instances of cooperation do take place, terrorism remains a highly secretive world in which states prefer to go it alone, especially on the operational level. A French counter-espionage official likened the cooperation between terrorist groups to firms making the same product which normally compete but sometimes band together as a trade association.

In general, Assad prefers alliances with small groups that he can dominate, and these play a far larger role in Syrian terrorism than do other states.

Organizations

MOST SYRIAN terrorism since 1983 has been undertaken by members of organizations based in Lebanon that are influenced, if not controlled, by the Syrian government. A December, 1986 Department of State report explains why:

> Available evidence indicates that Syria prefers to support groups whose activities are generally in line with Syrian objectives rather than to select targets or control operations itself. Damascus utilizes these groups to attack or intimidate enemies and opponents and to exert its influence in the region. Yet at the same time, it can disavow knowledge of their operations.

In this way, Assad exerts effective control while he can simultaneously disclaim responsibility.

In addition to plausible deniability, indirect sponsorship makes it possible to add manpower and skills. The proxy groups can call on many more devoted followers than can the military dictators in Damascus. Indirect sponsorship also permits Assad to play an intermediary role. Time and again, he assumes the mantle of statesman, talking to foreign leaders about ways to win the release of their hostages or stop terrorism on their territory, a posture that not only distances Assad from terrorist groups, but protects him from the full wrath of foreigners. No state dares punish him, for no one wants to alienate this key intermediary. Assad thus maintains good relations with many leaders—even those whose citizens suffer his assaults.

Three types of organizations provide Assad with potential recruits:

Palestinian Organizations. After being pushed out of Lebanon in 1982, many factions of the PLO took refuge in Syria, where Assad brought them under the banner of the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF). The PNSF includes As-Sa'iqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (run by George Habash), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (Ahmad Jibril), the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Na'if Hawatma), and Abu Musa's Fatah dissidents. Other groups include the Arab Organization of the 15th of May for the Liberation of Palestine (Naji 'Alush) and Fatah-Revolutionary Command (Abu Nidal). The Syrians wooed Abu Nidal

[3] *Newsweek,* April 7, 1987.

[4] Unnamed specialist, quoted in the *New York Times Magazine,* January 4, 1987.

[5] Pictured in *L'Express,* February 27, 1987, p. 12.

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from his Iraqi patrons at the end of 1979 or early 1980,[6] and since then he has been one of Assad's most active agents, conducting operations in almost every country of West Europe and many in the Middle East. He seems to have moved on to Libya in early 1987.

Arab Organizations. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), founded in 1932, enthusiastically approves of Assad because his goals coincide with its own plans to establish a single Syrian state covering the present territories of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Syrian backing permits the SSNP to control a portion of Lebanese territory to the south of Tripoli. Together with the Ba'th Party of Lebanon and the Lebanese Communist Party it carried out nearly all of the fifteen suicide attacks against Israeli and South Lebanon Army troops that occurred in 1985.

Other groups include the (Druze) Progressive Socialist Party, the (Shi'i) Amal, the (Sunni) Nasirites, the Lebanese Revolutionary Brigades, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Fraction (FARL), Arab Egypt, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, the Eritrean Liberation Front, and Polisario. Iraqi media have portrayed the Islamic Jihad Organization in Lebanon as a "cover for [Syria's] political crimes," and this is at least partially true.

Non-Arab Organizations. Since about 1980, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) has received Syrian help—training bases, logistical support, and an operations center. When the group had to leave Beirut in 1982, it found new quarters in Syrian-controlled Lebanon. French intelligence is reported to believe that Damascus operates ASALA under Soviet supervision as a way of destabilizing Turkey and weakening NATO. The Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) has served as Syria's main instrument against the Turkish government. The PKK, which remains the single most likely suspect in the February 1986 assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, has been called "a state within a state in Western Europe."[7] Mehmet Ali Ağca, the Pope's assailant, testified that he was trained in Syria as a member of the Turkish Gray Wolves.

For operations in West Europe, Syrian agents have worked with the Red Army Faction of West Germany, Action Direct of France, the Red Brigades of Italy, the Basque ETA and the Fighting Communist Cells of Belgium. Further afield, help also goes to Zulfikar of Pakistan, the Pattani United Liberation Organization of Thailand, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka. The Japanese Red Army spokesman lives in Damascus.

Should a convicted terrorist be let out of prison, chances are good he will head for Syrian controlled territory. Within less than a month of his May 1985 release, Kozo Okamoto of the Japanese Red Army turned up in the Biqa' Valley. On his release, Bruno Breguet, an associate of "Carlos," flew straight to Damascus, where he was met on arrival by Syrian authorities and whisked away. In April 1986, Frédéric Oriach of Action Direct (and said to be the "inventor" of FARL) also went straight for Syria.[8] "When all of these people are in town at the same time," writes G. Jefferson Price in the *Baltimore Sun*, "the lobby of the [Sheraton] hotel they favor acquires the atmosphere of a gangland meeting."

WHAT IS IN IT for these organizations? Why do they do Damascus's dirty work? The principal reason is that the Syrian state (like any other) can provide assistance to helpful groups. Benefits include international access, money, high technology, and suicide bombers.

Diplomatic immunity permits the virtually unhindered transport of weapons, explosives, special tools, and money across international boundaries. Embassies double as safe houses and, in time of crisis, serve as

[6] Yossi Melman, *The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu-Nidal* (New York: Adama Books, 1986), p. 125.

[7] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 August 1988.

[8] Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, *Guerres secrètes au Liban* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p. 327; *Le Nouvel Observateur*, September 19, 1986; *L'Evénement du Jeudi*, September 18–24, 1986.

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inviolable sanctuaries. Unlike revolutionary groups, states have virtually inexhaustible amounts of money to spend on terrorism. From a state's perspective, terrorism is a very inexpensive way of waging war. Payments to operatives appear to be good but not lavish.

States have access to expensive, fragile, and restricted equipment that private groups could not hope to acquire. Syrian agents have been caught with such highly explosive substances as Czech-made Semtex H, penthrite, and trityl.[9] They also dispose of submachine guns, propellants, and a variety of remote-control devices. A workshop is said to exist in Damascus which specializes in the production of rigged Samsonite suitcases (which are then exchanged for those of unsuspecting passengers). States forge the passports of other states with special skill. Georges Ibrahim 'Abdallah of FARL carried no fewer than five passports (two Moroccan, an Algerian, a Maltese, and a South Yemeni).

States can provide organizations with operatives prepared for suicide. Suicide bombers have two great advantages: they tend to cause the most damage and they usually do not survive to be captured (and reveal what they know). But there are few fanatics who volunteer to give up their own lives, and this is where the state has a role. The connection between state authority and suicide may not be obvious, but it can be very direct. Governments can use their powers of coercion to pick someone and offer him a choice: "Either you die a protracted, painful, and certain death in jail, your family is harassed or killed, and your name is dragged through the mud. Or you undertake this operation, in which case you have a chance of surviving. And if you die, you go quickly, your family is rewarded, and we make you a national hero." Under such circumstances, suicide attack is a rational and prudent choice.[10]

Operations

IN SYRIA PROPER, there are about twenty-five training camps for irregular warfare, five of them near Damascus. The Yarmuk camp is apparently the one most specifically dedicated to honing terrorist skills. Other bases, including Abu Nidal's base at Hammara, operate openly in the Biqa' Valley of Lebanon, an area under complete Syrian control. The training camps are supervised by the Syrian army and family members live in Palestinian camps in Damascus. A former member of Abu Nidal's group testified that the standard course of training in Iraq (which presumably resembles what is found in Syria) lasts six months. A typical day consists of a ten kilometer run, four hours of physical workout and practice on such weapons as the Kalashnikov and the W. Z. 63 machine gun, followed by classes of indoctrination. In advanced training, "we learned how to kill people with a variety of methods, how to enter buildings quietly, stalk people through the streets and then escape."[11]

The Syrian government usually arranges for passage from Lebanon or Syria to the site of the operation. It supplies a false passport (or two). In some cases, a Syrian intelligence *(mukhabarat)* official escorts the operative. Travel tends not to be direct: agents going to Rome, say, will go via Yugoslavia or Greece.

To gain maximum flexibility, Syrian authorities rely heavily on "sleepers," agents put in place far in advance of an operation. Sleepers commonly enroll in language school or university, an easy way to gain legal status in a foreign country, then gather information on targets and travel freely across borders. They exploit the large transient populations and easy political asylum laws of places like West Berlin. Sleepers sometimes set up two residences, one for normal life and the other as a safe house, the latter often near an airport. Lodgings sometimes multiply; police counted

[9]On one occasion, a Middle East smuggler of a plastic explosive tried to prove to the police that it was an oriental cake by eating some of it! (*Le Monde*, September 10, 1986).

[10]This summarizes the argument in my article, "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism," *The National Interest*, No. 4 (Summer 1986).

[11]Nidal Muhammad, quoted in *Newsweek*, April 7, 1986.

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five apartments belonging to FARL in three West European countries. Numbered bank accounts in Switzerland are *de rigueur.* Presumably, the three SSNP members caught smuggling explosives from Canada into the United States in October 1987 were equipping a sleeper; and the same applies to Yu Kikumura, the Japanese Red Army member caught with three powerful bombs on the New Jersey Turnpike in April 1988.

The Syrians take great care to insure that they do not leave fingerprints. In some cases, they call on agents the very day of an operation or rely on "cutouts," individuals who take on a single task without knowing anything further about the operation. They also prefer to rely on the members of a single family, figuring that these are impenetrable by the police. Notable families in Syrian service include the 'Abdallahs of Lebanon and the Hindawi-Hasi clan of Jordan.

President Assad keeps personal tabs on terror operatives through his close associates. The camps and operations are under the supervision of Brigadier General Muhammad al-Khuli. On one occasion, an agent received instructions from Khuli that were signed by him personally. Control is further maintained by having operatives call the key figures in Damascus at critical moments, even from foreign countries.

The Syrian government relies on suicide squads for some of its most challenging operations. Assad delivered a remarkable speech in May 1985, telling a student audience:

> I have believed in the greatness of martyrdom and the importance of self-sacrifice since my youth. My feeling and conviction was that the heavy burden on our people and nation . . . could be removed and uprooted only through self-sacrifice and martyrdom . . . . Such attacks can inflict heavy losses on the enemy. They guarantee results, in terms of scoring a direct hit, spreading terror among enemy ranks, raising people's morale, and enhancing citizens' awareness of the importance of the spirit of martyrdom. Thus, waves of popular martyrdom will follow successively and the enemy will not be able to endure them . . . . I hope that my life will end only with martyrdom . . . . My conviction in martyrdom is neither incidental nor temporary. The years have entrenched this conviction.[12]

Assad almost never brags; one may be sure that an announcement like this has an operational angle to it. Indeed, it appears that, beginning in March 1985, Assad and Khuli oversaw the training of specially picked suicide squads. Air pilots among the soldiers were trained in Lebanon and at the Minakh air base near the Turkish border.

Some details about the Syrian-sponsored suicides became known in August 1987 when an Egyptian, 'Ali 'Abd ar-Rahman Wahhaba, gave himself up to the South Lebanon Army, an Israeli-backed force. Wahhaba told the following story: He went to Lebanon in the early 1980s looking for work; there he was seized and, under repeated torture, compelled in 1984 to join a *mukhabarat*-backed group, Arab Egypt. In 1986 he underwent a two-week training course in weapons and explosives at a camp run by the chief sergeant major of Syrian intelligence in the Biqa' Valley. In January 1987 Wahhaba "was taken to Syrian television studios in Damascus, where he was given a prepared script. He was filmed saying he is going to commit suicide of his own free will in an attack against the Zionist enemy." 'Abdallah Ahmar, second in command in the Syrian Ba'th party, oversaw the filming; later, General Ghazi Kan'an, the head of the *mukhabarat* in Lebanon, personally sent him off on a mission and blessed his undertaking. In the end, Wahhaba did not explode the eleven kilograms of TNT hidden in his jacket, but gave himself up to the South Lebanon Army.[13]

Inexpensive as it is, training camps, special weapons, sleepers, and intelligence agents do drain the depleted resources of the Syrian government, so special financing is needed. The Syrians engage in various forms of creative funding: arms-peddling, drug-running, car-stealing, "protecting" merchants, and ex-

[12]Radio Damascus, May 4, 1985.

[13]Radio Jerusalem, September 4, 1987.

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torting from the Arab oil-states. Some countries even use student funds for this purpose; between 1976 and 1978, Iraqi scholarships money to Palestinian students in Europe went through Abu Nidal, and he used his position to win such services from them as buying an apartment, renting a car, moving a suitcase, or sheltering a stranger.[14]

Victims

THE RECORD SHOWS that while the Syrian regime will exploit any locale, their targets remain almost always the same—Jordanians, Lebanese, Palestinians on the one hand, Israelis, Jews, Americans, and Britons on the other. (See the tables for a statistical summary of the 1983–86 period.) Jordanians have suffered far more from Syrian aggression than any other people. Jordan was also the site of the greatest number of incidents, followed closely by Greece and Italy. But Greeks and Italians were never the intended victims. On the other hand, while only three incidents took place in Israel, Israelis and Jews suffered from nine attacks.

The Syrian regime pursued many of its opponents abroad. Muhammad 'Umran, a prominent Syrian politician during the 1960s, lived in Tripoli, Lebanon, after 1967; he was assassinated on March 4, 1972. Evidence at the scene indicated Syrian government complicity. Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, one of the founders

Table I
Identity of Intended Victims 1983–86

18	Jordanians
9	Israelis & Jews
8	Americans
7	*Arafat's* PLO
6	Britons
1	Kuwaitis
Summary	
26	Arab
23	Western & Israeli

Table II
Locations of Syrian Terror 1983–86

11	Jordan
8	Greece
7	Italy
4	Turkey
	Cyprus
3	Spain
	Israel
1	West Germany
	United Kingdom
	Austria
	Netherlands
	Portugal
	Romania
	Kuwait
	U.A.E.
	India
Summary	
23	Western Europe
13	Arab Middle East
11	Non-Arab Middle East
1	Eastern Europe
1	India
24	Europe
24	Middle East
1	Elsewhere

Source: "Syrian Support for International Terrorism: 1983–86," *Department of State Bulletin,* February 1987, pp. 75–76. Being a U.S. government report, this document errs on the conservative side. For example, it ascribes none of the PKK activities to Syrian sponsorship.

of the ruling Ba'th Party, founded a journal in Paris, *Al-Ihya' al-'Arabi,* in which he denounced the misdeeds of the Assad regime. In July 1980, after calling on Syrians to overthrow Assad, Bitar was killed in a Parisian garage. Although the French government made no formal charges, Syrian opposition groups attributed the crime to the military

[14] *Le Nouvel Observateur,* November 7, 1986.

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attaché of the Syrian embassy in Paris, Colonel Nadim 'Umran, an 'Alawi.

Four days after Bitar's death, Assad announced that "all those who oppose the regime will be annihilated .... We will pursue them everywhere."[15] In keeping with this threat, Syrian assassins attacked a leader of the Muslim Brethren, 'Isam 'Attar, in March 1981 in his house in Aachen, West Germany. He was not at home and so survived, but his wife was killed. Other dissidents were killed by hit squads in West Germany, France, Yugoslavia, and Spain.

Arafat's wing of the PLO has been attacked on a number of occasions. Either Abu Nidal or the PNSF assassinated a number of Arafat's men in Europe, including Na'im Khadir in Brussels, Majid Abu Sharar in Rome, and 'Isam Sartawi in Lisbon. A Palestinian with close ties to Arafat who edited an anti-Syrian weekly in Athens was shot three times from a yard away as he left his apartment building in September 1985. Two Palestinian groups based in Damascus claimed responsibility for the March 1986 assassination of Zafir al-Masri, the newly-appointed mayor of Nablus; in the West Bank itself, however, many residents accused Syrian operatives of the crime.

Lebanese leaders who resist Assad's wishes also find themselves targeted. Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze and leftist chief in Lebanon, was killed in March 1977 to silence his outspoken criticism of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. Fearful that Bashir Gemayel would draw the Lebanese government closer to Israel, Damascus had the SSNP kill him in September 1982. In February 1988 security men found half a kilo of sophisticated explosives on a plane used by Bashir's brother Amin Gemayel, the president of Lebanon. Immediately after the discovery, Syrian intelligence officers at the Beirut airport moved in, seized the explosive, and refused to let it go.

Lebanese journalists have also suffered Syrian violence. Salim al-Lawzi, publisher of the important Lebanese magazine *Al-Hawadith*, had acquired embarrassing information about internal conditions in Syria; in response, Syrian agents tortured and killed him in February 1980. A few months later, Riyad Taha, president of the Lebanese Publishers Association, was gunned down from a car.

Nowhere, however, is the impact of Syrian terrorism so great as it is upon the Jordanian government. The entire Syrian-Jordanian relationship is dominated by the threat of covert violence from Syria. One round of attacks began in late 1983: the Jordanian ambassador in India was shot on October 25; the next day the ambassador to Italy was wounded; in Greece a security agent was killed in November; and in Spain on December 29, one embassy employee was killed and another wounded by submachine fire. Abu Nidal's group—then based in the Rukn ad-Din quarter of Damascus—was implicated in all of these crimes.

The attacks then abated, only to begin again when King Hussein and Yasir Arafat agreed on February 11, 1985 to work together, a pact strongly opposed by the Syrian and Soviet governments. Eleven days later, a four-month sequence of terrorism began. It included a bomb at the American Research Center in Amman; an explosion in an airliner of the Jordanian carrier, Alia; a hand grenade attack on Alia offices in Athens; a rocket attack on the Jordanian embassy in Rome; a rocket attack on an Alia plane in Athens; an Alia plane hijacked in Beirut and blown up; a bomb attack on Alia offices in Madrid; and the assassination in Turkey of a Jordanian diplomat who also happened to be the brother-in-law of the Jordanian commander-in-chief.

This campaign put Amman under siege. To end the assault, King Hussein in November 1985 wrote an astonishing letter to his prime minister. In it, he admitted that the Muslim Brethren who had been attacking the Assad regime had long been based in Jordan—something he had hitherto not realized! "I was deceived .... Suddenly the truth was revealed

[15]Quoted in Charles Saint-Prot, *Les Mystères syriens: La Politique au Proche-Orient de 1970 à 1984* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), p. 14.

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and we discerned what we had been ignorant of. We came to know that some of those who had something to do with what had taken place in Syria in terms of bloody acts were among us [in Jordan]."[16] The camps were closed forthwith, Assad was appeased, a Syrian-Jordanian reunion came to pass, and Syrian terror against Jordan stopped. In February 1986, Hussein abrogated his accord with the PLO. The Jordanian example suggests one way for a target to shake the Syrian menace—surrender.

Of course, the Syrian regime targets Israelis and Westerners too. The French ambassador to Lebanon, Louis Delamare, was killed on September 4, 1981, less than a week after arranging a meeting between Yasir Arafat and the French foreign minister, Claude Cheysson. Although the French government—ever solicitous of Assad's feelings—did not directly charge Damascus with responsibility, it did leak information to Michel Honorin, a reporter for the TF1 television network. With this evidence, Honorin conclusively established Syrian complicity in a television program which aired on April 21, 1982. The very next morning, bombs went off at the offices of *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, an Iraqi-backed weekly based in Paris. (It had also published embarrassing information on the February 1982 massacre at Hama.) By noon, the French government decided to expel the Syrian cultural and military attachés, Michel Kasuha and 'Ali Hasan (an 'Alawi).

Syrian operatives have repeatedly assaulted Americans in Lebanon. The U.S. ambassador, Francis E. Meloy Jr., was killed in June 1976 by Palestinians working for Syria. A Syrian intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Diyab, met with agents one or two days in advance to plan the October 23, 1983 destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Among those in attendance were several members of Syrian-run Palestinian organizations, including Ahmad Hallaq and Billal Hasan from As-Sa'iqa and Ahmad Qudura from Abu Musa's group.

After filing stories about unrest in Syria, Reuters correspondent Berndt Debusmann was shot in the back by a gunman firing a silencer-equipped pistol. BBC correspondent Tim Llewellyn was threatened by Syrian agents and fled Beirut before being harmed, as did CBS correspondent Larry Pintak. Even scholars have been targetted. One of the French hostages in Lebanon, Michel Seurat (pen name: Gérard Michaud), had written a major study on decision-making in Syria which emphasized the role of 'Alawis and the opposition of the Muslim Brethren. According to the Paris-based magazine, *At-Tali'a al-'Arabiya*, Assad took offense at this analysis and had Seurat executed in March 1986.

Dealing with Damascus

THERE ARE FOUR major sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East: the PLO, Libya, Iran, and Syria.[17] While the first two attract most attention, they in fact have a record of ineffectiveness. Despite nearly two decades of intensive terrorism, neither the PLO nor Libya has attained any of its goals. Iran and Syria have been engaged for shorter periods, but they have had much greater effect, for their rulers use terror not as a way to kill indiscriminately but as a means toward a specific end. Assad does not boast or indulge in media spectaculars, and he always attends carefully to timing. He acts with secrecy and pays close attention to his public reputation, not wanting to be seen as a sponsor of terrorism. Assad's hallmark is the closely calculated, low key, and far-sighted use of terror. There is an inverse proportion between extremism and efficacy: Qaddafi is the most extreme and least successful, and Assad the least extreme and most successful.

Nonetheless, the Syrians manage to avoid the consequences of their actions. This is due to several factors. First, efforts to leave no "return address" have worked, for although

[16]Amman Television, November 10, 1985.

[17]The comparison of these four sponsors is more fully elaborated in my forthcoming article in *Terrorism*, "Why Asad's Terror Succeeds and Qadhdhafi's Does Not."

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everyone knows that the Syrians are deeply complicit in terrorism, time and time again governments shy away from directly blaming Damascus. Thus, in May 1986, at the height of Syrian activities, the White House spokesman called it "premature" to judge Syrian complicity in terrorism, saying the evidence was not "conclusive." Even though the Italian minister of the interior acknowledged having documents "proving that Syria is not innocent," an Italian magistrate ignored highly incriminating circumstantial evidence of an official Syrian role in the December 1985 Rome airport massacre; his reluctance to issue a warrant was explained on the basis of insufficient evidence to make a case in court. Off-the-record, French officials in 1986 called Syrian responsibility "virtually a certainty," but they did not say so in public.

Second, the Syrians have been singularly successful at getting the credit for uncovering and returning hostages that their own proxies and allies captured in the first place. Gérard Michaud explained how this is done: "The victim disappears without the authors of the kidnapping claiming responsibility for their act or identifying themselves; then the victim reappears one happy hour—like a white rabbit produced from the hat of the Syrian information service."[18] Western officials often travel to Damascus to seek Assad's aid in reducing terrorism. In one case, Spanish authorities passed on to the Syrians copies of the "false but genuine" Syrian passports belonging to the two culprits in an attack at Madrid airport! In another instance, David Dodge, former acting president of the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped in Lebanon but spent part of his captivity in Iran. To get from one state to the other he had to be taken through Syria—which could only be done with Damascus' permission. After his release by the Syrian authorities, the White House expressed "gratitude" to Hafez al-Assad and his brother Rif'at for their "humanitarian" efforts.

Third, cries of indignation swell up in Damascus whenever foreign governments (including the West German, Italian, British, and American) point to Damascus as a major sponsor of terrorism. With one voice, President Assad and his aides reply that they are the victims, not the perpetrators of terror. They even claim that they bear no more responsibility for terror than do the Italian authorities for the Red Brigades. The brother of the president has dismissed terrorism as "cowardly, disgusting, and revolting." The Information Minister has declared that "We do not maintain any relations with groups such as that of Abu Nidal." Syrian radio echoed: "Syria is among the countries that has condemned, denounced, and resisted terrorism."

Fourth, little Syrian-sponsored terror, unlike that of Libya or the PLO, is directed against U.S. nationals. Rather than randomly attack Americans, Assad pursues the more comprehensive goal of sabotaging U.S. policy in the Middle East. This makes him more of a menace but emotionally less of a target. Finally, the Syrian government is a tough, strong ally of the Soviet Union. Even the Israelis think twice before tangling with Damascus.

State-sponsored terrorism is the dominant form of terrorism today. The U.S. Department of State reports that "almost half the terrorist casualties suffered in 1983 were linked in a broad sense to state involvement in terrorism." According to a press report, the Quai d'Orsay concluded that every case of Middle East terrorism in West Europe has been "propped up" by Damascus, Tripoli, or Tehran.

The involvement of Syria and other states means that the old argument about injustice and political frustration lying at the source of the violence is now completely untenable. "In other words," Thomas L. Friedman observes, "the root causes of a significant portion of today's terrorism seem to lie not in any particular grievance that can be treated, but in

[18]Gérard Michaud [Michel Seurat], "Terrorisme d'Etat, terrorisme contre l'Etat: Le cas syrien," *Esprit*, October-November 1984, p. 195. On Seurat, see above.

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the intrigues, power struggles, jealousies and machinations that are part of the web of international relations."[19]

Moreover, the phenomenon will not go away with a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for much of Syrian-backed terrorism has nothing to do with this conflict. Indeed, terrorism connected to Israel is intended not to further a peaceful settlement but to block one. As soon as the Arab-Israeli peace process makes progress, Damascus goes into action. Assad is not protesting the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel but attempting to block negotiations altogether. "Sadly," as Barry Rubin notes, "the more the United States pushes for peace, the more terrorism will increase."[20]

State-sponsored terrorism is a form of warfare. Accordingly, efforts to reduce its incidence must lead its victims to go beyond police measures and begin to take more comprehensive political and military steps.

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[19] *The New York Times*, April 28, 1986.

[20] *The New Republic*, June 2, 1986.

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After 1992: Multiple Choice

Anthony Hartley

NINETEEN NINETY-TWO is to be the *annus mirabilis* of the European Community. So, at least, numberless speeches, press conferences and 'background' notes from Brussels would have us believe. For this is the year when the mass of European legislation directed to the 'completion' of the Common Market will come into force. This program of some three hundred regulations and directives—which owes much to the intellectual gifts of Lord Cockfield, the British Commissioner who had charge of its formulation—represents the most sustained attempt towards the further economic integration of Europe that has ever been made. The intention is to reap the benefits of scale afforded by a market of over 320 million people and turn Western Europe into a single giant industrial power.

As time goes on, the year 1992 is being considered with some apprehension in cities as far apart as Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Kuala Lumpur. Questions are being asked—whether the enterprise is likely to succeed, what policies can be expected from it, and whether it marks the onset of a political Europe. If so, what role will a new, dynamic Community play in the transformed world order which now seems to be approaching—one version of which was presented recently by Mikhail Gorbachev in his December speech at the United Nations?

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All these questions relate to what is now the probability of major changes in Europe and a sense that the postwar structure of international politics is coming to an end. The 1992 program and its desired end of strengthening and consolidating the European Economic Community (EEC) only forms one part—and that not the most important—of the problems of Europe's future in the 1990s and beyond. It is in this wider context that the development of the Community must be considered. Indeed, it is this context which will dictate the conditions of its success or failure. The microcosm of the Community needs to be viewed alongside the macrocosm of its political environment, and it will be simpler and clearer to start with its present state and then to discuss its relationship to the world around it.

The first fact to note is that there is no doubt about the enactment of the 1992 program. Most of the legislation is on the table, and, though there may be some fraying at the edges, there is no reason to think that most of it will not be completed by the date fixed.[1]

[1]The exceptions are: (1) the harmonization of indirect taxation, and (2) the abolition of frontier controls—both of them subject to objections by Margaret Thatcher who does not wish to surrender national control over taxation and wishes to keep frontier controls as a means of combatting terrorism. The latter dispute gives rise to particularly significant misunderstandings between Britain and its partners. As was shown by the recent Ryan case, when the Bel-

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But it is also important to remember that these are economic measures that do not go beyond the Treaty of Rome. It was always intended that there should be effective free trade within the EEC. That this has not been the case hitherto is simply due to the evasions of national governments and the inability of the European Commission to produce a comprehensive policy to strike down the various barriers to trade. This latter defect was remedied by Lord Cockfield. In his White Paper of June 1985, non-tariff barriers—from health and environmental regulations to differing technical standards—were identified, and the service sectors, financial services, and insurance brought into the Common Market for the first time. None of this, however, went further than the original Treaty, nor is it certain that, once the program is in operation, new ways of evading its intentions will not be discovered by protectionist-minded governments. Certainly there is nothing here to suggest that 'European Union' is round the corner.

Competing Visions

THE METHOD USED to vote the 1992 program through the Community machinery, however, was a novelty, while being at the same time a reversion to the original intention of the Treaty. An amendment to the Treaty—the so-called "Single European Act" (SEA)—was passed by national parliaments. This provided that, if general agreement were reached on a program of legislation (e.g. the 1992 program), then its details could be enacted by qualified majority voting.[2] The innovation was seized upon by committed European federalists as supporting their view of the future evolution of the Community. When the president of the commission, Jacques Delors, in a speech to the European Parliament, gave his own triumphalist interpretation of 1992 as a decisive transfer of power to Brussels, he received a sharp rejoinder from Mrs. Thatcher, which, by all accounts, upset him considerably. In a speech at the European sanctum of the College of Bruges she repeated what she had said before: that "active cooperation between independent sovereign states" was "the best way to build a successful European Community"—a definition harking back to De Gaulle's "Europe of the States." This is an accurate description of the present European reality, despite its deviation from the orthodoxy of Jean Monnet and his disciples. These exchanges began a rather inconclusive debate on the future of the European Community, which can be expected to continue, but whose theoretical points seem divorced from a Europe more concerned with Nissan cars than with political philosophy.

Who is likely to be right about the future of Europe, Mrs. Thatcher or M. Delors? It is always difficult to observe accurately and dispassionately a process in which one is taking part, and, for that reason, discussion has tended to center more on the *aims* of the European Community—its aspiration to "ever-closer unity"—than on its *present nature*. Yet the Community and its institutions have not followed a line of logical development on which prediction of their future could be based. Like a potato or dahlia tuber the growth has been lumpy and unexpected, with little in it of the rational unfolding of a flower. The result has been a set of institutions which in no way corresponds to those envisaged by the Treaty of Rome and which contains elements based on contradictory assumptions about the Com-

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gian government refused to extradite a member of the IRA at the request of the British, terrorism arouses emotions in Britain which are not reciprocated in other EEC countries except Spain and Germany (which have ETA and Baader-Meinhof). The anger in Britain over the behavior of Belgium was very great. At the Rhodes summit a British official, asked what Mrs. Thatcher was going to say to M. Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister, replied: "She's going to tell him that he's a shit!"

[2]That is, by a two-thirds majority with individual states being allotted a number of votes proportionate to their size.

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munity's future. Since 1970 there have been three constitutional innovations: the bi-yearly meeting of Heads of State and Government, called the European Council, direct elections to the European Parliament, and the SEA. Of these the first is an institutionalization of the Europe of the States, the second a step towards federalism, and the third contains a mixture of both trends.[3]

It is not very easy to see how the government of a united Europe could emerge from such confusion of purpose or from what roots it would spring. No more than Mrs. Thatcher are most heads of government ready to see themselves legislated out of existence. Their utterances on European unity often smack of pious unreality, if not hypocrisy. Monnet's original theory of European integration stressed the unification of economic functions which, it was thought, would be followed by a political 'great leap forward' when the process had gone far enough. This quasi-Marxist view of history has not been realized, and the great political breakthrough is still awaited. Another way of putting it would be to say that the economic infrastructure has not dominated the political suprastructure. In fact, recalling De Gaulle and the changes he wrought in Community practice, the reverse seems to have been the case.[4] This seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The progress of European integration has usually been the result of reaction to a threat, but it would require a considerable upheaval to transform the present institutional fragments into a "European Union." The European Community is more likely to continue as a permanent arrangement between states than to emerge as a new state in its own right. Nor, as will be seen, are international conditions propitious for any such emergence.

The Appeals of Protectionism

YET THE IDEOLOGY of the 'founders of Europe' still continues to influence the direction of Community policies—particularly in two areas which affect Europe's international relations: Agriculture and External Trade. If the Commission is so attached to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which increasingly appears to be a burden on European industry and a liability in international trade negotiations, it is not only for the *beaux yeux* of European farmers. This is a policy which the Commission manages entirely and which is, therefore, the brightest jewel in its crown, having a symbolic value over and above what it actually achieves. Similarly, a protectionist trade policy is felt by many convinced Europeans to have an identifying and integrating effect on the Community. Were the barriers really down, then, in one of its most important fields of action, the Community might begin to merge into the surrounding world. But Europe, it is thought, should be in the business of acquiring an identity, not losing one, and there is nothing like a scrap at Geneva with American or Japanese negotiators to stiffen wavering ranks. Without protection, it can be argued, Europe would be subject to the full effect of market forces which might distort or preempt attempts to create strong high-technology industries or limit the extent to which existing enterprises could be sheltered from American or Japanese 'takeovers.'

Moreover, there are still some who would like to see a *dirigiste* Europe—socialist politicians or trade unionists, but also European officials who not only (quite understandably) wish to enlarge their own spheres of competence, but also consider that European integration would be served by *dirigiste* economic policies centered on Brussels. *Dirigisme* has usually gone hand in hand with protectionism. In December the European Council came

[3]The SEA slightly increased the powers of the European Parliament, but also provided the European Council with a political secretariat—a potential diminution of the Commission's powers.

[4]In 1966 France forced on the Community the adoption of the "Luxembourg Compromise"—an agreement that any state would have a right of veto in matters where its "vital interests" were concerned.

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out in favor of an 'open' Europe, but there are still states and individuals who believe that the cause would be better served by a more closed system—if not "Fortress Europe" then a Europe with some entrenchments, a Europe considered as a larger example of the traditional continental state, governed through a centralizing bureaucracy and endowed with the normal apparatus of state power, including that of raising tariffs.

On free trade, divisions within the Community run on national lines. France and Italy are instinctively protectionist; Britain and the Netherlands are free traders; Germany espouses free trade in manufactures, but protects its own market by cartels and environmental legislation which acts as a non-tariff barrier. In the present ('Uruguay') round of negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the pressures towards protectionism are becoming visible in the EEC, the United States, and Japan. The breakdown of the GATT meeting in Montreal in December 1988, owing to the EEC's refusal to meet an American demand for the abolition of agricultural subsidies by the year 2000, leaves a very serious problem unsolved and could produce a deterioration in commercial relations between the trading blocs involved. Nineteen ninety-two will have the effect of opening up other areas of disagreement between Europe and its trading partners. Already the Commission's use of the word 'reciprocity' has caused alarm.[5]

Such possibilities have produced reactions from other governments. Mikhail Gorbachev is said to wish to discuss the consequences of 1992 with Mrs. Thatcher; in New Delhi there have been words of warning from Mr. Rajiv Gandhi; in Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, once a ferocious critic of Britain, now seeks British support for an 'open' Community. Japan and the United States are better able to defend themselves, but are equally concerned.

There is little need to emphasize just how disastrous a retreat from free trade, brought about by conflicts between economic blocs, would be. The present relatively ordered world economic system was founded, and has been kept going, under the auspices of free trade. The United States took the lead in creating this system and, much to its credit, has continued to support freedom of trade even under the burden of its present balance of payments deficit. Despite pressures from Congress, employers and unions, successive administrations have not succumbed to the delights and poisons of protectionism. But the clash between Brussels and Washington which seems imminent could tilt a balance which, one suspects, is becoming more and more delicate. No doubt, the Democratic majority in Congress would be only too glad to urge President Bush to take a hard line with Europe and Japan. Equally, any yielding to pressure for a new, draconian trade act would swing the EEC and Japan towards retaliation. In this context, the current dispute between the EEC and Washington over hormones in meat, though trivial in itself, assumes importance as a possible sign of things to come.

In the coming years it will be important to avoid occasions of offense—important too to settle the present growing crisis over agriculture, if we wish to preserve the world trading system intact. The blocs are forming in Europe, North America and East Asia, and it may well be that North America has less to fear from a trade war than the other points of the triangle. Were the present sensitive, but relatively tolerant, relationships to develop into aggressive competition, it would have repercussions far beyond the sphere of world trade and call in question political, as well as economic, ties.

[5]Without going into detail, one example can be given of the kind of problem that may arise. If the Community agrees on common rules to govern banking, will the United States and Japan be asked to change their own banking laws so as to give EEC banks 'reciprocal' opportunities in their domestic markets? Negotiations on matters like this would be laborious and painful.

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The Gorbachev Factor

FROM THE EUROPEAN point of view the moment would be singularly ill-chosen for such an upheaval. For we come now to the wider political environment in which the European Community will have to develop in the years to come. That environment is changing rapidly, and its future shape may restrict, and will, in any case, condition the realization of European aspirations. A new mobility in East-West relations is likely to interfere with a process of European integration originally stimulated by a political threat from the East.

European statesmen are going to need all their energies to come to terms with the new world of international politics, sketched in outline by Mr. Gorbachev in his UN speech. The Soviet leader has combined daring domestic reform with an adventurously intelligent foreign policy. The resulting collapse of existing assumptions has left European statesmen bewildered and in need of time and thought to recover themselves.

They have before them many unanswered, and probably unanswerable, questions, much material for speculation, but few unambiguous facts. It does seem clear that the Soviet Union is going through a crisis of change, brought about by the impossibility of continuing any longer in the same sclerotic style of government without running the risk of economic and social collapse. Gorbachev has staked his own political career on reform and has pushed his innovations to a point which no one would have thought possible even two years ago. In some directions his changes seem to have gone beyond the boundaries of traditional Marxism-Leninism. His toleration of the resurgence of the Soviet nationalities has run counter to the most constant traditions of the Russian state, and his implicit concordat with the Orthodox Church must have shocked old-fashioned communists. The Party bureaucracy too must be terrified by the introduction of elections for office—something which strikes at its privileges and its patronage. All this is perilous in the extreme, and one can only speculate as to whether Gorbachev will survive the enmities he has undoubtedly conjured up.

Yet this walking of a tightrope at home has been accompanied by an assurance and an aplomb in the management of foreign policy that has raised the prestige of the Soviet Union and its leader to unparalleled heights. Russia's foreign policy has never been so successful. Gorbachev's new diplomatic machine, organized on the model of the American National Security Council, has done its work with great efficiency. In Europe the military threat of Pershing and Cruise missiles, directly targeted on the Soviet Union, has been removed; the unpopular Afghan war has been run down, and the device of bringing in a UN peace-keeping force will probably enable the present Afghan government to continue in power and spare Russia a serious loss of face in the region; in the last few years the Soviet Union has kept the diplomatic initiative, and the visits to Moscow of world leaders have testified to the international standing of its leader and opened the way for agreements which could relieve the domestic economic strain. Gorbachev's skill in the conduct of foreign policy has increased his reputation at home and, as a result, made *perestroika* easier.

Europeans, however, confused by the sheer unexpectedness of events they had not foreseen, have been torn between two opposed reactions to this sudden mobility of Soviet policy. Of course, signs of a thaw in the Soviet Union must be welcome. However imperfect they may be, *perestroika* and *glasnost* are better than what Edward Garnett once described as "the long winter of Russia's dark internal policy." Moreover, the new 'Europe First' policy, the rise in the level of Soviet representatives in Western Europe, the change in attitude towards the EEC—all these favorably inclined straws in the wind can hardly be ignored.

Nevertheless, the new situation has posed difficult and disagreeable problems for the European allies of the United States. It now seems thoroughly unlikely that Mr. Gorbachev is simply setting an elaborate trap for

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the West. But might he not disappear and be replaced by some more orthodox communist figure or even by a Russian Bonaparte? If disorder among the Soviet nationalities or disaffection among the client states of Eastern Europe were to grow, with all the potential for international turmoil that this would imply, would not the security of Western Europe be as much endangered by the weakness of the Soviet Union as it has been, in the past, by its strength? Moreover, even were *perestroika* to succeed and the Soviet Union to emerge strengthened and rejuvenated, would this be entirely in the interest of Western Europe? Would Russia not remain a threat simply because of its size, military power, and geographical position?

European leaders have found no very comforting answers to such questions. Some, recognizing that President Gorbachev is the best Soviet leader they have got, look for means of helping him with his economic problems ("an East European Marshall plan") on the grounds that a fat Russian is better than a thin Russian. To which others retort that it is absurd to provide the Soviet Union with the means to maintain its vast armed forces and that tough negotiation and the modernization of NATO's conventional forces are a more appropriate response to events in Eastern Europe. Mrs. Thatcher has combined the two approaches, announcing that Mr. Gorbachev was a man she "could do business with," encouraging his reforms and praising his UN speech, while, at the same time, taking a hard line on human rights and the level of Soviet armaments. In West Germany, the Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has said that Gorbachev should be "taken at his word." The Federal Chancellor, Helmuth Kohl, has been more cautious.

No doubt, some Western Europeans secretly prefer the old immobility along the Elbe to the new risks and opportunities opening before them. The stagnant Russia of Leonid Brezhnev was slow on its feet in diplomacy and public relations and could be kept at bay as a matter of routine by the Atlantic Alliance. In those days everyone knew where they were—not least the leaders of the Soviet Union's East European satellites. Now Gorbachev is challenging Western leaders to take part in a new world order, and this challenge is addressed as much to peoples as to governments. It can hardly be ignored or resisted by Europeans. At best, as Mrs. Thatcher has realized, it can be countered by an intelligent policy operating on two levels. So far, however, little common ground has emerged from the ritual consultations between the United States and its allies, or from the processes of European 'political cooperation.'[6]

In fact, the leaders of Western Europe have little choice; they cannot keep things as they are; the era of change is upon them whether they like it or not. Already the arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have resulted in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) are under way. Naturally, everyone is in favor of arms control, ignoring the fact that disarmament is usually a consequence of a better political relationship rather than its cause. Such negotiations affect directly the security of Western Europe; take away NATO's nuclear forces, and Europeans would be left facing the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. After all, it was not so long ago that they were being told how essential the acceptance of Pershing and Cruise bases was, and that their governments

[6]'Political cooperation' within the European Community consists of consultations between member-states on matters involving foreign affairs and security. There are meetings of Foreign Ministers and sometimes common statements on matters of importance. It is vain to expect substantive policies from a forum which contains one neutral state (Ireland) and another whose loyalty to NATO is doubtful (Greece under Andreas Papandreou). For that reason attempts are being made to resuscitate Western European Union (WEU) as a body within which problems of Western European security could be discussed. Spain and Portugal have just become members of WEU.

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had to embark on a bitter political struggle to implement that decision.[7] Since it was argued at that time that Pershing and Cruise were symbols of an "American commitment to Europe," it is hardly surprising that Europeans should have been disquieted by the INF treaty. The message was reinforced by the Iklé-Wohlstetter report's contention that Europe would play a reduced role in America's security commitments over the next twenty years.[8]

In his speech to the United Nations on December 7th, Mr. Gorbachev made an obvious effort to assuage European fears for the future. If implemented, his proposals for unilateral troop reductions and, more to the point, for troop withdrawals in Central Europe (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) rectify to some extent the imbalance in conventional forces that is largely responsible for European military apprehensions.[9] More may follow in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

MORE IMPORTANT still was the ideological content of the UN speech which appears to go far beyond previous slogans such as "peaceful co-existence." To talk of "de-ideologizing relations among states," of "unity in diversity," and of the impropriety of "attempts to look down on others and to teach one's own brand of democracy," suggests some dismantling of the ecumenical claims of Soviet communism. But it was precisely the existence of these claims and the hold they exerted over a minority of true believers in other countries which, backed by the looming presence of Russian armed force, constituted the special characteristics of the "Cold War" in Europe. It was the fear of succumbing to a combination of internal subversion and external pressure that brought Western Europeans together in the Atlantic Alliance. At the United Nations, therefore, Gorbachev was signalling to Europeans and others the end of the Cold War—a phrase which has also been uttered by President Reagan.

Is he to be believed? Even if the specific mode of conflict we call the "Cold War" comes to an end, the Soviet Union will not cease to have *interests* in Europe and to pursue them actively. Gorbachev undoubtedly has his own views on relations with Western Europe and the shape of the long-delayed Central European settlement. The new priority assigned to Western Europe by Soviet foreign policy suggests that the first moves are being played in a rather different game from before. About the ultimate ends of Soviet policy we can only speculate, but it would not be unreasonable

[7]This is the third occasion on which West German leaders have been forced to march their troops up the hill and march them down again. The other instances were the "mixed-manned, multilateral force" (MLF) in the 1960s and the cancellation of the neutron bomb by the Carter administration. Such experiences are disorienting.

[8]*Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy* (Washington: GPO, January 1988). Listing American commitments in East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Central America, the report says that an all-out war in Europe is unlikely. Adverse developments in Central America "could be expected to endanger control of the Panama Canal and threaten the political stability of Mexico. These developments would force the United States to divert far more of its foreign policy resources and defense assets to the Caribbean region, leading to a reduced American role in NATO" (p. 11). The obvious implication of this line of thought is a diminished American presence in Europe and less attention to European affairs.

[9]Of course, a considerable Soviet superiority in conventional forces still remains, and it is also possible that the withdrawals may not turn out to be quite what they seem. But if, as one suspects, Gorbachev has a European agenda which depends for its realization on a relaxed diplomatic atmosphere, he would be foolish to run the risk of appearing insincere. What is important about his offer is not so much military small print as its psychological impact.

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to suppose that the major objective is to bring West European management, technology, and financial resources to the aid of the ailing Russian economy. The means of its realization, however, are already in view, designed to take advantage of the *permeability* of Western Europe to an ostentatiously unmenacing, but pressing, diplomatic offensive.

German Vulnerability

HERE WEST GERMANY is the key state. On the one hand, it is clear that German public opinion is vulnerable to a conciliatory Soviet approach. On the other, West Germany and the Soviet Union have much to gain from each other. The most obvious and the most rapid solution to Russia's economic problems would be to enlist the aid of German industry, which, through various devices—mixed companies, management studies, loans—could impart its own efficiency to the sclerotic state enterprises of the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe too the Soviet satellite states could take part in a German-backed policy of development which would relieve the Soviet Union of its present burden of support and also, through an increased prosperity, contribute to a more relaxed political atmosphere. Past German experience in Eastern Europe and the similar structure of German and East European technical training, industrial standards, etc., would make the implementation of such a policy relatively easy. The final result would be a sort of symbiosis between the German economy and those of the countries to the east. In this case foreign policy successes would be directly relevant to a solution of Russia's internal problems and the consolidation of Gorbachev's own position.

West Germany too would gain from the much-needed stimulus to its industry imparted by new activities and new markets. Moreover, some alleviation of conditions in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) could also be part of the deal. This would probably not go as far as reunification, but might involve a gradual convergence of the two German states, with increased intra-German travel, cultural exchanges and the removal of some of the more objectionable features of the GDR's regime. Joint German discussions on the restoration of communications, a German conference on dying forests to please the 'Greens', dismantling of the walls and minefield along the frontier between the two Germanies—there is plenty of brightly-colored paper in which any such package could be wrapped. Between the Soviet Union and West Germany there is the potential for a bargain, as there must always be when each side has something the other wants. A central part of Mr. Gorbachev's European policy must be to turn that potential into reality.

That West Germany is vulnerable to any such approach is evident from the present state of public opinion and the political parties in the Federal Republic. The Socialists (SPD) have already embraced a policy which undermines NATO's nuclear strategy. The 'Greens' are in favor of what amounts to a neutralist Germany. German industrialists see opportunities in the East, and Herr Genscher is an advocate of a 'positive response' to the Soviet Union. Dr. Kohl and his fellow German conservatives have their doubts, but it would be hard for them to reject an apparently advantageous offer from Moscow.[10]

As for public opinion, it is characterized by a growing pacifism and a distaste for the industrial achievements of the Federal Republic, fostered by the churches and the universities. German hankerings after a foreign policy serving more purely German national interests lead in the same direction, as does the increasing irritation felt by Germans with the presence of NATO forces on their soil—an irritation that has recently produced some bizarre incidents, including a demand by a West German admiral for the withdrawal of

[10]See the analysis of the present state of political opinion in West Germany on relations with the Soviet Union in Robbin Laird, *Bonn and Moscow: A Partnership in Progress?* (London: The Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 45–49.

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foreign troops and nuclear weapons from German soil. Indeed, it seems likely that most Germans under thirty would welcome with open arms any agreement which could be represented as the advent of 'peace' in Central Europe. Few would examine the small print.[11]

Ostpolitik—policy made for and towards the East—is nothing new in German history. Under the Weimar Republic it had its advocates in men like von Seeckt, the commander of the Reichswehr, and von Maltzan in the Foreign Office. Even in the Federal Republic traces of the same line of thought were to be found in Hans Kroll, Adenauer's ambassador to Moscow. If Mr. Gorbachev's offer to Bonn were conceived on a sufficiently large scale, its appearance sufficiently tempting, then the odds are that it would find many takers. The question is rather whether he is in a position to make an offer imaginative enough to have the required impact on German public opinion.

Moscow and the Community

IF WE CARRY speculation a little further, it might be thought that such a development could mean West Germany's withdrawal from, or the break up of, the European Community. But this is not certain. The recent marked change in the Soviet attitude towards the Community may well indicate a realization that the latter could be a useful vehicle for establishing those closer economic ties with Western Europe that the Soviet Union so badly needs. Moscow has at last recognized the EEC, and contacts have begun between Brussels and the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Significantly, Russian objections to Austria's candidature for the EEC appear to have been withdrawn. There has been much talk by Gorbachev and other Russian spokesmen of "our common European home," though this tolerance towards the European idea does not extend to the emergence of a new 'superstate' or to the inclusion of defense in the remit of the Community.[12]

Indeed, it may be that Mr. Gorbachev sees a close relationship with the EEC as the best way of preempting the rise of a European political union. In the present climate of opinion it is not to be expected that such inconvenient embraces could be rebuffed. Moreover, could not the desire of countries such as Hungary and Poland for more institutional contacts with the EEC and greater access to the Common Market come to mean, in practice, an extension of the Community to the east which might end in an alteration of its political and economic balance? A request for membership by an East European country, made in the name of peace and reconciliation in Central Europe, would be difficult to reject. Here again, as in the case of West Germany, politically induced economic ties could bring about far-reaching change.

The European Community began its life as the economic base for the European end of the Atlantic Alliance—that, at least, was how it was perceived by many in Washington and Moscow. To transform it into a springboard for an effective neutralization of Central Europe and an 'Austrian-type' postwar settlement would be an imaginative exploitation of the present fluidity of European politics, which Gorbachev's new course has brought

[11]A recently published book by the distinguished German historian, Arnulf Baring: *Unser neuer Größenwahn: Deutschland zwischen Ost und West* (Stuttgart: 1988), gives much evidence to support this conclusion. Professor Baring's argument, which has created much controversy in the Federal Republic, is that over-confidence, political romanticism, and a simple desire for change are carrying West Germany out of its political 'integration' with the United States and into a catastrophic attempt to become once again, in Bismarck's words, "the honest broker of Europe." Professor Baring writes: "A silent emigration from the Atlantic camp can be observed, an inner neutralization with the formal preservation of ties with the West. American influence is disappearing accordingly" p. 61.

[12]See Laird: *Ibid.* p. 37.

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about. A restructuring of European politics which included: (1) a 'special relationship' between the two Germanies and the Soviet Union; (2) the aborting of European political union, but the extension of 'economic Europe' to the East; and (3) a more distant concern for Western Europe on the part of the United States would satisfy the requirements of the Soviet Union both for security and for economic improvement. As for the Europeans, they would be guaranteed a quiet life, economic prosperity and the freedom to concentrate on cleaning up rivers or passing directives about smoking in public places without the worries of world politics or the financial strain of improving their own defenses. 'Peace,' 'agreement,' 'reconciliation'—these are words which cast an enjoyably rosy cloud over future dangers and difficulties. For many Europeans—especially the young—the present divisions in their continent seem an anachronism, and they are willing to run risks (whose nature they cannot, in any case, perceive or estimate) to remove them. Gorbachev's new European policy—and this is the basis of its strength—has stimulated such longings by bringing them out of the imagination into the realm of reality.

Developments of this kind would leave the international influence of the United States much weakened. The success of Russia's European policy would mean a considerable change in the balance of power, with economic as well as political consequences. America could, and probably would, be asked to join in a guarantee of the new European status quo, but a NATO emptied of real content would not provide the United States with an adequate means of action in Europe. Moreover, disarmament and agreement in Central Europe would spread the belief that there was little need to bear the continued financial strain of stationing American troops in Europe. Commitment to European security could be replaced by a benevolent but distant concern—almost by neo-isolationism. No doubt, it would be in America's interest to maintain some form of alliance with Britain and France—countries which possess their own nuclear deterrents and whose attitude towards Mr. Gorbachev's policies is more cautious than that of Germany, Benelux, or Italy. But this would be a residual connection, directed to dangers that hardly exist and ill-adapted to cope with a new European conjuncture.

THIS KIND of scenario may not, of course, come about in the form suggested above. There are other directions which Gorbachev's political offensive could take.[13] Moreover, as Claudel observed, "the worst is not always certain." The temptations extended to the Germans and other Europeans may not be sufficient. The United States may assert its leadership of the West and succeed in the task of keeping the Alliance together during a period of expectancy. The European Community and the United States may avoid the trade war which would drive a wedge between them. In a sense the best response to Gorbachev would be to 'wait and see,' but Europeans feel that they are being forced into action, and the vision of many of them is obscured.

Whatever may be the view taken of the direction and the scope of Mr. Gorbachev's European political offensive—and, of course, it is not only European—the fact remains that West Germany is a vulnerable and, therefore, a probable target. Other countries in Western

[13] A British Soviet expert, Dominic Lieven, has suggested another sequence of events: "To avoid damage to Soviet prestige or security ... it might make sense for Moscow to reopen the whole issue of European security. If the Eastern bloc ... is going to disintegrate, it is in the interests of the Soviet Union to ensure that NATO goes with it. And certainly it is a moot point whether West European public opinion would tolerate NATO for long should east-central Europe be effectively Finlandised, and whether in particular opinion in the German Federal Republic would in that event remain committed to NATO once the German question had been put on the agenda" *The Tablet*, 12/17/88.

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Europe share that vulnerability. This being so, the European Community's future and its aspirations to political unity are bound to appear problematical. The present European political conjuncture has begun to dissolve before the Community is ready to play its part in the events that will follow. The Europe of the Twelve is in the position of a player of *Go* who has failed to get his stones down early in the game and now finds all the most vital strategic points occupied and his freedom of action constrained.

The effective neutralization of Germany and an opening of the EEC towards the East would create a permanent barrier to European attempts to arrive at common foreign and defense policies. The original European ambition was conceived under the stress of war and the fear of a common enemy. The apparent disappearance of such a threat and the prospect of an end to conflict in Central Europe could leave behind it a Europe more akin to the loose ties that bind the Nordic Union, with Europeans following the Scandinavian example of pacifism and moralism in international affairs. This would be a Europe not necessarily dominated by the Soviet Union—though the possibility of domination would be there—but tied to it by economic advantage and its own conception of itself as a 'bridge between East and West': a Europe that would be a parody of De Gaulle's vision of a community of states stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

If the Soviet Union is now going through a 'crisis of change,' Europeans must prepare to go through a crisis of adaptation to that change. It could be a primary role of the new American administration to help them in this direction—in the first place by facing them with the possible consequences of their own actions. For this purpose President Bush will be a more suitable interlocutor than President Reagan. But there is little time left, and peoples must be convinced as well as governments. Nineteen ninety-two could be the date when the European Community completes its internal market, but is left with a political contest which it has hardly begun to understand.

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Dealing With Friendly Tyrants

Richard N. Haass

TRADITIONALLY, American foreign policy has been distinguished by abstract formulations that do not translate easily into the actual conduct of policy. The most recent example is the Reagan Doctrine, now destined to become one of the principal legacies of the former President's eight-year tenure. The doctrine itself is little more than an elaboration of James Burnham's proposals for liberation, set forth some thirty years ago. What is more, one searches in vain for a precise articulation of the doctrine by the Reagan administration. What such a search makes clear is that originally the Reagan Doctrine was less a consciously formulated general initiative leading to specific applications than it was a retrospective attempt to give theoretical coherence to a set of responses already taken toward situations as diverse as those of Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. But, as is usual with doctrines, once formulated it assumed a reality of its own.

Just as the theory of the Reagan Doctrine has been a mixed and controversial affair, so too with its practical consequences. Thus, aid has been given to the Afghan rebels despite their uncertain commitment to democracy or even pro-American orientation, while aid has been denied to the *contras* despite the fact that their victory would result in a government more to our liking. This is not to say that the actions undertaken in the doctrine's name have been misguided or ineffectual; quite the contrary. The negotiations now underway or contemplated in Angola and Afghanistan, for example, would be unthinkable without the American record of support for the anti-communist insurgencies in both countries. Such results, however, should not tempt us into overestimating the worth of a policy instrument such as the Reagan Doctrine. At best such abstract formulations raise useful questions and place the burden of argument on those who oppose the initiatives in question. At worst, their demand for consistency threatens to deprive policy-makers of the flexibility they need in a complex world.

Such risks are especially evident in another area of policy-making that is perennially troubling to the United States: that of dealing with friendly tyrants. Given both the prevalence of such regimes and the American concern with promoting freedom and democracy in the world, it may be no exaggeration to say that our policy toward such rulers—who are pro-American, right-wing, and authoritarian—constitutes the most controversial foreign policy question before us.

China in the 1940s, Cuba in the 1950s, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua in the 1970s—all were cases where authoritarian regimes gave way to hostile, anti-American govern-

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ments, at enormous cost to the United States. More recently, there is the painful situation unfolding (or unravelling) in Panama, where successive U.S. efforts to dislodge an increasingly unfriendly tyrant are thus far meeting with determined resistance. In the future, the United States may well have to cope with analogous situations in countries as diverse as Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, Zaire, South Africa, Singapore, and El Salvador (again), to name just a few.

Not all the historic precedents are ones of crisis and failure. There are, for example, the post-World War II achievements of creating strong democratic institutions in the German Federal Republic, Italy, and Japan. One can draw comfort as well from the emergence in the 1970s of democracy in both Spain and Portugal after generations of authoritarian rule. More recently, there are the experiences of El Salvador, Argentina, the Philippines, and South Korea, where nondemocratic regimes have been, or seem likely to be, replaced by governments characterized by a respect for democratic procedures and civil liberties and well-disposed towards the United States.

What to do about authoritarian regimes before and during a political transition is no simple matter, and surely not as simple as some on either side of the question propose. One approach would have the United States continue to support a friendly authoritarian regime on the grounds that it has served our political, economic, and military interests well and (unlike probable successors) would continue to if it survives. Animating this view is the belief that owing to key security concerns, the United States has no alternative but to back local leaders who are often unsavory. The perceived lack of a strong democratic alternative in many societies contributes to this security-first bias. Also feeding it is the belief that in many instances the United States lacks the means to do much to bring about desired reform. This perspective derives succor from the experiences of Iran and Nicaragua, which it views as evidence of the costs associated with our pulling back from traditional if undemocratic friends.[1]

The other main school of thought advocates withdrawing American support from authoritarian elites on the grounds that it contradicts this country's values to lend support to repressive, and usually corrupt, governments that are losing or have lost the support of their own people. Those of this persuasion also harken back to Iran and Nicaragua, but draw different lessons, emphasizing the costs associated with the United States *not* pulling back sufficiently early or sharply from undemocratic friends.[2]

Neither approach can marshal a compelling general case. The former, usually attributed to the political Right, adopts too short-term a perspective, underestimating the difficulty of protecting American interests in an environment in which the United States no longer enjoys widespread public acceptance. The second approach, whose advocates tend to be on the political Left, often underestimates the significance of the interests involved and tends to be overly sanguine about the ability of the United States to protect those interests following a change in regime. Both approaches are too dogmatic to offer much guidance to the policy-maker, particularly when—as usually happens in such cases—events unfold rapidly and diverge from any textbook pattern.

Origins of Crisis

CERTAINLY, the case for the United States aligning itself abroad with democratic governments and movements is

[1]This description is drawn in part from the influential writings on the subject by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. See her *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism & Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). The essay by the same name was first published in the December 1979 issue of *Commentary*.

[2]For a discussion and critique of such views, see Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986).

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strong. Part of the reason is simply a matter of preference for values that parallel our own. Americans are on the whole a moral and religious people, and democracy and support for basic political and personal freedoms are seen as inherently desirable, an extension of simple fairness and justice. We are also an ideological people, and support for democracy accords with our need for an international mission that goes beyond calculations of power and purse. There are reasons of state and realpolitik to consider too. Democracies tend to be more stable, reliable, and pro-Western, and—although there are exceptions—less prone to use military force for aggressive purposes. In addition, our own ability to function effectively as a great power depends upon popular support, support which in no small part depends upon convincing the American people and Congress that they are being asked to make sacrifices for values consistent with their own.

One should not interpret these attributes of democracy as producing a conclusion that the United States always ought to intervene—politically, economically, or militarily—on democracy's behalf. Promoting democracy is a proper interest of the United States, but it is not the only interest nor is it even in all circumstances the most important one. As is the case with any interest, the costs of promoting democracy (measured in the expenditure of resources or the diminution of other interests) must be weighed against the expected benefits that would accrue to the United States were democracy to take root in unfamiliar soils.

It is often suggested that there is no choice, and that the only way the United States can safeguard its traditional interests is by promoting substantial political change. Yet this attempt at bridging apparently competing concerns is more glib than real. Existing regimes (which may not share American views regarding the desirability or viability of democracy) are unlikely to work closely with a U.S. government that is perceived as hostile. Successor regimes may calculate that their interests are better served on the whole by a less friendly posture towards American interests.

After some years of ambiguity, the Reagan administration sought to find a middle ground. A milestone came in a March 1986 speech by President Reagan which asserted that "The American people believe in human rights and oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the Left or the Right. We use our influence to encourage democratic change, in careful ways that respect other countries' traditions and political realities as well as the security threats that many of them face from external or internal forces of totalitarianism."

Although this speech marked a significant statement of concern and a departure from previous emphasis upon totalitarian evils, it, too, offers little in the way of policy guidance. The reality is that it is difficult if not impossible to generalize about what the United States should do about authoritarian regimes. Each case is *sui generis* and real dilemmas have to be confronted. The prevailing response of most policy-makers (and the one that has dominated post-World War II American foreign policy) is to attempt to straddle the dilemma, in the process affording pride of place to security interests while doing what can be done to promote democracy and human rights. We have given priority to a country's foreign policy while trying not to ignore its domestic behavior.[3]

The reality, though, is that U.S. policymakers are at times denied this luxury. Authoritarian regimes are prone to challenges, as the lack of absolute strength and the simultaneous decline of legitimacy often combine to undermine their capacity to rule. This can occur amidst economic success, with the emergence of a large middle class that seeks

[3]This bias towards emphasizing "hard" diplomatic and security-related interests over "soft" concerns such as promoting human rights and democracy is an outgrowth of the realist paradigm. For a recent affirmation of this approach, see George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter 1985/86).

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to match its newfound economic might and independence with a political say. To some extent this took place in Iran: the Shah failed to build political support for his government, while the dislocation and tension caused by rapid and uneven economic growth helped bring about a population vulnerable to the appeals of fanatical religion. A related phenomenon is taking place in the Asia-Pacific region—in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore—where demands for greater democracy are being felt in several of the countries that have experienced an incredibly rapid transition from traditional to industrial societies.

The ability to rule can also fade in situations of economic failure. Inflation, unemployment, and poor growth can breed unrest. Corruption and large inequalities in living standards tend to fan the flames of resentment. Key institutions such as the church and military become safe havens for the opposition. In such environments insurgencies promising radical distribution of economic and political power tend to flourish. China under Chiang Kai-shek, Cuba under Batista, Nicaragua under Somoza, Vietnam under Diem and others, the Philippines under Marcos, Haiti under Duvalier—all are classic examples of disintegrating authoritarian systems that in the end proved unstable.

If economic conditions can interact with authoritarian rule to shake the foundations of government, it often takes a particular incident or series of incidents to bring about a crisis. Tensions can come to a head after a military fiasco (the ousting of the Argentine junta after the Falklands war debacle), an incident in which the regime uses excessive force to the outrage of the population (the Philippines in the wake of the Benigno Aquino assassination), or at a time of succession (Spain after Franco, South Korea recently). Alternatively, a crisis can arise simply through the accumulation of popular grievance, the emergence of a strong opposition, and a loss of will on the regime's part—Castro's takeover in Cuba, the Sandinistas' ousting of Somoza, and the fall of the Shah of Iran all come to mind. When the crisis comes, the regime can only maintain itself by a massive use of force; often it finds itself unable or unwilling to do so.

Developments within the United States may stimulate a crisis. The American media can elicit public and congressional demands for action, or even bring direct pressure to bear on the ruler in question. (It was while being interrogated on the David Brinkley program that Marcos, apparently spontaneously, announced that he would hold the election that led to his downfall.) Active constituencies—in effect, special interests—can influence both the press and the Congress so that an administration finds it impossible simply to carry on. (South Africa comes to mind in this instance.) Or an administration may find its own reasons—much as the Reagan administration seems to have done in 1987 and 1988 with Panama—to create a sense of crisis and confrontation, in the hopes of bringing about the departure of an unwanted regime.

What the Record Suggests

WHATEVER the cause or situation, any policy that has a chance of succeeding must begin with a serious assessment of the prospects for change. A number of questions come to mind. How vulnerable is the regime, and can it be reformed or is it too brittle and set in its ways? How repugnant is the regime? What is there to take its place? What U.S. interests are at stake? What levers does the United States have at its disposal to shape events? And how agreed are key voices in the executive branch and the Congress on the direction of policy?

The *first* question, that of the regime's vulnerability, is crucial. It makes little sense for the United States to challenge an existing regime that can easily resist our efforts and, in the process, even increase its strength relative to those political forces we are ostensibly seeking to promote. Certainly Panama, and arguably South Africa prove this point, in that U.S. pressures seem to have reinforced regime or elite resolve while weakening the opposition.

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Second, policy choice should reflect in part the nature of the rule. Some authoritarian regimes allow more opposition or at least independent political activity than others. Some are more respectful of human rights. Not all practice or permit torture. Not all are corrupt. In short, there is the question of degree, which in the imperfect world of politics is usually crucial. Singapore is not Rwanda, and Taiwan is not Zaire.

Third, the United States must be certain (or, at least, reasonably confident) that a desirable alternative exists or can be developed, and that it is or can be made sufficiently strong to be the probable successor government. It makes little sense in the long run to weaken a friendly authoritarian regime only to see it replaced by some anti-American totalitarian system that is beyond our capacity to influence. Few would argue that either the United States or the people of Iran are better off today under the Ayatollah than they were under the Shah. Much the same can be said for Nicaragua. Time will tell in Haiti.

Fourth, the United States must be sensitive to competing interests. While an individual is free to adopt an absolutist ethic and to give democracy or human rights unqualified precedence in all circumstances, a state—whose first priority must be survival in an uncertain world—is not. It must live by the ethic of responsibility and always take into account the likely consequences of its actions, which must take precedence over consistency and purity of motive. Promoting democracy is never the only interest at stake; in some circumstances it may not be the most important.[4] In many instances, important strategic assets—landing rights, critical raw materials, the control of "choke points," maintenance facilities—are at stake in countries run by friendly tyrants, and it would be sheer irresponsibility not to consider the likelihood and consequences of their loss in formulating policy.

Fifth, there is the question of the intensity of U.S. involvement in the country and what leverage the United States enjoys as a result. In some instances, a history of close political, economic, and social ties gives us great potential to affect events. In the Philippines, for example, the colonial legacy afforded us unparalleled opportunity. In other situations we have few levers, either because of the relative absence of historical interaction (South Africa), or because past interaction has created a legacy of extreme sensitivity and hostility to U.S. interference (Mexico).

Sixth and last, there is the question of domestic consensus in the United States. U.S. interventions are most likely to have the desired effect when there is broad agreement within the executive branch and Congress that the United States ought to adopt a certain line using the available means. In the absence of such consensus, policy is likely to lack the necessary consistency, intensity, and staying power required either to unnerve the government or embolden the opposition. The Philippines is a good (if rare) example of what can be accomplished with consensus; Panama is an unfortunate recent example of what tends to happen when Washington is in disarray.

These six questions—considered together and related to each other—produce some useful guidelines. Diplomatic action is most likely to succeed when a regime is vulnerable, viable alternatives are to be found, and consensus exists in Washington. Where vulnerability is not great, the United States would be wise to hold off. But even when a regime is shaky, the absence of desirable political alternatives or consensus in the United States ought to prompt caution and patience, at least until those deficiencies are remedied. Where levers are absent, there is not a lot that can be done. Again, though the importance of the American interests at stake is a vital consideration, in isolation it provides little guidance, as great stakes can be a justification for either daring or caution. In other words, focusing on any single factor and ignoring others is unlikely to lead to sound policy. What is required is the complex balancing of factors

[4]On this theme, see Robert W. Tucker, "Isolation and Intervention," *The National Interest,* No. 1 (Fall 1985).

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that, more often than not, compete with rather than reinforce each other.

There are then questions of tactics. Here one encounters a problem that matches the earlier strategic dilemma. How (and when) to act when confronted with a friendly tyrant can be just as difficult a question as whether to act. Too much pressure can alienate the current government, resulting in a loss of access and influence. Overt pressure can also be counter-productive by strengthening the government and presenting it with an opportunity to wrap itself in some anti-American nationalist mantle. Panama again comes to mind here; so too does Mexico. Public pressure may actually make it more difficult for a government to respond to democratic impulses, lest it appear to be unduly subservient.

Yet public signals are necessary if we are to communicate to opposition groups and the public at large that the United States does not endorse the methods or policies of the regime. If we do not do this, a climate of anti-Americanism might take hold that would be prejudicial to our interests should the government be ousted. The United States would have been wiser to withdraw support, or at least distance itself, from the junta that ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974; some of the problems in U.S. relations with Greece today can be traced back to Greek resentment of U.S. policy during this period. The conundrum, though, is that public steps and in particular sanctions can hurt precisely those individuals and groups we want to help.

Any effective policy thus requires a fine touch concerning what the situation will bear and how far to go. The United States must stay close enough to the current regime so as not to forfeit all influence or undermine it before a desired alternative exists. At the same time, the United States must distance itself sufficiently so that the regime is persuaded to reform, or an alternative develops (if necessary with our assistance) that views this country as friendly and not simply a cynical ally of a non-democratic government. It has to be said that—given the public way in which the United States conducts its policy, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the extent to which the primary concern of some of those actors is to satisfy domestic constituencies—this is not an art in which America excels.

Slouching toward Solutions

IT MAY BE useful to approach the management challenges inherent in encouraging democracy by breaking the problem down into three phases.

Long before any crisis materializes, but where a calculation can be made that one is very likely some time down the road, what is called for is a mixture of public and private statements and actions that make clear our preference for the development of democratic institutions and improved observance of human rights. The instruments available are several. The U.S. political leadership can speak out regularly as to its preferences. Special envoys can be dispatched. Votes can be cast in the United Nations and the various international economic institutions that dispense aid and loans. Opposition figures can be afforded prominence and assisted in the techniques needed to gain power legally and govern. Covert financial assistance can be provided to opposition groups to allow them to organize and spread their message. Aid might also be dispensed overtly through an instrument like the National Endowment for Democracy. The flow of security assistance, economic and military alike, can be regulated. Ceilings can be set on the sophistication of technology to be transferred. The flow of goods and loans can be interrupted. The difficulty inherent in some of these latter suggestions, however, is that they are likely to generate tension in the bilateral relationship and within the country itself, even if it does not already exist.

The United States should have two goals at this point: to reform the regime and to promote a pro-Western, pro-democratic opposition. The purpose ought not to be to trigger a crisis—to do so would be irresponsible in that U.S. interests are at stake, the regime deserves time to change, and a responsible opposition takes time to emerge—but to set

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in motion a reform process that will, if successful, allow for the gradual evolution of the political order towards democracy. This is also a time for those in the administration and Congress concerned with the country in question to work to build a consensus on behalf of a pro-reform policy.

THIS INITIAL or pre-crisis period offers the best opportunity to sow seeds of democratic reform. Yet it is often difficult to do so. When an authoritarian ruler appears fully in command and facing little or no opposition, it is difficult to convince him that reform is needed. U.S. attempts to nurture contacts with what opposition does exist are likely to be resented and might actually result in some retaliation. So-called "third forces"—moderate democrats who reject the extremes of Right and Left—are easier to promote in the abstract than in reality, where they tend to get pulled in one direction or the other, or simply crushed by one or both of the two poles, both of which are likely to have few qualms about resorting to violence.[5] It is also difficult to convince policy-makers on the U.S. side that stirring an apparently settled pot is a wise course of action; at any moment there are always enough unavoidable problems to contend with without having to go out and create new ones. The fact that no one can guarantee a pro-American successor government only increases reluctance to rock the boat.

These difficulties approximate closely what in fact took place in Iran during the years prior to the revolution that brought down the Shah. The United States looked to Iran to bear a large share of responsibility for the security of the region and its needed energy supply. The Shah seemed safely in control, and made it clear that he did not appreciate U.S. embassy officials developing close ties with opposition figures. Back in Washington, government officials were reluctant to antagonize this old friend of the United States and loathe to create an additional foreign policy issue at a time when Vietnam and other concerns posed more problems than already could be handled. The result was that little effort was made to reform the regime or develop ties to (and, in the process, moderate) opposition figures.

A somewhat different pattern unfolded in China in the 1940s, when Chiang Kai-shek resisted American entreaties to put his house in order or face a communist victory. Then, the problem was less U.S. reticence than Chiang's ability to refuse to respond. Much the same phenomenon has been at work in Pinochet's Chile, though his demise now seems imminent. In other cases, however, the United States can be faulted for cozying up too close to abusive and corrupt regimes and for doing too little to promote reform and an alternative. Greece, Cuba, and Nicaragua all come to mind here.

There are some successes to point out. Turkey is perhaps the best example of the reformist path to democracy. On several occasions, the military has intervened in Turkish politics and taken control of the government, most recently in 1980 when terrorists of all political persuasions were threatening to bring about virtual anarchy in the country. The United States showed sympathy for the Turkish predicament and continued to extend security assistance, while simultaneously urging a gradual return to democracy and an end to the curtailment of political liberties and human rights. Turkey has since promulgated a new constitution, held genuine elections and improved its human rights record; it is close to being a full-fledged democracy and remains a close American ally.

El Salvador is another example of success. Repressive military rule characterized that country for seven years beginning in 1972; in 1979 younger military officers overthrew the

[5]For a useful discussion of the difficulties in promoting so-called third forces, see Owen Harries, "The Idea of a Third Force," *The National Interest*, No. 3 (Spring 1986). U.S. tinkering with this notion is treated with considerable disdain by Graham Greene in his novel, *The Quiet American* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1955).

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government and began the transition to democratic rule. The United States both supported the democratic process—helping to conduct free elections in 1982 and again in 1984—and provided economic and military assistance to the government, so that it could cope with anti-democratic threats from the armed guerrillas of the communist Left and the death squads of the political Right. Today, El Salvador is run by a civilian government that supports U.S. foreign policy in Central America and continues to observe human rights to a degree that alternatives to the Left and Right would not.

The United States has also assisted the emergence of democracy in Asia. In both the Philippines and South Korea, the United States for years worked both to moderate the regime and to develop ties to a moderate opposition. There were constraints in both cases: the United States has important interests to protect, and the governments faced real threats to their security from communist forces. Success was not total. In each of these two instances change only came amidst crisis—the Aquino assassination in the Philippines, the April 1987 decision to terminate constitutional reform talks in South Korea—but in each case the United States was well-positioned to affect the course of events because it had not alienated important participants in both the government and the opposition. The fact that there was broad consensus within the Administration, and between the Administration and the Congress, on the key elements of policy further enhanced U.S. effectiveness.

As these examples make clear, a crisis affecting political control and civil order can come about despite our best efforts (or because of them). During this second phase, the United States has few options but to improvise (introducing various sanctions mentioned above) and hope for the best. The two Asian examples just noted suggest crises are likely to turn out well when they are produced by internal developments and when preceded by years of involvement on behalf of democracy; events in Iran, Cuba, or Nicaragua suggest that the end-game will turn out badly for U.S. interests if they occur in a context of diplomatic neglect on our part. Prospects are less bright when the United States is caught unprepared (Iran) or has triggered a crisis before a regime has grown sufficiently weak or the opposition sufficiently strong and friendly (Panama).

A Plea for Modesty

THE ULTIMATE sanction—the employment of covert or overt force by the United States, on its own or with other parties, to oust a regime—is rarely a good idea. The mere suggestion of the possibility can strengthen the nationalist credentials of the target. Even if successful, American use of force can undermine the legitimacy of a successor regime except in those circumstances such as Grenada where the tyranny is both hostile and extreme. Achieving desired ends through the use of American forces is made more difficult by the proliferation of arms around the world and the broad-based support of some personal and all corporate regimes. Armed intervention also creates precedents and weakens what international norms exist against interference in the internal affairs of another state.[6] Last, it is difficult to build the requisite domestic consensus in the United States for a policy that can be costly in terms of lives and resources and goes against the prevalent norm of non-intervention.

If the tyrant is removed by whatever means, the United States will find itself in a third phase. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that American responsibility for pro-

[6]For the classic discussion of this topic, see John Stuart Mill's essay "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," reprinted in his *Essays on Politics and Culture* (New York: Doubleday & Company/Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 368–384. Mill concludes that as a general rule one ought to desist from intervening on behalf of a people struggling for democracy against their government unless that tyranny is "upheld by foreign arms."

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moting democracy does not end with the ouster of an authoritarian regime and its replacement with a more democratic one. Indeed, what the United States does during this third phase of the democratization process can be just as critical as actions taken and statements made before and during any crisis. As the Philippines demonstrates, consolidation of fragile democracies is no easy task; Haiti is a painful example of what can go wrong after the friendly tyrant problem is only apparently solved.

The consolidation of fledgling democracy tends to require large amounts of political support—visits, discouragement of would-be coups, intelligence-sharing—and economic assistance, including aid, trade opportunities, and investment. It can also require security assistance to defeat those anti-democratic opposition alternatives that opposed not only the old regime but the current one. The challenge is to buy time so that emerging political institutions and attitudes can take root among key sectors of society; as a rule of thumb, one should allow at least a generation to pass before one can assume that military men and ambitious civilian counterparts accept the precepts of pluralism and due process.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that while we can influence processes of political development in foreign countries we cannot engineer or fine-tune them. History, culture, religion, personality, wealth, force, even chance—any or all might have more of an impact on the outcome of what happens elsewhere than the efforts of American officials and private citizens. Both the nature and the resolve of regimes we are trying to reform, and the orientation of the alternatives we are trying to influence, may be beyond our reach. The fact that democracy is faring far better in Europe, Asia, and Latin America than it is in either the Middle East or Africa has less to do with American diplomacy than with local realities. Political culture—characterized by one historian as something "shaped by a nation's historic experience [and that] enters the nation's bloodstream and changes as slowly and reluctantly as do language and customs"—counts for a good deal.[7]

SIMILARLY, it is important to retain flexibility on the question of what constitutes a democracy. Not every society can be expected to reinvent Westminster or Washington. Although there are certain essential elements of democracy that ought to be embraced, including legitimate political participation and succession along with freedom of expression, we should be tolerant of traditions that themselves have less tolerance for pluralism and dissent than we are prepared to live with. We should also be prepared to be more forgiving of those societies with little democratic experience. This is not meant to be patronizing, just practical.[8]

But difficulties also stem from our own politics. Contributing to the problem is the fact that in most situations the United States is rarely united. Divisions within the executive branch, between the executive and the Congress, and between various parts of the government and interests groups or the media, further complicate attempts to broker reform. So too do differences between the United States and foreign governments (including democratic allies), who retain and often exercise the ability to undermine U.S. political and economic sanctions.

None of the above is intended as an argument for neglect. Often what we choose not to do can be as important as what we elect to do. Rather, it is a plea for modesty and perspective; managing the domestic political conflict of others promises to be difficult and risky at best. The essence of a dilemma is that it cannot be solved. The challenge posed by friendly tyrants fully deserves the description.

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[7]Richard Pipes, *Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 20.

[8]For more on this theme, see Owen Harries, "Exporting Democracy—and Getting it Wrong," *The National Interest*, No. 13 (Fall 1988).

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From Panda to Dragon

China's Nuclear Strategy

Chong-Pin Lin

AT THE VERY OUTSET of the Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (the "Iklé-Wohlstetter Report," released in January 1988), it was observed that by the year 2010 "China may have the world's second or third largest economy" and "(it) may well become a superpower, in military terms, though still behind the Soviet Union and the United States." The responses to the Report to date have been largely Eurocentric in focus and have failed to reflect the Commission's emphatic concern about an emerging multipolar world, a major characteristic of which is the accelerating expansion of China's role. Among the disproportionately few responses to the Report's assessment of China, attention once again seems misplaced. Instead of exploring the implications of China's growing economy, skepticism centers on the numerical accuracy of the forecast: Can China become the *second* largest economic power in *twenty-two* years? In addition, doubt is expressed about China's ability ever to catch up with the advanced powers in military technology. A missing piece which can both shed light on and help focus the discussion is China's nuclear weapons program: its development, its deployment, and its use for the attainment of both external and internal political aims.

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Evolution of Nuclear Forces

ON OCTOBER 16, 1964 China succeeded in detonating its first atomic device and became the fifth member of the world's nuclear weapons club. Its four predecessors were the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), and France (1960). By the end of the 1970s, China had surpassed the latter two and quietly emerged as the world's third largest nuclear power. According to London's International Institute of Strategic Studies, the total numbers of strategic nuclear launchers—bombers, land-based ballistic missiles, and sea-based ballistic missiles—for China, France, and Great Britain by 1979 were respectively 160, 115, and 64.[1] This dramatic transition, however, has escaped public attention for nearly a decade.

Even less attention has been given to the impressive efficiency of the Chinese in developing their nuclear weapons. After its first atomic detonation, China spent less time than any of its predecessors in acquiring the technologies required for developing the hydrogen bomb. The United States needed seven years, the Soviet Union four years, Great Brit-

[1] *The Military Balance 1978–1979* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 19, 22, and 56.

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ain five years, France eight years. China took less than three years. In addition, China expended less time than any of its predecessors between the initial nuclear explosion and the first launching of a space satellite, a precursor to intercontinental ballistic missile technology: the United States required thirteen years, France ten years, the Soviet Union eight years, and China merely six years. Moreover, China acquired multiple warhead technology in less time—calculated from its first nuclear test—than any other nuclear club member: twenty-four years for the Soviet Union, twenty-three years for the United States, twenty years for France, and seventeen years for China.

Such achievements cannot be explained away merely as the late-comer's advantage since other late-comers often required more time in developing a particular technology than did their predecessors. For example, Great Britain spent more time than the Soviet Union in progressing from its first atomic detonation to acquiring the hydrogen bomb, and France required more time in this regard than any of its predecessors—the United States, the Soviet Union, or Great Britain. Again, France took more time than the Soviet Union in moving from its initial nuclear test to the launching of its first space satellite.

China succeeded in launching its first full-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in May 1980 and is the only country other than the superpowers to field an ICBM. In October 1982, China fired its first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from underwater and thus acquired a more survivable nuclear deterrent. The acquisitions of both ICBM and SLBM technologies took China more time than its predecessors—no doubt due to the adverse impact of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Even so, the setback of the nuclear weapons program was much less than those of the other national projects during the same period. By most tests, China's overall performance is striking. Measured by the time following its initial nuclear detonation, China has outpaced the other powers in developing three of five key technological areas—the hydrogen bomb, the space satellite, and the multiple warhead.

Conventional wisdom in the West has held that China "muddled through" its nuclear weapons development without a strategy. In fact, in order to catch up with the advanced nuclear powers, Chinese leaders adopted a strategy of developing weapon components simultaneously, and then integrating them further downstream. For example, four years before its 1964 initial atomic detonation, China had successfully tested a short-range (500-mile) ballistic missile (SRBM). Then, just one year before the detonation, China succeeded in testing a medium-range (750-mile) ballistic missile (MRBM). In 1966, China flew a MRBM with a nuclear warhead and began MRBM deployment. Such speedy development owed much to the simultaneous initiation of the nuclear warhead and the ballistic missile programs in 1956.

CHINA'S 1982 SLBM test was a milestone event that surprised some Western observers who had considered the project both too expensive for a poor country such as China and strategically unnecessary.[2] Not understood at the time was that China had begun planning for its sea-based deterrent in 1956, eight years before Beijing's project on the first atomic detonation came to fruition.

In 1960, engineers at the Hongqi Chinese shipyard in Luda started to assemble a diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine. Its construction was completed in 1964. Simultaneously, plans to apply nuclear power to submarines also began. During his April 1960

[2]Prior to China's SLBM test in October 1982, most Western observers thought that the PRC's SLBM program would be too costly, technologically difficult, and too provocative to the United States, whose support of Beijing was indispensable for countering the Soviet threat at that time. See, for example, Doug Richardson and Graham Warwick, "China's Air and Missile Forces," *Flight International 116* (September 22, 1979), p. 959.

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visit to Japan, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai revealed that within five years China would begin building its first nuclear attack submarine (SSN). The designing of the ship began in 1965, its construction followed in 1968. In retrospect, the threads that were pulled together in 1982 to form China's sea-based nuclear deterrent appeared quite early—four years before its first nuclear detonation, the same year the United States acquired its first SLBM, and eight years before the Soviet Union followed suit.

Since the end of the 1970s, the military's share of China's national budget has continuously declined.[3] Military modernization has occupied the lowest priority of the Four Modernizations. (The others, in order, are Industry, Agriculture, and Science-Technology.) In March 1988, Zhao Ziyang even placed defense as the tenth and last item on his policy checklist during his speech to the National People's Congress. However, the constraint on the defense budget has not slowed China's progress in nuclear weapons development. According to some analysts, one reason is that additional funding for such programs comes from separate sources allegedly allocated for scientific research. In addition to acquiring technology for extended-range ICBMs in 1980, for multiple warheads in 1981, and for SLBMs in 1982, China has made great strides in its space program, heavily manned by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and intimately related to the technology of the nuclear weapons development.

In April 1984, China succeeded in sending a satellite into geosynchronous orbit. By March 1988, it had launched ten recoverable satellites with a 100 percent success rate since November 1975. In addition to China, only the United States and the Soviet Union have so far mastered the technology to recover satellites. On September 7, 1988, China successfully sent a meteorological satellite into solar-synchronous orbit with a launcher designated as Long March 4. The test paved the way for Beijing's acquisition of an extended-range ICBM, East-Wind 6, which uses the same rocket. East-Wind 6 is more powerful than the full-range (9,400-mile) ICBM tested in 1980. However, the specifications and the development of East-Wind 6 have been shrouded in mystery and secrecy, apparently to avoid projecting a threatening image of China to the world. A similar approach was evident in 1976 when Beijing launched a space satellite with a rocket equivalent in power to that used by East-Wind 5, the full-range ICBM tested four years later. Serving a multitude of scientific and commercial purposes, the space program provides a convenient arena for furthering China's nuclear weapons delivery capability.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

SINCE OCTOBER 1964, China has maintained with impressive consistency three basic principles in its declared nuclear weapons doctrine. One is that China develops nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense. A second is that China acquires nuclear weapons in order to break the superpowers' nuclear arms monopoly so that the world's nuclear arsenal will eventually be dismantled. A third is that China will never initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The "no first use" pledge signifies that China will only resort to its nuclear weapons for retaliation. To a typical U.S. observer steeped in the tradition of Massive Retaliation and Mutually Assured Destruction, such a second-strike posture for Beijing implies that the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter, not to fight, a nuclear war. The consequent expectation has been that the Chinese do not need to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) to be used on the battlefield for nuclear war-fighting, an expectation reinforced by the public silence of PRC officials about Chinese development of a tactical nuclear capability.

[3]The share of China's defense budget in government expenditures declined steadily from 17.5 percent (U.S. $5.8 billion) in 1979 to 8.3 percent (U.S. $5.3 billion) in 1987. Tai Ming Cheung, "Modernizing China's Defense," in *Armed Forces*, September 1988, p. 415.

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Within the Chinese military, however, training soldiers to fight a nuclear battle has been, far from an abstract option, a practiced agenda. Three years prior to China's first atomic detonation, the PLA General Political Department issued a guideline to high level commanders in a then classified document, *Bulletin of Activities, (Gongzuo Tongxun)*, No. 27, on July 25, 1961. The guideline stated: "... the Army ... besides learning the methods of defense, should ... find out how to use our atomic and chemical weapons for successful attacks...." In the 1980s the PLA has pursued its tactical nuclear capability with heightened zeal. The February 29, 1980 issue of the *PLA News* (Jiefangjun Bao) reported an exercise where the Chinese side attacked, with a miniaturized nuclear warhead of five-kiloton yield, an enemy equipped with TNWs and holding a defensive battlefield position at the same moment. Since the mid-1980s tactical nuclear troop training has begun to take on a combined-arms dimension. In mid-October 1987, the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted exercises simulating combat under nuclear warfare conditions in the West Pacific and South China Sea. At the end of June 1988, the Chinese Navy and Air Force jointly held a two-hour exercise under simulated nuclear warfare conditions at a naval base in the East China Sea. During the event, Chinese bombers attacked the naval base with mock nuclear weapons. By 1988, the PLA had acquired TNWs including at least nuclear land mines, nuclear bombs deliverable by fighter-bombers, short-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, and submarine-launched cruise missiles that may carry nuclear warheads.

Beyond Minimum Deterrence

ONE DISTINCT FEATURE of China's nuclear weapons strategy is the art of manipulating ambiguity, aimed at the prospective enemy's perception, and achieved through massive concealment, peppered with selective and sometimes redundant revelation. From the beginning, the deployment of Chinese strategic land-based ballistic missiles has been characterized by concealment, mobility, and dispersal in contrast to the conspicuous, stationary, and concentrated deployment of other nuclear powers such as the U.S. and France. The Chinese have hidden their missiles under camouflage, in mountain caves, and in jungles. According to one report, neither of the superpowers with their extensive satellite reconnaissance was completely certain of having located all of China's strategic land-based ballistic missiles.[4]

The Chinese leaders have been silent about the operational doctrine of their nuclear weapons. Beijing has publicly enunciated little about its operational plans, such as at whom the nuclear weapons are targeted, where in that country they intend to strike, and when exactly they will launch a retaliatory attack. One explanation widely shared in the West is Chinese ignorance—saying little reflects knowing little—resulting from a late entry into the world's nuclear club. The validity of that explanation is questionable. It assumes that a member pronounces its knowledge and that the knowledge increases in proportion to years of membership in the nuclear club. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise, especially when the practice of the Soviet leaders, whose penchant for secrecy is comparable to that of their Chinese counterparts, is examined. Most of the Soviet military chiefs—Marshals V. D. Sokolovsky, A. A. Grechko, D. F. Ustinov, and N. V. Ogarkov—have written on Soviet strategy. While Sokolovsky's classic *Military Strategy* was published in 1962, five years after the Soviet Union launched its first ICBM, no Chinese equivalent has yet appeared, already eight years after the first flight of China's full-range ICBM in 1980. Beijing's silence on its operational doctrine seems less a sign of ignorance than an indication of an implicit deterrent doctrine.

As a result of China's strategy of ambi-

[4]U.S. Senate and Congressional Research Service, *Implications of U.S.-China Military Cooperation* (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 2.

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guity, the impressive development of its nuclear force escaped the attention not only of the Western general public, but also of Western experts. During a March 19, 1986 U.S. Senate hearing, Senator William Proxmire asked: "What do you find about Chinese nuclear capability? Are they building up . . . ?" The U.S. official responsible for watching the PRC defense did not have an answer. A brief reply was provided afterwards for the record.[5]

Insufficient Western attention has resulted not only in ignorance of China's nuclear arms hardware but also in misperceptions of the accompanying software: the mode of China's nuclear deterrence. It has been commonly accepted in the West that the best description of China's nuclear strategy—if it has one at all—is that of minimum deterrence. A closer examination suggests that such labeling is inappropriate and misleading.

MINIMUM DETERRENCE is defined as a strategy to deter a rational attack by relying on a small strategic nuclear force capable of inflicting limited, yet unacceptable, damage to an enemy. Since the term supposedly describes a strategy rather than a mere quantitative measure of the nuclear armory, it also carries qualitative and conceptual implications.

Because minimum deterrence is not principally a war-fighting strategy, a nation following its tenets will tend to accept the notion of mutual vulnerability: stability of deterrence is maintained through a balance of terror. It follows that seeking self-protection destabilizes this mutual hostage-holding relationship. The Chinese have never accepted mutual vulnerability. For at least three reasons, they find absurd the idea of leaving their survival in the hands of foreigners. First, the Chinese still bitterly remember how foreign powers infringed upon their national sovereignty from the mid-nineteenth century up to the mid-twentieth century. Second, the Soviet Union, a once trusted ally, turned into a most dangerous and threatening enemy in the 1960s and 1970s. Third, an ancient Chinese strategist named Sun Zi, whose teaching has remained influential, once laid down the precept that in war, more important than attempting to win is to first occupy an undefeatable, hence an invulnerable, position.

A second practical implication of minimum deterrence is that the nation subscribing to it, once attacked, will incline toward retaliating immediately with an "all-out" strike lest its small arsenal not survive or, through attrition, be reduced to a level below that needed for inflicting substantial pain on the enemy. In other words, adherents of minimum deterrence believe that nuclear war is likely to be spasmodic. But the Chinese have always perceived general war, conventional and nuclear, to be a protracted conflict. An insight into the Chinese concept of protracted nuclear war was given by a PRC strategist who said that Chinese commanders had considered launching strategic ballistic missiles against the Soviets "hours, days, weeks, months, or even years" after a Soviet nuclear attack on China.[6]

A third implication of minimum deterrence drawn by its subscribers is that only a finite number of strategic delivery vehicles—often put as fewer than 200–250—are required to carry it out. Typical are the practices of Great Britain and France, who now have 64 and 151 strategic delivery vehicles respectively. The count for China, continuously on the rise, had exceeded 250 by the mid-1980s.

A fourth implication is that the total effective destructive power of the subscribing nation falls between 10 and 100 megatons, and probably need not exceed 200. By 1985, the

[5]U.S. Senate, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Congress, Second Session, Part II, Executive Session, March 19, 1986 (Washington: GPO, 1986), p. 123.

[6]Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, *War and Peace: The Views From Moscow and Beijing* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 129.

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total strategic nuclear megatonnage of Great Britain and France was below 40 and 150, respectively, while China's went beyond 350, far surpassing the conventionally conceived scope of minimum deterrence.

Finally, a fifth implication is that the variety of the subscriber's strategic delivery vehicles remains unexpansive. The origin of the term minimum deterrence, whose development coincided with the 1950s U.S. Polaris argument, suggests that such a notion is typified by the sole reliance on a sea-based deterrent, as evidenced by the subsequent strategic deployment by Great Britain. The Chinese, in contrast, have never ceased to expand their nuclear weapons spectrum. Unlike France, which has limited its land-based strategic deterrent to one kind—eighteen intermediate-range ballistic missiles—China has acquired four kinds, from a medium-range ballistic missile to a full-range intercontinental ballistic missile and is currently developing a fifth kind, the extended-range intercontinental ballistic missile. Since Beijing has acquired its survivable, sea-based nuclear deterrent since the mid-1980s, its incessant augmentation of the land-based spectrum signifies a strategic intent that goes far beyond the Polaris model of minimum deterrence conceived and developed in the West.

Policy Relevance

THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS may be labeled as academic with negligible impact on reality. However, three recent trends of events overturn such a verdict.

The first trend is the robust economic performance in China since its leadership launched its modernization drive a decade ago. Since then, the growth of China's gross national product (GNP) has continued to be positive, resulting by 1988 in the longest period of unbroken growth in PRC history. Moreover, China's GNP growth has exceeded 10 percent every year since 1983. The first two quarters in 1988 saw China's GNP growing at an extraordinary rate of 17 percent. Indeed, high growth has brought China raging urban inflation up to 30 percent in retail price. Socially destabilizing, this rampant inflation compelled the PRC leadership's decision to suppress economic growth to 8 percent in the coming two years. Nevertheless, even when curbed at an 8 percent growth rate, China's total GNP will have doubled three years before the end of the century.

China's impressive economic improvement has led an increasing number of Western economists to forecast sustained expansion of its national wealth. For example, Albert Keidel, president of Washington D.C.'s Rock Creek Research which specializes in China's economy, observed in March 1987 that by the end of the century, China will have joined in East Asia's "miracle growth" exemplified by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and that "China's economy will be larger than most current projections suggest."[7] The Strategy Commission's forecast on China's growing economy, rather than representing a shocking prediction, simply continued the recent wave of Western awareness of surging PRC economic power.

In the past decades, when China hovered between seventh and tenth in world rankings of national economies, it entered the nuclear weapons club, surpassed France and Great Britain in the size of its nuclear arsenal, and developed a triad of survivable retaliatory nuclear forces. If by 2010 China's economy will have become, not necessarily the world's second largest as predicted by the Commission, but third, fourth, or even fifth, what will China's continuously growing nuclear arsenal then be like?

Endowed with an immense labor force and abundant natural resources, China still has a grossly inefficient economy. Its great potential for growth remains largely untapped. If China's economy becomes the world's number two in total GNP not necessarily by 2010, but by 2020 or 2030, or even

[7]David M. Lampton and Catherine H. Keyser, eds. *China's Global Presence* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), p. 67.

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2050, the strategic implications for the United States and the other Asian countries must be considered.

The second trend that has enhanced the policy relevance of China's nuclear weapons strategy is the recent activity in arms control and disarmament. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, signed by the superpowers on December 8, 1987, eliminated an entire category of weapons between the superpowers, making China—with a near monopoly on ballistic missiles 300–3000 miles in range—a much coveted source of arms supply to third world countries in general and rich Middle Eastern customers in particular. In addition, the restrictions on missile sales announced last year by the U.S. and six of its allies further enhanced the desirability of Chinese missiles.

THE STRATEGIC arms reduction talks (START) between Washington and Moscow which began in mid-1982 have made substantial progress since the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in 1985. Although the START negotiations were not concluded during the Reagan administration, the issue in all likelihood will remain on the U.S. national agenda for years to come. Among the items agreed to by both sides are a 50 percent cut in nuclear warheads and a 1,600 ceiling on strategic launchers that largely consist of medium and long-range bombers, land-based ballistic missiles, and sea-based ballistic missiles. Thus the realization of a START regime would dramatically boost the status of the third nuclear power, hitherto perceived to be relatively insignificant. If the proposed START limitations were adopted today, the percentage of the total number of Chinese strategic launchers to the equivalent number of either superpowers' would rise to 17 percent, from less than .5 percent two decades ago. If China's strategic armory were to expand at the current rate (70 percent per decade), the figure would soar to 30 percent in ten years. Given China's growing national wealth, its demonstrated ability to expedite development of weapons systems, and its expanding access to Western science and technology, the percentage could rise even higher. Granted, one could add the 215 strategic launchers of the combined British and French nuclear forces in 1988 to the superpowers' total (5,481 in 1988, but only 3,200 under a START regime). That would not change the ratio very much.

For years, both Washington and Moscow attempted to persuade Beijing to enter the strategic arms control negotiations. Although Beijing had begun to show interest in the issues by the mid-1980s, this change in attitude did not alter China's condition that, for it to participate in such talks from an inferior position, the superpowers must first terminate all testing, production, and deployment of their nuclear weapons. The superpowers' recent progress in arms reduction revived some expectations in the West that China might soften its stance on participating in arms control. That expectation was chilled by the June 2, 1988 statement made at the United Nations by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, when he reiterated China's former position on disarmament and found insufficient the superpowers' efforts to date: "Even if they reduce their strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, the remaining nuclear weapons they possess can still destroy the world several times over."

The third trend that has increased the significance of China's nuclear weapons strategy is the growing assertiveness of Beijing's foreign policy, manifested by its active effort to sell arms around the world and its apparent preparations for building a capability to project forces outside China proper. In the fall of 1987, Iran fired at ships passing through the Persian Gulf with Silkworm missiles originating in China. In mid-March, 1988 it was revealed that China had been selling Saudi Arabia East-Wind 3 ballistic missiles which, with a 1,600-mile range, can reach any site in Israel. Three months later, the Israeli press reported China's prospective sales to Syria of a mobile, solid-fuel M-9 missile with 357-mile range, a weapon that would expose Israel to additional threat. That Syria with its conventional dependence on Soviet arms supplies

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would approach Beijing shows how the INF treaty enhanced the international significance of China's strategic arsenal.

During his July 14–15 visit to Beijing, Secretary of State George Shultz urged the Chinese to stop its "indiscriminate" arms sales in that tinderbox region. He achieved no immediate success. In September, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci made another attempt while visiting Beijing. He returned to Washington feeling "confident" that the Chinese would be "prudent and responsible" in their transfer of missiles but admitted that PRC leaders did not give him any assurances. Meanwhile, reports continued to circulate that potential buyers of M–9 missiles include not only Syria but also Iran and Pakistan. Whether China's aggressive effort to sell arms is precipitated by the military's need to compensate for a curtailed defense budget, or whether such sales represent a basic shift in foreign policy, this new PRC assertiveness has coincided with an increasingly outward-looking and active PLA.

On March 14, 1988, the Chinese navy sank three Vietnamese boats during a territorial conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The prior coastal patrol image of the PRC navy was then in need of revision. On April 5, General Chi Hoatian, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, stated during an interview that China should "raise its combat capability through the development of new weapons systems." Referring to the comparison between Chinese military capability and the advanced powers, he avowed, "Whatever others have, we will have; whatever others do not have, we will also have." On June 3, Beijing announced that it will further strengthen its 56,000-man marine corps with increased training and equipment. In mid-June, the *New China Agency* reported the formation of a 1,500-man rapid deployment force that, within twenty hours, can reach anywhere in Chinese territory, as defined by Beijing. At the end of June, the Chinese air force and navy conducted a large scale exercise in the East China Sea under simulated nuclear and chemical warfare conditions. In September, an Australian radio station reported that China was ready to begin construction in Dalien of a 60,000 ton aircraft carrier. All this suggests that the PLA is developing the skills and infrastructure necessary for power projection, in addition to maintaining its traditional People's War capability.

Beyond Rational Calculus

THE CONTINUING advancement of China's nuclear arms can be explained in terms of a number of motives, including the maintenance of security. Yet, Beijing decided to go nuclear during 1955–56—after the threat from the U.S. had already passed its peak as the Korean War came to an end, but long before the threat from the Soviet Union grew dangerous in the 1960s and 1970s. What compelled Mao and his colleagues to acquire the atomic bomb went beyond simple security considerations. The motivations comprised, among others, maintenance of national autonomy and security, global influence, and even future technological spillover to facilitate domestic economic development.

But, the most powerful and persistent motivation has been to regain lost national self-esteem. Two months after China's first atomic detonation, Premier Zhou Enlai spoke on the event: "Have we not exploded an atomic bomb? Has not the label, 'Sick Man of the East', fastened to us by Westerners, been flung off?" Three weeks after China's first successful test on a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October 1982, the *PLA News* recalled the sinking of Chinese warships by the Japanese navy in 1894–95, which resulted in a devastating national humiliation to the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty, and commented that "the billowing waves splashed up by the SLBM washed clean the historical shame imposed upon this great nation."

To regain national self-esteem is not strictly a strategic motivation for China. Nor is it a rational one. It has, however, sustained this poor and backward nation's efforts to achieve the status of the world's third largest nuclear power during decades of extremely

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adverse conditions. Such motivation guarantees the continuity of China's improvement of its nuclear capability. Facilitated by growing national wealth and boosted in comparative nuclear force by superpower arms reduction, China's status as a nuclear power will dramatically rise.

China may never have the opportunity to use its nuclear weapons in armed conflict. Nevertheless, its psychological use of the weapons will be significant. China's heightened nuclear status, as perceived by the world, will serve as the backbone of what Beijing has announced to be its "independent foreign policy," increasingly assertive in an emerging multipolar world. An inward-looking, melancholy-faced, and slow-moving panda will not overnight become a howling and mauling grizzly. The panda, however, has the potential to gradually transform itself into an outward-looking, self-assured, and dynamic dragon. The nature of the dragon, belligerent as Saint George's assailant monster or benevolent as conceived in Oriental mythology, depends on the persuasion of the political rule in China. In either case, the days when China's nuclear weapons strategy could be taken lightly are now history.

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Why Commissions Don't Work

Gary J. Schmitt

THE YEAR WAS 1966. Nevada highways had no speed limit. Victory in Vietnam was just around the corner. And political science still thought itself a science. It was also the year that saw the appearance of Aaron Wildavsky's classic article, "The Two Presidencies."

Wildavsky's essay sought to explain how it "is" that a U.S. president is able "to control defense and foreign policies and so completely overwhelm those who might wish to thwart him." Compared with the presidential scorecard in the domestic arena, the Oval Office's record in the area of national security seemed to indicate that there was not just one presidency, but two.

Indeed the nation's chief executive seemed to resemble the figures in last year's Christmas-time hit movie, "Twins." In domestic disputes, he stood like Danny Devito; in foreign affairs, Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Things have obviously changed. Nevada has a speed limit. Vietnam was won, but by the wrong side. And, as the above example suggests, political science is far from exact.

To be fair, Wildavsky would not claim otherwise. He would be the first to admit that the two presidencies thesis was not to be taken as an immutable law of nature. It was a description of what was, not what had to be. Today, the thesis is in need of some revision. In recent years in the area of foreign and defense affairs, attempts by the President to flex some muscle have met with resistance, and sometimes defeat.

In two important instances—the modernization of the nation's land-based nuclear deterrent, and the crisis in Central America—that resistance was sufficiently strong to compel the Reagan administration to create ad hoc, presidential commissions in an effort to overcome policy stalemates.

The advantages thought to be gained by creating such panels are well known. A bipartisan segment of the elite is asked to deliberate about a matter of high political import, unencumbered by the constraints of the political process. The obvious virtue of a commission is that its members are, in theory, more free to consider an issue in an objective manner and, if required, to make whatever bargains are necessary to achieve a common ground.

Until fairly recently the appointment of a commission was thought to be a way of avoiding an issue, not a mechanism for actually solving problems. Whether commissions actually worked this way or not, the conventional wisdom was that they were a convenient way of delaying judgment on a matter while at the same time seeming to give it some attention. Commissions were, according to the literature, tools "to treat the politics of the situation rather than the situation."

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But perhaps the most important point regarding the use of commissions is that a critical problem like that of Central America or our nuclear deterrent would have to be turned over to such bodies at all. Commissions have now come to be seen as an appropriate response to policy deadlocks between Congress and the president. Within the arena of national security, they serve as a necessary substitute for a functioning foreign policy consensus. Behind the creation of these bodies lies the judgment that the normal political process has simply broken down. Whatever else might be said about commissions, their use seems to be an implicit admission on the part of the government that it cannot (or will not) govern in these critical instances.

The Scowcroft Commission

THE DECISION to modernize the land-based leg of the nation's nuclear deterrent was made in the early 1970s. It was based on the reasonable premise that the Minuteman system would gradually become obsolete militarily and, by dint of years, progressively more expensive to maintain operationally. The need for the greater capability of the MX grew as the number of high-value, hardened military targets in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact continued to expand. Without the more effective MX in its arsenal, the U.S. ability to maintain a satisfactory level of deterrence would become increasingly problematic.

The difficulty was that, by the late 1970s, Moscow was in the process of fielding an ICBM force that would be capable of neutralizing our own silo-based ICBMs. If the MX was to be deployed, the question was how. Given the character of the Soviet build-up and the resulting "window of vulnerability" for our own ICBM force, basing MX in the standard fixed silos seemed out of the question.

The Carter administration's answer was to deploy 200 MXs and move them in and out of 4,600 shelters dug over large expanses of Utah and Nevada. To allow the Soviets to verify that the shelters contained only the proper number of missiles, the plan included elaborate barriers and "viewports" to permit their satellites to determine, at random times, where missiles were and where they weren't. Candidate Ronald Reagan rejected this massive Rube Goldberg-like scheme as the logical culmination of a bankrupt arms control process that not only failed to reduce the level of nuclear arms but had made keeping them even more costly. The fact that public opinion in the affected states was decidedly negative about the proposed basing plan only helped reinforce candidate Reagan's opposition.

But, as President, Reagan wanted MX's capability. In October 1981, he announced plans to deploy 100 of the ICBMs in silos, the first 36 to go into existing Titan holes. (The plan was described as a temporary measure until a more permanent solution to the basing problem could be found.) Temporary or not, the plan drew little support, even in the Republican-controlled Senate. Forced back to the drawing board, the next Administration basing proposal, in November 1982, was the equally ill-fated "dense pack," a system of closely-spaced silos whose vulnerability was theoretically reduced by the fratricidal effects attacking nuclear warheads would have on each other. For a number of reasons, including lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposal was dead on arrival on Capitol Hill.

In the wake of its failure, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces was born. In January 1983, the panel was formally constituted and charged with "review[ing] the strategic modernization program . . . [paying] particular attention to the intercontinental ballistic missile system and basing alternatives for that system." Brent Scowcroft, retired Air Force general and former national security adviser, was named its chairman.

The eleven members of the Scowcroft panel were divided between Republicans and Democrats, all well-known and widely respected figures. Equally impressive was the panel's list of senior counsellors, a list that included four recent secretaries of defense. Expectations for the Commission's success

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were high. Not only did it have the "right" mix of members, but it diligently went about the business of touching all the right political bases. In particular, the Commission was careful to consult with key Congressmen and Senators. As one Commission member was quoted as saying: "We're not going to the President with anything until we know the Democrats can buy it."

The Commission conducted its task with dispatch. In March, after scores of meetings and hearing hundreds of witnesses, the Commission completed its work and reported to the President. Its key findings: deploy 100 MXs in existing Minutemen silos and develop a new, mobile, singlewarhead ICBM. A week later, the President endorsed the Report's recommendations. There was every hope that the panel's conclusions and proposed plan of action would, as they hoped, "provide the basis for a broad national consensus on these difficult issues." These hopes were apparently met when, in the first key vote following the issuance of the Commission Report in May 1983, the House passed—by a fifty-three vote margin—the proposed basing mode for MX.

In retrospect that vote marks the high point of the panel's success on Capitol Hill. From then on, the fortunes of the "consensus" package put forward by the Commission declined. By the following October, monies for MX development could only muster a nine vote majority in the lower chamber. In the Senate, MX would face even stiffer opposition in 1984. Only a tie-breaking vote by the Vice President saved the missile program defeat. Even then, the Administration's request to procure 40 of the ICBMs for the year had been slashed to 21. Finally, growing tired of repeated and highly contentious votes over MX, Congress in 1985 capped the number of MX missiles to be deployed in silos at 50—half that recommended by the Scowcroft Commission.

Congress did not completely shut the door on procuring more MXs . . . if a satisfactory basing mode could be found . . . if, in short, the Commission's recommendation was put aside.

In response, the Administration began to lobby for putting 50 more of the MX on specially configured trains. But while this proposal was getting "on track," the wheels were beginning to come off the small ICBM program (by then dubbed "Midgetman"). With political pressures building to reduce the defense budget, the Senate began to question the $30–$50 billion price tag for deploying 500 Midgetman missiles. In contrast, 50 rail-based MXs, carrying the same number of warheads as the fully deployed Midgetman force, were projected to cost about a third as much to field. As the Commission itself had noted, in "bang for buck" comparisons, Midgetman was coming in a poor second.

IN ADDITION, it was believed that the Administration was less than committed to development of the small ICBM. In part, this had to do with Congress's decision to legislate strict requirements on the missile itself. The result was a missile tightly circumscribed in throwweight and capacity to carry penetration aids, decoys, and chaff. The Administration's view of the matter was reflected in the ease with which it changed spending priorities vis-à-vis the two systems. The funds requested for Midgetman development in 1987 had been more than three times the amount asked for to develop the rail version of the MX. In 1988, the opposite was the case. Faced with this change, a shrinking defense budget, and a split between the two chambers over which system to fund, Congress did the expected—it slowed work on both and deferred a "final" decision on funding until the new President had taken office.

In the end, the fate of the Scowcroft Commission's proposals was probably sealed by the fact that they were *perceived* as being politically expedient. For the Administration, there was MX; for those worried about ICBM vulnerability, there was the mobile missile; for those interested in arms control, there was a new approach based on limiting warheads rather than launchers. In the words of Congressman Les Aspin at the time: "This is a straight-out political compromise."

So, fairly or not, the Report, rather than

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calming the waters, provided new stimulus to those pushing their own agendas. In the absence of an agreed-upon strategic vision, bipartisanship tends to be defined by (and at the mercy of) the most persistent political actor. Perceived as an act of high political calculation, the Report became an invitation to those involved in the issue to keep the bidding open. And keep it open they did.

Under the pressure of an upcoming vote in May 1983 on MX, the House forced the President to keep the Commission alive. The panel, led by its chairman Brent Scowcroft and Commission member James Woolsey, then undertook the task of hammering out a new arms control proposal that satisfied Senators Nunn and Cohen, among others. The result of this effort was the tabling in Geneva of the now largely forgotten "double build-down" proposal and mutual agreement to changes in the formal U.S. negotiating position at the talks. Intentionally or not, the Commission became a vehicle for Congress to attempt to participate in the negotiating process. In the fall, Woolsey was even added to the START delegation. Congress now had (along with JCS, State, and the rest) its own representative to the talks. To quote Strobe Talbott, it was as though the "legislative branch of the government had, in effect, fired the executive branch." While this is an overstatement, 1983 certainly seemed to be a year marked less by negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva than with Congress here in Washington.

Executive branch independence was not the only casualty. By buying into the Commission's "compromise," Rep. Les Aspin had implicitly agreed to back deployment of MX. But supporting MX ran counter to the wishes of a majority of his Democratic colleagues and eventually almost cost him the chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee. Unlike chairmen of old, Aspin was not as free to commit his committee to a particular position. Institutional changes have made Capitol Hill a more democratic (or anarchic) place and, as a result, a more difficult partner with which to work. In brief, putting a consensus package together is one thing, making it stick (in today's Congress) is another.

These institutional hurdles aside, the political difficulties facing Aspin and the Scowcroft Commission were not insignificant. By the end of the Carter administration, a sense of urgency had developed in the country regarding the need to meet the Soviet build-up in its nuclear forces. The U.S. was facing, according to then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, one of those "critical turning points in the histories of nations." Our response to that threat had been deferred "too long; we can defer it no longer." By the end of 1982, however, public opinion had shifted. Not only was there now a reluctance on the part of their representatives to deploy MXs in this or that basing scheme, but, through the efforts of the "nuclear freeze" movement and the publicity given the Catholic Bishops' letter on nuclear deterrence, there was a growing public sentiment that doubted the moral legitimacy of these weapons per se.

In this political environment it was not surprising that the White House was reluctant to promote deployment of the MX through arguments centered on its specific capabilities. When President Reagan talked to the issue, he made his case for the MX in terms of the age of our existing ICBMs, the Soviets' own modernization program, and the need to negotiate from a posture of strength in Geneva. What was missing was a substantive discussion of MX's unique characteristics or, more importantly, the strategic rationale for its acquisition. In the end, the Oval Office never fully joined the question.

Against this background, the Scowcroft Commission Report made a useful contribution to the debate. It was blunt, for example, about the need to bolster deterrence by being "able to put at risk those types of Soviet targets—including hardened ones such as military command bunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons storage, and the rest—which the Soviet leaders have given every indication by their actions they value most." Our strategic modernization, it argued, should be keyed not to our own expectations

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but to the "set of beliefs" that rule "the minds of the Soviet leaders." Their belief in nuclear weapons as a means for advancing state interests and, if necessary, fighting, was the reality that had to be dealt with. Deterrence was not some "abstract notion."

But while the Commission was clear in this regard, it also undertook to propose a new strategic regime in which "stability should be the primary objective." The key to this new era would be the deployment of the smaller, mobile, single-warhead ICBM on our part, as well as the Soviet Union. By deploying the MX in the short term and altering the character of our modernization program in the long term, we could hope to induce the Soviets to join us in an arms control regime based on this principle. In short, we sought, in the words of one commission member, "to convince Moscow" to abandon their ways and adopt our own abstract notion of stability—a concept, Fritz Ermarth has pointed out, "vital to U.S. strategic thinking, but hardly identifiable in Soviet strategic writings."

In the end, the Commission Report rhetorically was a divided document, whose recommendations stood on separate footings. Politically, there was a need to have an unflinchingly clear, coherent strategic view that could order and prioritize the modernization program. Failing that, it seems inevitable that the political forces involved would see in the Report their own particular agendas and eventually go their separate ways.

The Kissinger Commission

IN JULY 1983 President Reagan established the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. Its genesis was Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson's frustration with attempts to bring the Reagan White House and Hill Republicans together with his Democratic colleagues in the Congress over the issue of Central America. His concern was shared by key players within the Administration. With military aid to El Salvador stalled in Congress, and the program to support the Nicaraguan insurgency under growing attack, Administration policy appeared to be unraveling. With the success of the Greenspan Commission on Social Security freshly in mind and the just completed Scowcroft Commission example before it, the logic for creation of another panel must have seemed unassailable.

The Commission, composed of twelve members and chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was given the task of formulating a policy for the region that might command bipartisan support. The Commission was composed of five Democrats and seven Republicans, who were (on the whole) decidedly moderate and pragmatic in character.

After six months of review, hearings, and travel, the Commission completed its work and reported its findings to the President in early January 1984. A month later, President Reagan, with few changes, submitted a legislative package embodying the Commission's proposals to Congress.

While the Kissinger Commission report contained scores of recommendations, its central proposals were economic and security-related, and divided between immediate and longer-term programs. In the short term, the Commission sought to stabilize the situation in Central America by a number of steps, the key one being an immediate infusion of aid: $400 million in economic and developmental assistance for the region and $400 million, over two years, for the military effort in El Salvador. For the long haul, the Commission proposed that Washington provide some $8 billion (spread over five years) in economic aid to the region and firmly commit itself to resisting Soviet and Cuban expansion into the area. To accomplish the former, it recommended a number of financial and institutional measures intended to build an infrastructure for the region's economic growth. For the latter, it proposed a substantial increase in military aid to El Salvador and "oppose[d] dismantling existing incentives and pressures" on Nicaragua. Underlying all these proposals was a sense of the region's geopolitical significance to the United States. While humanitarian and human rights con-

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cerns played a role, they were secondary; the goal was less the establishment of functioning democracies than it was the prevention of Moscow from capitalizing on the real social tensions in the area.

In terms of straight numbers, probably the most successful implementation of the Commission's proposals was the emergency economic aid package. Well over 90 percent of the $400 million was appropriated in a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1984 (FY 84). Emergency military assistance for El Salvador had much tougher going. The FY 84 supplemental request from the Administration totaled nearly $179 million; Congress approved, in two separate acts, a figure just shy of $132 million. For the two year period, military aid was some $75 million short of the target set down by the Kissinger Commission.

For the long-term economic and development assistance, the Commission and the Administration proposed that the region receive a total of $6 billion ($1.2 billion per year) in direct aid and $2 billion in guarantees through FY 89. This part of the program has not fared nearly so well as its short-term counterpart. During its first three years, the amount of aid appropriated by the Congress for Central America fell further and further behind both the panel's recommendation and the Administration's actual requests. By FY 87, the State Department calculated that there existed a shortfall of three-quarters of a billion dollars between target levels and approved funds for the region. In general, the Commission had recommended almost doubling the amount of economic assistance planned for Central America. What actually got appropriated was an increase only somewhat more than half the originally projected sum.

It is possible, of course, to argue that the amount of economic support provided by Congress is a "glass half full." The level of support has been, after all, substantial. Certainly it is greater than what had been planned for the region before the Commission issued its report. Given the constraints imposed on the foreign aid budget by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the amount appears fairly impressive. No doubt a case can be made that Congress has made a solid effort to support the Commission's proposed economic assistance plan for Central America.

Yet this line of reasoning goes only so far. The conduct of foreign affairs has its own necessities and logic. Contrast, for example, the amount of aid the Soviet Union is willing to provide its Caribbean allies, Cuba and Nicaragua. Despite its economic problems, Moscow is still willing to subsidize those two countries, on a yearly basis, at a level approximately equal to the total amount of economic assistance proposed by the Commission for the whole of Central America—spread over half a decade. This is not to argue that every dollar or ruble is wisely spent; however, broadly speaking, the comparison is obviously useful in gauging strategic intent and commitment to the region.

In addition, Congress has recently begun to concern itself with whether assistance levels for Central America are "too high"—too high in the sense that other areas of the world are more destitute and in need. In 1987, for example, Congress explicitly curtailed executive branch discretion over the aid program to keep spending for Central America from adversely affecting assistance levels for sub-Saharan Africa. While not without its own strategic importance, the effort to protect funds for this part of the Third World owed more to philanthropic considerations than to geopolitical realities. In the end, it was another indication that the Commission had failed to convince Congress of the priority of a sustained commitment to El Salvador and its neighbors.

The Kissinger Commission's key security proposals—increased military aid to the region, particularly for El Salvador, and continued support for the contras—have fallen on hard times as well. While security assistance for El Salvador no longer is the cause for inflamed congressional debate, the amount of aid provided the Salvadoran military has steadily declined. The same is true for Honduras. In FY 88 the change was more than gradual: total U.S. military aid available for

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the region was some 40 percent less than what the Administration had requested. As for the contras, with the exception of 1986, funds to keep them in the field have been nil.

This lack of success is hardly surprising. Expectations were not high. In both the House and the Senate (even with its Republican majority) support was so thin that it was a real question as to whether the program laid out by the Report and sent forward by the Administration would even make it out of committee. This rough start was a blunt reminder that, whatever the merits of a given commission's work, it cannot avoid returning to the political system in which the original policy stalemate was lodged.

In the House, the first hurdle was Congressman Michael Barnes' subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Barnes described the Report as "a war plan, not a peace plan" and, through the subcommittee, gutted most of the Commission's recommendations from the foreign aid bill. And what aid the Committee permitted was placed under stringent controls and the threat of a one house legislative veto. At the full committee, the Report fared only slightly better. In the end, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee passed on to the full House a foreign aid bill that neither endorsed nor rejected the Kissinger Commission proposals.

In the Senate, the results were much the same. The Foreign Relations Committee reported out an assistance package minus the Commission's recommendations after the Senate's "odd couple" (Senators Dodd and Helms) joined forces to block attempts to push that part of the package through.

The turning point in the congressional debate took place several thousand miles south of Washington. In early May 1984, Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected President by the people of El Salvador. Widely and dramatically covered by the media, the election seemed almost overnight to give the Administration's assistance program for Central America new life and a new legitimacy. President Reagan followed Duarte's election with a televised address to the nation in which he appealed to the House, in particular, to pass the Administration's aid request for Central America. The next day, May 10, Majority Leader Jim Wright led 55 fellow Democrats across the aisle to support a Republican motion to add the $1.2 billion to the foreign aid bill called for by the Kissinger Commission.

In the end, most of the $1.2 billion was approved in that year's Continuing Resolution. But other parts of the aid package drawn up by the Commission (such as a multi-year appropriation) were dropped from the bill. Congress's commitment to the Commission's program was shaky at best. And as the above account suggests, even that support probably had less to do with the persuasiveness of the Report itself than with events in the region. Democracy takes root in El Salvador and aid is provided; mines go off in Nicaragua and funds for the *contras* disappear.

A key reason why the Commission had such a rough reception was that it began its work deep in a hole dug by the Reagan administration itself. While the President at the beginning of his first term focused his considerable communication skills on matters such as the budget and taxes, Central American policy was handed over to lesser officials for its defense and (on occasion) covert programs for its implementation. In neither the 1982 nor the 1983 State of the Union address did President Reagan make a single explicit reference to either El Salvador or Nicaragua. In fact, not until April 1983, more than twenty-seven months after taking office, did the President give a major speech on Central America.

The decision to conserve the Oval Office's political resources for fights over the domestic agenda may (from a certain perspective) have made sense at the time, but its consequence was an inadequate public articulation of what was at stake in the region. By the time of the Commission's creation, the terms of the debate over Central America had been set largely by others.

Moreover, even after the Commission submitted its report to the President, support from the White House was uneven. The State

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of the Union address that followed only two weeks later mentioned the Commission's work, praising the "wisdom" of bipartisanship, but offered no substantive commentary. (In fact, the President spoke more about issues such as space exploration and prayer in the schools than Central America.) While the Administration adopted the Commission's specific proposals as its own, the President did not campaign in any real sense for their implementation.

By late 1986 funding and implementation of the Commission's proposals had been so ragged that Congress asked the Administration to develop a plan for re-invigorating the panel's program. But it was a request that owed as much to the politics of the day as to any new-found appreciation by Congress of the substantive merits of the Report or sustained executive branch lobbying on its behalf. The request came from members of Congress who wanted to give themselves a bit of political cover for their vote to approve $100 million for the Nicaraguan resistance.

It is important to note how little impact, if any, the Commission's work had on this change in Capitol Hill's attitude toward the *contras.* The Administration's decision to alter its emphasis in the region from containing Marxist advances to promoting democracy, and the Sandinista's own heavy-handed totalitarian behavior, were the keys. The fact is, by 1986 the Administration had largely left the geopolitical thrust of the Kissinger Commission Report behind for a policy decidedly more ideological in character. The program laid out by the Commission stood to benefit from this change, but the Report itself was not its cause.

Like the Scowcroft Report before it, the Kissinger Report was without question a consensus document. As *The New Republic* noted:

> There is virtually no serious proposition about Central America that is not agreed upon. The crisis is military. The crisis is political. The crisis is economic. The crisis is regional. The crisis is global . . . The United States should send military aid . . . economic aid . . . social aid.

It provides a little to virtually everyone, both left and right. Yet, in doing so, Kissinger's Commission did not succumb simply to the politics of building a consensus. The document makes a strategic argument and holds to it. So, for example, while the roots of the crisis in Central America are described as being indigenous—the product of poverty and repression—the Report makes clear that the urgency here owes much to Cuban and Soviet exploitation of a situation in which important American interests are at stake. The Report, in short, has a logic and coherence that is more than the mere sum of its parts. As a result, it could be ignored but it could not be easily used for simple partisan advantage.

However, in the end, our policy toward Central America has been less affected by the work of the Kissinger Commission than events in the region, the inability of Congress to decide on, and stick to, a clear policy, and inconstant presidential leadership. Whatever its intrinsic merits, the lasting impact of the Commission has been far from what its creators had hoped.

NEITHER THE Kissinger nor the Scowcroft Report had the impact desired by their authors or promised by the theory that legitimates their use.

The beginning of this decade was marked by a debate over how best to modernize the nation's ICBM force; it nears its end with that debate still unresolved. In the meantime the Soviet Union has fielded two new, mobile ICBMs (the SS-25, and the SS-24) and readies itself for deployment of a follow-on to its nuclear behemoth, the SS-18. The Carter administration had plans for 200 MXs; the Reagan administration will leave office with 50.

As for Central America, the early 1980s saw Washington facing two immediate, practical problems. One centered on eliminating the threat to the region posed by the Sandinista consolidation of power in Nicaragua; the second involved sustaining a beleaguered regime in El Salvador. The first problem has obviously not been solved, and shows no sign of being solved anytime soon. As for the latter,

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El Salvador has been sustained; democracy has taken root and the insurgency essentially contained. Yet the existing stalemate in the war there and the increased attention given to a possible victory by the Right here suggests that El Salvador is less a problem solved than one put on the back burner. How much (or little) progress has been made in building a consensus about Central America will become more evident as Nicaragua moves off the country's front pages and the focus again returns to El Salvador.

Obviously, neither the Kissinger nor the Scowcroft Commission can be held solely accountable for what has happened. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the problems they were asked to tackle have not been solved, and their recommendations largely put aside.

Not all commissions, of course, have failed. Some, like the Greenspan-led panel on social security, have succeeded politically. Why do some achieve lasting results, and not others?

One answer might lie in the difference between domestic and foreign affairs. It may be the case that cutting a deal in domestic matters is easier—there is often a "pie" to be divided and any number of ways of doing so. Moreover, recommendations often can be implemented in a single act.

A second is that these commissions were being asked to accomplish very different tasks. The Kissinger and Scowcroft Commissions were established to come up with a set of recommendations around which a bipartisan consensus could be built. The Greenspan Commission was charged with developing a bipartisan plan for funding a program for which a fundamental consensus already existed. In matters like social security and base closings, what is missing is the political will to tackle these issues head on. What is absent in the debate over Central America and our strategic forces is not only will, but an agreed upon set of principles to guide the debate.

IN THE ABSENCE of such principles, presidential leadership in foreign and defense matters even approximating that described by Wildavsky will be difficult to sustain. Establishing a set of principles and rebuilding the intellectual framework for a new consensus is a task that no ad hoc commission is ever likely to accomplish. If it is to be done at all, it will require the sustained attention of the presidency.

But the breakdown of the postwar consensus is hardly the whole problem. As Wildavsky makes clear, the leadership position of the presidency was built on important institutional advantages, many of which have disappeared or have been greatly reduced. The demise of party politics and the rise of a semi-sovereign Congress have made constituting a consensus difficult, and maintaining and implementing it even more problematic.

Thus, even if a commission were able to accomplish the task of elucidating a set of principles acceptable across the political spectrum, it has no way of facilitating their adoption. Since the Executive Branch can no longer act with the unity of purpose and decisiveness which the Founders thought essential for conduct of our foreign and defense affairs, implementation of any policy is at the mercy of the various cross currents in today's Congress.

In the past, commissions were used by the government to avoid making decisions; today, they are used (in cases like base closings, pay raises, and the like) to avoid responsibility for making decisions. They are also used in attempts to circumvent the paralysis and incoherence of modern American government. But, as the history of the Scowcroft and Kissinger Commissions suggest, they are poor substitutes for presidential leadership and no hedge against the structural problems that mark the current congressional policy-making process. In fact, their use may only delay addressing these more fundamental issues.

Like speed limits on Nevada highways, commissions may be inevitable, but of marginal utility. And for those trying to get from Utah to California, they may prove a positive detriment.

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P. W. Botha's Foreign Policy

Robert B. Shepard and Christopher H. Goldman

PIETER W. BOTHA assumed the leadership of South Africa in September 1978 and in the ensuing ten years has led his country through a period marked by chronic internal unrest, a weak economy, and mounting international pressure against apartheid. While Botha has often been viewed—with some justification—as a heavy-handed, colorless dictator, he has established a clear and distinctive leadership style marked by an unrelenting appetite for political combat, a distaste for the traditional dogma of apartheid, and a passion for firm, centralized, hands-on management. At once aggressive, stern, stubborn, shrewd, and stolid, Botha has enjoyed power and has used it deftly.

Despite harsh criticism from his Afrikaner constituency, he has abolished many of the most visible aspects of apartheid, has extended voting rights to Asians and coloreds, abolished pass books, and opened up jobs previously unavailable to non-whites. This departure from apartheid orthodoxy has stemmed not from any belief in democracy, but rather from his perception that these moves will divide non-whites and frustrate opposition to his government. Indeed, Botha has shown himself to be a consummate Machiavellian whose policies have all sought to achieve his principal goal: the preservation of white rule in the long term. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of foreign policy.

Under Botha's tenure, every aspect of South African foreign policy has undergone a sweeping transformation. He has redefined radically the criteria for South Africa's security as well as the means by which his country deals with both southern Africa and the international community. Far less willing than his predecessors to accommodate South Africa to global opinion, he has embraced enthusiastically the use of military force, covert operations, and secret diplomacy. In doing so, he has afforded South Africa far greater flexibility in achieving foreign policy goals and responding to international challenges. He authored his nation's first comprehensive, guiding doctrine on foreign policy and developed a highly articulated grand strategy. Nevertheless, confronted with change and crises, he has shown a striking talent for maneuver and improvisation.

Botha has demonstrated a willingness to use force brazenly and regularly against the states of southern Africa. Yet he has also shown himself a veritable master of diplomacy, overt and convert, in expanding South Africa's network of trading partners and circumvent mounting international pressure to isolate Pretoria.

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The result has been a foreign policy that has dealt as well as possible with the unique circumstances in which South Africa finds itself. To be sure, Botha has made moves that might be questioned even in terms of realpolitik, and his record is not one of continual success. But given that he is concerned to maintain white preeminence, his foreign policy has been remarkably successful in maximizing South African power in adverse circumstances.

Botha's Ascendancy

A POLITICAL PROTÉGÉ of the first National Party prime minister, D. F. Malan, Botha rose rapidly through the party ranks, attaining the leadership of Cape Province at the age of forty. Two years later Prime Minister B. J. Vorster appointed him a member of his cabinet, and in 1966 named him defense minister, a post that he held for the next fourteen years.

It was during this period, in the mid-1970s, that South Africa experienced domestic and regional crises that for the first time in the nation's seventy year history raised doubts about the apartheid state's ability to survive. The Soweto disturbances of 1976, the gravest internal crisis the state had ever suffered, shook the confidence of South Africa's whites more than any previous domestic uprising. When, in the same year, the Portuguese government granted independence to Angola and Mozambique, the *cordon sanitaire* that had protected South Africa from black Africa evaporated and South Africa found itself with two hostile Marxist states on its borders. These two new states in turn became bases for guerrilla movements: Mozambique for guerrillas seeking to overthrow the Smith regime in Zimbabwe, and Angola for operations by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) against South African control in Namibia. With the traditional security perimeter seemingly shattered in the course of a year, a number of high ranking officials began to argue that Vorster's policy of detente toward the new neighbors amounted to appeasement, and would eventuate in the creation of bases for anti-apartheid guerrillas all along South Africa's borders. To survive and prosper, they argued, South Africa had to become a regional hegemon. Aggressive measures, including the use of force, were required to confront the revolutionaries on its borders and give Pretoria control over the region. P. W. Botha, whose advocacy of military solutions earned him the nickname "Piet Wapen" (Piet the weapon), emerged as the most vociferous proponent of this new strategy.

Botha became South Africa's high priest of national security policy. He was the driving force behind a huge arms build-up by South Africa in the mid-1970s; the principal advocate of South Africa's ill-fated incursion into Angola in 1975; and the architect of a series of raids on SWAPO bases in Angola in 1978. Botha also took the lead in developing a comprehensive national security doctrine when, in 1977, he and fellow hard-liners, mostly in the military, articulated their world-view in the form of a ministerial white paper. South Africa, they claimed, was under a "Total Onslaught" from external and internal forces, all of which were coordinated by Moscow. To combat this massive conspiracy, they argued, all sectors of South African society needed to be modernized and mobilized: the country must be transformed into a garrison state, with a permanently mobilized military, an indigenous military-industrial complex, and a system of domestic political controls capable of thwarting dissent within the country. This doctrine, eventually given the name "Total Strategy," represented the core of Botha's thinking as to how South Africa ought to adapt to the new, threatening situation that confronted it.

In 1978, when Vorster resigned under pressure, Botha, with the virtually solid support of his Cape base, won a hotly contested three-way race for the prime ministerial post, defeating Pik Botha and Connie Muldar on the second ballot. From the outset, Botha's leadership style contrasted sharply with that of Vorster. Where Vorster had been a sloppy and often indecisive leader, Botha, in the

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words of one veteran observer, was "a manager, an organizational virtuoso, a leader who relies on expert advice, planning, preparation, structure and follow-through. . . ."[1] And where Vorster eschewed long-term planning, developing policies reactively only when crises necessitated new responses, Botha, guided by the "Total Strategy," showed himself to be an aggressive initiator of action right from the outset.

DURING HIS FIRST few years in office, Botha's principal goal was to consolidate his power base. He skillfully restructured the entire South African government, turning it into a military style organization. From the cabinet down to the local level, Botha created a government that was at once more efficient, more hierarchical, and more obedient to his tight, personal control. By 1983, when his reforms were made permanent in a new constitution, Botha had created a new, highly centralized, and often secret system of management. With the entire governmental apparatus responsive to his control, Botha was able to assert his authority over national security policy without bending to the interests of the various groups that in the past had made the planning and coordination of policy a difficult and unpredictable affair.

At the apex of this apparatus stood a small, secretive group known as the State Security Council (SSC). This group, originally a largely inactive, pro forma council established under Vorster in 1972, was converted by Botha into the central decision-making body for all issues pertaining to national security. Its jurisdiction has been defined sufficiently broadly so that it has exercised authority not only over foreign policy decisions but also over all aspects of domestic political life, from the writing of the new constitution to determining the content of television programs. Composed of the approximately half-dozen leading cabinet officers (the numbers can vary), the SSC has become, in effect, a supercabinet. Its decisions, formulated at regular closed session meetings, always have been accepted by the full cabinet with little or no discussion. The secret, central role of the SSC has given Botha the capability to conduct the kind of secret diplomacy and covert military operations that have become his trademark.

Outside the SSC itself, the preeminent influence on Botha's foreign policy has been the military. His closest colleague over the past two decades has been Magnus Malan, Vorster's military chief of staff and, since 1980, Botha's own minister of defense. Malan has proven to be the most influential of a group of younger military strategists Botha has drawn into his inner circle to play a major role in the operation of the SSC. Indeed, professional military officers have headed the SSC secretariat, which provides the council with its own, separate sources of intelligence.

While the military has regularly propounded a hard-line, unilateral approach to foreign policy issues, the leaders of South Africa's large multinational corporations have just as regularly advocated diplomatic solutions. Concerned about maintaining a good investment climate and expanding trade opportunities, leading businessmen have continuously sought to upgrade South Africa's international image, and have also favored good relations with the states of southern Africa that provide South Africa with a steady source of much needed cheap labor. While they have not objected to the occasional use of force, corporate heads have consistently shown a preference for non-violent approaches to solving South Africa's problems.

The third major institution that has played an important role in foreign affairs has been the leadership of the National Party. Although they have been solidly behind Botha's domestic efforts to modernize apartheid and have supported many of Botha's specific foreign policy efforts, the party's leaders have been split on the general direction of policy, with a significant number, led by Botha's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roloef (Pik) Botha,

[1]Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1986), p. 34.

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advocating more conciliatory policies and a greater reliance on diplomacy. A highly visible and popular politician, Pik Botha has been particularly sensitive to South Africa's international image and has been the most outspoken counterweight to the military.

It is a testament to Botha's political prowess that he has managed to maintain the support of these three most powerful groups, despite their often differing perspectives on foreign policy. By tying the large corporations more closely to the government, he has often created overlapping interests. He has held numerous meetings with key businessmen, included private sector figures on the Defense Advisory Council, and involved individuals from the largest corporations in important foreign policy decisions. The result has been a growing interdependence of the three groups, and a greater reliance of all three on the central authorities.

Botha has experienced no serious challenges to his domination over either his party or the nation since he assumed power. Nevertheless, as South African politics have become increasingly fractious in the 1980s, the political arena has expanded and two new groups have begun to exert what, from Botha's point of view, has become an unwelcome influence on foreign policy: the political Right and non-whites.

Right-wing political parties have scored enormous electoral gains in the past few years. The Conservative Party, formed by dissident National Party members who failed to prevent Botha from initiating a series of domestic reforms, has replaced the moderate Progressive Federal Party as the major opposition group in Parliament. Led by Andreis Treuernicht, a former Botha cabinet minister, the Conservatives' popularity among working-class Afrikaners has soared, and they have taken an increasing number of parliamentary seats away from the National Party. Much of the Right's success, such as its recent electoral victories in white working-class districts of the Transvaal, can be traced to Botha's proclivity to favor the interests of big business over the interests of white labor. The right wing's political success has made it a powerful and persistent advocate for a hard-line foreign policy.

South Africa's non-white population, by contrast, has had absolutely no say in foreign policy matters. But its protests and uprisings have sharply limited the range of options available to policy-makers. The Sharpeville protests in 1960, the Soweto uprisings in 1975–76, and the widespread protests in 1985–86 have focused international attention on the plight of non-whites and the often brutal manner used by the South African government to deal with the crises. The consequence of this has been that most states in the world have taken measures of some sort to exclude South Africa from the global community, making it ever more a pariah state.

Regional Power

IN HIS FIRST two years in office, Botha continued a relatively benign regional policy. His major initiative with regard to southern Africa was a proposal for a political and economic union joining South Africa, South African homelands, and neighboring states such as Swaziland and Malawi, all under the protective umbrella of South Africa itself. In a speech given in March 1979, Pik Botha spoke of "a constellation of Southern African States, seven, eight, nine, ten, with forty million people south of the Kunene/Zambezi . . . "[2] The advantages for Pretoria in such an arrangement were clear: the homelands would have received a modicum of international legitimization, South Africa's regional economic dominance would have been extended, and its security would have been enhanced by the presence of buffer zones. The "Constellation of States" proposal, however, never got off the ground. The projected partners in this arrangement, fearful of South African dominance, hostile to aparth-

[2]Roloef F. Botha, from an address in Zurich on March 7, 1979, in *The Southern African Record,* Number 22, December 1980.

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eid, and afraid of drawing international opprobrium, displayed little interest in joining.

Despite this rejection, South Africa faced few threats to its security in the late 1970s. This, however, changed in 1980. After a long period of passivity, the African National Congress (ANC) launched a series of strikes at key symbolic targets within South Africa. In June 1980, in the midst of the second global oil crisis, the ANC staged a daring, dramatic, and successful attack on South Africa's prized coal-to-oil conversion plant. After helping arrange for Zimbabwe's independence, Pretoria's preferred candidate, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, failed dismally and unexpectedly in the March 1980 elections, winning but three of the eighty seats available to black candidates while Mugabe's ZANU-PF party won fifty-seven seats. The South African intelligence community's inability to predict Robert Mugabe's election cast serious doubts on the abilities of the national security machinery. In Namibia, SWAPO intensified its guerrilla war, while at the same time nine independent black-ruled southern African states formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), designed to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa.

The coincidence of these events evoked in the minds of many South Africans the worst nightmares envisioned in the Total Onslaught scenario. With the electorate largely convinced that Botha's critique of South Africa's international predicament was on target, Botha was able to shift policy radically and adopt the military solutions he had long advocated.

Specially trained South African military units executed a series of raids on ANC targets in neighboring states, the most devastating of which were attacks against a refugee camp outside Maputo in 1981 and in Maseru, Lesotho in December, 1982. South African support for anti-Marxist dissident movements throughout southern Africa escalated rapidly, as weapons, advisers, and supplies flowed to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) in Mozambique. In 1981, Botha also launched *Operation Protea,* in which 11,000 men and more than 250 armored vehicles occupied southern Angola for three months.

The military campaigns were accompanied by continuing offers of economic incentives to South Africa's neighbors in return for political cooperation. In concert with several of South Africa's major corporations, Pretoria embarked on a program to develop an extensive network of trade relations with neighboring southern African states, designed to increase the region's economic dependence on South Africa.

THIS HEAVY-HANDED approach yielded some remarkable successes for Botha. Mozambique, the launching pad for ANC forays into South Africa, was subjected to a systematic campaign of attacks. For three years, the South African military struck ANC and economic targets in Mozambique, and supplied weapons and economic support to the MNR. Devastated by the MNR's war and South African attacks, Mozambique had little choice but to negotiate a settlement. With the signing of the Nkomati accord in 1984, the ANC's most strategically important base was effectively closed, at little cost to Pretoria. At the same time Angola and South Africa signed a truce agreement and South African troops were withdrawn into Namibia. By the end of 1984, all the nations of southern Africa had accepted the overwhelming power of Pretoria.

But just at its moment of triumph, South Africa found itself once again in the throes of crisis. This time it was not a foreign threat, but a resurgence of black protest, on a scale that dwarfed even the Soweto uprising of the mid-1970s. Strikes, riots, and demonstrations erupted throughout the nation in late 1984. At first uncertain as to how to handle the protests, Botha soon showed his usual resolve, ordering the wide-scale use of force throughout the country. In the next two years, the government killed hundreds of protesters, detained without charges over ten thousand others, clamped down on anti-apartheid organi-

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zations of all sorts and finally instituted a draconian state of emergency, still in effect today.

Unnerved by the uprising and increasingly dissatisfied with the government's inability to deal with the problems quickly, white South Africans, and the Afrikaner community in particular, called on Botha to strike harshly at South Africa's external enemies. In May 1986, for example, South African commandos launched simultaneous attacks on ANC targets in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. A campaign of assassination attempts on ANC leaders in exile escalated. For the first time, many observers within and outside South Africa suggested that the decision to launch these raids was rooted not in any particular threat, but in domestic politics. Whatever the cause, the raids proved enormously popular, as the majority of whites felt (and still feel) that the internal unrest was externally inspired and manipulated.

At roughly the same time, the South African-Angolan truce collapsed and South Africa became even more deeply committed to supporting Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. Between 1985 and 1987 thousands of South African troops occupied much of southern Angola. To redress this state of affairs, Cuban ground troops and pilots were dispatched to the front for the first time. The war intensified rapidly until, in the summer of 1988, South African forces made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale. Defeated in a crucial battle, Botha was forced to rethink his policy and return to the negotiating table. This occurred just as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev apparently put considerable pressure on Angola and Cuba to seek an end to the war, for which the Soviets were paying a substantial cost. Soon after, the parties involved (except UNITA and SWAPO) entered into negotiations under the auspices of the United States. These talks went on throughout the fall of 1988, until an agreement was signed in December. Under the terms of this agreement, Cuba will withdraw 3,000 of its 50,000 troops in Angola by April 1, 1989, and another 25,000 by November 1. South Africa, meanwhile, will remove all but 1500 of its 50,000 troops in Namibia by July 1. They will be replaced by a 9,000-man United Nations force that will supervise elections, slated for November 1. The remainder of the Cuban troops in Angola are scheduled to be withdrawn by July 1, 1991.

Why, after all these years of struggle, has Botha abandoned UNITA and almost certainly turned over Namibia to the Marxist SWAPO? Some observers have cited military defeat as the explanation, while others have stressed the increasingly unacceptable costs of the war in terms of young, white lives. Although these factors were clearly relevant, the decision to settle was most likely based on economic considerations, as the war in Angola and the occupation of Namibia drained millions of dollars a day from South Africa's coffers. Whether Pretoria will continue to support UNITA, and how Pretoria will deal with a future Namibian government that will presumably be led by SWAPO, remain open questions. Most likely, South Africa will turn responsibility for UNITA over to the United States, while SWAPO will be forced by economic realities to accommodate itself to South Africa's demands.

Trade and Sanctions

WHILE BOTHA'S POLICIES toward regional and domestic threats to South Africa's security have provided the greatest shocks to the whites, at least of equal importance to South Africa's security and prosperity has been its trade relations with the world. Although South Africa has a rich mineral base and strong industrial, technological, and agricultural sectors, it has always been highly reliant on foreign markets for its resources, and foreign sources for technological goods, fuel, and arms. During Botha's tenure, trade has steadily accounted for about 25 percent of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Maintaining trade connections is thus a major goal of South Africa's foreign policy.

Botha's tenure in office has been marked

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by persistent international efforts to force South Africa to reform itself. Such efforts have been made ever since the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, but prior to Botha's assumption of office they were almost totally ineffective. From 1960 to 1975, apartheid was denounced by virtually every state in the world. Several states imposed restrictions on economic and cultural links with South Africa, but poor enforcement and a plethora of alternate suppliers rendered most of these efforts ineffectual. The Soweto uprising in 1975–76 brought a wave of somewhat stronger measures. In addition to the usual verbal condemnations, South Africa was banned from the Olympics and the Commonwealth games, and most Commonwealth members terminated long-standing and much prized rugby, soccer, and cricket tournaments. The United Nations Security Council voted for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in 1977, and the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for an oil embargo as well as bans on loans and investments in 1979. Numerous foreign investors in South Africa adopted codes of behavior such as the American companies' "Sullivan Principles" and the European Economic Community's "Code of Conduct," and disinvestment campaigns were organized throughout the world. But for the most part the effects of these moves proved to be symbolic rather than substantive.

These measures had a deep psychological impact on South Africa's white population, which found itself excluded from the international athletic and cultural community. Significantly, though, few of South Africa's vital economic or military connections with the world were damaged. Indeed, Prime Minister Vorster had few problems expanding South African trade during this period, developing important new links with Israel, which soon became a major supplier of arms, and Japan, which offered Pretoria nuclear technology and much of the know-how for South Africa's coal-to-oil project in return for a steady flow of South African uranium, as well as agricultural products.

Botha thus took office at a time when many states had adopted a two-track trade policy toward South Africa. As numerous states placed a growing number of public restrictions on links with South Africa, many of these same states were more than willing to expand trade as long as the relationship could be wrapped in secrecy. Ever pragmatic, Botha quickly initiated new, often secret, trade links with states in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Arab world. He had no qualms about dealing with any state at all, and promptly established secret trade relations with states that were avowed enemies of South Africa, such as black African states, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Within a year of taking office, South Africa was trading with twenty-five black African states, including such strident supporters of the anti-apartheid movement as Nigeria and Ghana.[3] And despite the fact that Chinese people were considered non-whites within South Africa, he also developed a new, close, major trade relationship with Taiwan, with Botha and Taiwanese leader Sun Yun Suan promising to stand beside each other in the fight against international communism.

IN THE FIRST four years of Botha's tenure, South Africa experienced the greatest economic boom in its history—though for all his activity, the prosperity had little to do with his efforts. The second oil crisis of 1979, precipitated by the Iranian Revolution, prompted investors fretting about the fate of the world's economy to make massive gold purchases; and, as the *Economist* noted in 1980, "(w)hen chaos reigns, South Africa pros-

[3]See the *New York Times*, April 8, 1979. It should be noted that the Nigerian government has claimed that its trade to South Africa consisted of oil shipments made without its knowledge; this was cited by Nigeria as one of the reasons for expropriating British Petroleum in 1979. Whether the Nigerians actually knew is unclear. It has been alleged that other items have been traded surreptitiously between the two countries.

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pers."[4] The oil crisis also resulted in another global recession, which created intensified competition between industrial nations for market share. South Africa, awash in gold revenues, became a prime target of Western sellers. The country's exports leapt from $18.397 billion in 1979, Botha's first full year in office, to $25.684 billion in 1980 on the strength of high gold prices, while imports in 1980 and 1981 were more than double their 1979 total. Many black African states, set back by the recession, were enticed by the congenial trade offers made by Pretoria. Finally, when the oil crisis turned into an oil glut in 1981, several Persian Gulf oil producers seeking to expand their markets—most notably Saudi Arabia and Iran—evidently developed covert trade arrangements whereby they supplied South Africa with oil, in return for hard cash or gold.[5]

The period of prosperity ended abruptly in 1984. The price of gold plummeted from $800 an ounce in 1980 to $340 in mid-1984, and fell to $280 in early 1985. By 1985, export revenues and imports had fallen to their pre-1980 levels. This alone would have wounded the South African economy severely; but simultaneously there was the impact of the huge uprisings of 1985–86. The combined impact was devastating. The value of the rand fell from $1.29 in 1980 to $0.35 in August 1985. When foreign creditors refused to renegotiate South Africa's $14 billion short-term debt, the ensuing panic forced the government to halt trading on the Johannesburg foreign exchange and stock markets, and place a seven-month moratorium on foreign debt repayments.

The thorough coverage of the protests by the international media once again made South Africa the object of international scorn. This time, under strong pressure to go beyond rhetorical condemnations and with South Africa already effectively isolated culturally, foreign powers began to impose sanctions on Pretoria. The most serious of these were announced by South Africa's major trading partners, the U.S., Japan, and the members of the European Community. On September 10, 1985, the European Community announced its members would "harmonize their attitudes" toward South Africa, and imposed an array of sanctions. In December 1985, President Reagan, seeking to preempt a Congressional sanctions bill, decreed an Executive Order curbing trade in a limited number of areas. One month later, Japan announced a series of sanctions. More sanctions were imposed in 1986. The European Community passed additional measures, and the U.S. Congress passed the strongest of all sanctions bill, over President Reagan's veto. The substance of the bills is summarized in Table 1.

What effect sanctions have had on South Africa remains unclear. Reporting to the Congress one year after American sanctions were implemented, President Reagan argued that the effects of sanctions were "more negative than positive," and that while sanctions had harmed the South African economy, "their impact on the government itself and its political choices have not advanced our goals."[6] Helen Suzman, South Africa's most persistent white opponent of apartheid, has claimed that sanctions have done little but increase the stature and power of the political Right. Others have argued variously that sanctions have had an effect; that they have not been in place long enough to determine their effects; or that the current sanctions have been too weak, and that stronger, more well-coordinated sanctions are necessary for South Africa to be forced into making real changes.

Some effects can be assessed, however. First, over 60 percent of South Africa's export revenues come from sales of gold and strategic minerals. These have been untouched by any sanctions and, given the West's dependence on them, are not likely to be covered in the

[4] *The Great Evasion: South Africa: A Survey,* published by *The Economist,* June 21, 1980, p. 8.

[5] See Bernard Rivers and Martin Bailey, "How Oil Seeps Into South Africa," *Business and Society Review,* Fall 1981, pp. 53–59; and *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa, 1981–1982,* Amsterdam: The Shipping Research Bureau, 1981.

[6] *Washington Post,* October 3, 1987.

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Table I

Sanctions against South Africa by the U.S., EC, and Japan

U.S.	—	Banned exports of arms, nuclear technology, computers to apartheid enforcing agencies; banned imports of krugerrands, iron, steel, coal, and agricultural products. Placed restrictions on bank loans, banned new investments in South Africa, and banned direct air links.
EC	—	Banned exports of arms, computers to apartheid enforcing agencies, and oil; banned imports of krugerrands, iron, steel, and coal; placed restrictions on bank loans and banned new investments.
Japan	—	Banned export of arms and oil. Suggested voluntary bans on import of krugerrands, iron, and steel. Placed restrictions on bank loans, nuclear cooperation, and South African tourism in Japan. Banned new investments.

Source: Jeanne S. Affelder and Raymond W. Copson, *South Africa: International Sanctions,* Congressional Research Service, December 2, 1986.

foreseeable future. Second, a large increase in the price of gold has negated whatever possible losses were incurred by the sanctions. Between 1985 and late 1987, the price of gold per ounce rose from $280 to $450; as it is estimated that South Africa earns an additional $1 billion for every $50 per ounce rise in the price of gold, its exports have actually increased since sanctions were imposed.

One significant effect resulting from sanctions has been a change in the rank-ordering of South Africa's major trading partners: since 1986, Japan has surpassed the U.S. As recently as the early 1960s, the Japanese were considered non-whites by South Africa's racial classification code; today they are termed "honorary whites." Japan's policy toward South Africa has sought to follow the doctrine of *Seikei Bunri,* or "separating politics from business." The Japanese government has vigorously condemned apartheid, applied limited sanctions, and claimed it has not encouraged Japanese manufacturers to sell to South Africa. But as Richard Payne has argued, "these actions actually serve to deflect international criticism of the extensive economic ties between the two countries."[7] Numerous Japanese corporations have moved to fill in the gaps left by the U.S. and European Community, and sales of Japanese computers, automobiles, cameras, and electronic goods have come to dominate the South African market.

A vibrant covert trade has continued, a good part of it with avowed enemies of South Africa. Although Pretoria has depicted the Soviet Union as the mastermind of the "Total Onslaught" campaign to end its existence and Moscow has been a willing signatory to virtually every resolution condemning South Africa, the two states evidently maintain a mutually beneficial trade relationship. The Soviet Union sells an estimated $600–700 million worth of diamonds to De Beers each year.[8] Meetings of representatives of De Beers and the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry take place on a yearly basis. Combined, the two states supply 80 percent of the world's gold, and while evidence of collaboration is difficult to pinpoint, "consultation" between the two

[7]Richard Payne, "Japan's South Africa Policy: Political Rhetoric and Economic Realities," *African Affairs,* Vol. 86, No. 343, p. 177.

[8]Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soviet-South African Connection," *Africa Report,* Vol. 31, March-April 1986, p. 73.

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takes place and both move their gold onto the world market through the same Swiss banking consortium.

The South African economy has been in a deep recession now for nearly five years. But this ongoing slump has been brought about by low gold prices (that still remain relatively depressed despite the 1985-87 rises) and domestic unrest, not international pressure. Botha's aggressive pursuit of trade partners has undoubtedly helped alleviate the slump. He has created a new mode of dealing with an unfriendly world, and should gold prices return to their early 1980s level, South Africa's economy may well experience yet another period of protracted prosperity.

The past decade has also demonstrated that for all the pressure put on the apartheid state, few governments in the world have shown any inclination to make serious sacrifices in order to induce change in South Africa. More than any previous South African leader, Botha has successfully played on other states' self interest to maintain and expand South African trade. He has traded comfortably with the epicenter of global communism and with black African states that regularly call for South Africa's destruction. To apartheid purists this might be hypocrisy on Botha's part, but, by exploiting a matching hypocrisy on the part of the rest of the world, it has kept South Africa integrated into the global economy.

The Balance Sheet

SOUTH AFRICAN foreign policy under Botha's leadership has been characterized by aggressive militarization, increased secrecy, and the use of the full panoply of available options to respond to external challenges. Botha has been forceful and highly successful in navigating South Africa through unfriendly waters. He remains in complete control internally. He has reasserted South African primacy in the region of southern Africa and minimized any serious external threats. He has prevented opposition groups, such as the ANC, from developing any external bases for conducting operations against South Africa.

Still, it is possible to see weakness stemming from Botha's policies. He has been unable to convince the international community of the merits of his positions, and his personal style has tended to strike Westerners as strident, if not downright thuggish. South Africa's economy has moved from one crisis to another in the past decade. The ANC, despite its inability to work from bases near South Africa's borders, has seen its stature grow, and in 1988 alone it has mounted over one hundred bomb attacks throughout the country. In Mozambique, Botha has helped to create an unstable and seemingly hopeless situation that may well spill over into South Africa itself.

In signing the Angola agreement, Botha has taken a substantial risk. The creation of a Marxist state in Namibia and the possible collapse of UNITA could cause a further erosion of his domestic base, even if South Africa's regional security is improved. On the other hand, Botha does have the economic leverage to control SWAPO, and UNITA may well be able to survive and even enter into a coalition government with the current Angolan regime. Moreover, if things work out according to Botha's plans, South Africa will enjoy considerable economic savings, while its international stature may improve if the United States, Western Europe, and the states of southern Africa reward its effort by further normalizing relations. Should this scenario prevail, Botha will improve his own and his country's standing enormously.

Other serious difficulties still remain. While there are few external forces capable of harming South Africa's vital interests, internal opposition appears to be a greater threat than ever. The specter of black rebellion is ever present; while the South African government has successfully suppressed black uprisings in the past, blacks have continually regrouped and renewed their protests with increasing vigor. Black protest organizations have multiplied and gained increasing popularity. Black labor unions in particular have

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grown considerably more powerful, and the possibility of a general strike that can cripple the country's economy looms large. Further internal unrest may well galvanize the international community into strengthening existing sanctions against South Africa—though, as indicated, the state of the global economy and the price of gold will likely have a far greater impact on South Africa's prosperity and stability than such sanctions.

Another possibility is that white public opinion, already deeply split, could continue to shift away from the National Party. Should the hard-line opposition be swept into power, Botha's realpolitik foreign policy might well be abandoned in favor of a more dogmatic and rigid world-view that could undermine his successes. Even if the National Party remains in power, it will have difficulty finding a successor capable of mastering South Africa's complex domestic political conflicts while at the same time conducting South Africa's foreign policy as adroitly as Botha.

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The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy

John J. Weltman

WHEN THE REAGAN administration came into office, it proclaimed an overarching vision of international threat and of a military strategy that would enable the United States to meet that threat. This vision centered upon our relationship with the Soviet Union. The military services were to justify their procurement plans and their proposals for operations in the event of hostilities, in terms of this larger vision. The vision proceeded from the assumption of an expansionist Soviet Union, possessing the capacity to apply superior military force at any point it chose to threaten. Since early in the atomic age, the United States had chosen to deal with such a threat by reserving the possibility of resort to the use of nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional weapons superiority. But the Reagan administration argued that such a posture was no longer believable, since the Soviets had achieved—or were close to achieving—superiority in the nuclear realm. The dangers that the Administration saw at its outset were thus stark. At best the potential inability of the U.S. and its allies to repel Soviet attacks in areas of great significance to us—most crucially in Europe—would cause those allies to accommodate Soviet interests in peacetime. At worst defeat in wartime threatened, with the possibilities of incalculable escalation which might follow.

The Administration's recipe for rescuing the United States from this dilemma lay in the concept of "horizontal escalation" in a "protracted" war. If the Soviet Union could be assured that hostilities once begun could not be brought to a conclusion swiftly, it would be less likely to initiate them. For in a war whose duration was more than weeks, the industrial and economic superiority of the West could be mobilized to offset initial Soviet superiority in military forces in being. But how to assure that a war could be protracted, when it began from a Soviet or Soviet-supported attack at a point at which the Soviet side possessed military superiority, and thus the capacity to bring such an attack to a decisive conclusion? The answer lay in a strategy of deliberately spreading hostilities to other areas, where the Soviet side did not possess local superiority, and whose defense would require the Soviets to divert effort and resources from the point of initial attack. This meant that, faced with a Soviet conventional military attack in Europe, the United States might well respond with similar forces in the Pacific or against exposed Soviet client-states elsewhere in the world. Such a capacity on the part of the United States would reduce any Soviet confidence that they could bring a war to a swift and decisive conclusion, making it that much less likely that they would contemplate beginning such a conflict at all.

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WHETHER OR NOT the assumptions from which the Administration proceeded were valid is a topic which we will not debate here. We need only note that the various armed services formulated their plans in terms congruent with Administration premises. Thus the strategic nuclear forces were to develop the capacity to survive and carry on controlled attacks for weeks or even months. In this way the Soviets would be denied confidence that a nuclear exchange could be brought to a conclusion favorable to them. The Air Force and the Army were to emphasize their capacity to mount sustained operations distant from the initial theater of operations. The Navy's response to the Administration's grand vision took the form of the "Maritime Strategy," and the purpose of this article is to examine that strategy.[1]

The opportunities presented by the Reagan administration's approach to military strategy were welcomed by many segments of the Navy's leadership as a way to escape from the constraints which they felt the Carter administration had imposed upon them. At the onset of the Reagan administration the Navy found itself confined to a subordinate role in national military planning. The previous administration was "continentalist" in its military outlook. Military planning was largely driven by the requirements of stiffening the defense of the primary theater of military operations in Europe. The Navy's role was largely one of protecting the transport of troops and supplies across the Atlantic. While the Carter administration's horizon was to broaden during its term to include the problem of defending oil fields of the Persian Gulf from putative Soviet attack, the Navy's role here was also subordinate, largely confined to transporting and protecting forces in the Gulf. In contrast, the Reagan administration now offered naval planners an opportunity to present their service, not as a subordinate player in a reactive military scenario dominated by Soviet initiative, but as the key service in a global strategy which could regain the initiative and military advantage for the United States.

While justified in terms set by the Administration, the Navy's planning also reflected internal agendas within its officer corps, as did that of the other services. Indeed, the criticisms which were to come of the Maritime Strategy's feasibility in the Soviet-American confrontation, which was its ostensible context, were to cause some to suspect that a force more suitable to non-Soviet Third World contingencies was being surreptitiously acquired under the aegis of the Maritime Strategy. To be sure, forces called for under the Maritime Strategy could well be pressed into service to strike against Third World targets, as was to be shown in Libya and Lebanon. To argue that they were acquired for this purpose, however, may well be to attribute overly subtle motives to the authors of the Navy's approach. As we shall see, the main lines of the Maritime Strategy are easily enough understood as the product of internal preferences within the Navy, in a situation of budgetary plenty.

Any discussion of naval strategy cannot ignore the internal structure of the Navy. The naval officer corps is composed of a number of "communities," each oriented toward certain platforms and weapons systems. The principal such communities are: carrier aviation, surface, submarine, and maritime patrol aircraft. Historically, naval strategy and tactical notions have tended to flow from these communities; debates about the role and mission of naval forces in future conflict have tended to be debates between members of the respective communities.

This is not to accuse the debaters of advocating strategic positions merely to advance the budgetary fortunes of weapons systems, platforms, and careers congenial to them. The strategic debate in the Navy reflects, instead, a general pattern repeatedly found in military history. In periods of technological change,

[1] See "The Maritime Strategy," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1986, for the U.S. Navy's public account of the manner in which it proposed to operate in conflict situations, along a spectrum from crisis through general conventional war against the Soviet Union.

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the operational character which the next war may take is highly uncertain. A variety of plausible—yet contradictory—scenarios exists. Without compelling evidence to the contrary, officers tend to believe that those weapons systems, platforms, tactics, and operations which are familiar, will continue to be important in future conflict. Strategic concepts which provide a place for the familiar seem more credible than those which do not. As a rule, an ambiguous future paradoxically produces heightened conservatism in military institutions.

Mahan versus Corbett

THE MARITIME STRATEGY provides the Navy with conceptual guidance about its role in a general war with the Soviet Union, a war that remains nonnuclear for an extended period of time. It does not cross the threshold into nuclear exchanges. (Thus, operations by ballistic missile submarines are not considered.) This particular scenario is not, of course, of the Navy's invention. It has been the standard basis for planning general purpose force structure under the Reagan administration. Rather than questioning the plausibility of such a scenario, let us examine the efficacy of the Maritime Strategy within it, however far-fetched it may be as a premise. In such a conflict the problem for the Navy would lie in identifying those missions and deployment patterns which would maximize its impact on the progress and outcome of the war.

Historically, navies have approached this problem in one of two ways. In the first, strategical focus is on seeking battle with the main elements of the enemy's fleet. Victory in such a battle eliminates threat at sea, and *ipso facto* gives the victor untrammelled access to the sea for whatever purpose he desires. Naval procurement decisions, in this view, should concentrate on platforms and weapons systems designed for offensive action against major enemy naval capabilities. Any other mission or force structure surrenders the initiative to the enemy, leaving him free to hamper and obstruct friendly use of the sea at points of his own choosing. Thus, a force directed and designed primarily for commerce protection—or for attack on the enemy's commerce—is doomed to futility, because it is always vulnerable to destruction by the enemy's still intact battle fleet. This essentially is the outlook promulgated by Alfred Mahan, the renowned American naval historian and strategist, at the turn of the century.

The classic alternative to Mahan was put forward by Julian Corbett, a British analyst who wrote his major work shortly after the First World War. Corbett suggested that the proper role of a navy in war must be determined by the particular circumstances of the war. No specific set of missions or force structure is universally applicable. To give priority to an attack on the enemy's fleet may be advisable in some circumstances, but not in all. In the particular case of a maritime power with a superior navy fighting a large continental land power with a less capable fleet, the outcome of the war is fundamentally a function of the land battle. A favorable outcome for the maritime power can only be achieved by inflicting reverses on the continental power on land. The role of the navy must, above all, be directed to influencing favorably that land battle. Thus, the first priority of the maritime power's navy must be to protect seaborne lines of communications to the land theater, and to facilitate the introduction of armies into that theater from the sea. In such a war, it is entirely possible that a large battle fleet may actually be counterproductive to this end, by forcing the maritime power to divert resources away from the protection of the lines of communication and to the guarding of this highly valuable asset. Furthermore, the continental power's inferior navy may be able to prolong this diversion by avoiding battle indefinitely. In Corbett's view, this is precisely what happened during the First World War. The British were so concerned with protecting their battle fleet from the Germans that they neglected, with almost catastrophic consequences, the defense of

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their sea lanes. Their expensive fleet as a consequence became largely irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy represents a choice of Mahan's approach over Corbett's. The approach which the Navy has endorsed may be described as "early forward press." It contains guidelines for deployments and operations in a continuum of scenarios ranging from peacetime presence, through crisis, through general conventional war.

Of greatest interest to us here are the guidelines for general conventional war. The Navy would make early deployments directed toward destroying Soviet naval units. As outlying Soviet and Soviet bloc capabilities are destroyed, U.S. forces would press forward in the direction of the Soviet homeland. A key element of this forward movement would be offensive anti-submarine warfare—waged principally by U.S. attack submarines—directed against Soviet submarines in home waters, specifically including Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile submarines (SLBMs).

This campaign would, it is claimed, have a number of effects. By placing a substantial portion of Soviet nuclear forces under threat, the U.S. Navy would force the Soviets to devote substantial resources to protection of their SLBM forces, resources which would not be available for attacks on NATO supply lines in the North Atlantic and Pacific. Thus, offensive action is presented as the most effective method of protecting these supply lines.

But the anti-SLBM campaign also has another, more direct purpose. By changing the nuclear weapons balance, the campaign makes escalation to the nuclear level a progressively less attractive option for the Soviets, and creates an incentive for them to end the conflict, on less favorable terms than might result simply from a successful Soviet land campaign in Europe.

The forward movement of other U.S. naval forces, spearheaded by the carrier battle groups, would also open other options for operations against the Soviet bloc. Air and missile strikes against military facilities on the Soviet periphery could be mounted, as could amphibious landings. At a later stage, when East bloc defenses had been weakened, naval air and missile strikes might be made in direct support of NATO operations on the central front.

Attacks against the shore, and amphibious landings, when mounted on the flanks of a Soviet thrust on the central front, could turn and frustrate that thrust, as well as provide support to U.S. allies. When mounted against the Soviet periphery at points further afield from the central front, these attacks could constrain the Soviets from drawing down peripheral forces in order to reinforce their forces on the Western European theater, or even force them to divert forces from that theater to defend peripheral areas.

Direct attack by carrier battle groups and attack submarines against the Soviet Navy and its support facilities would, U.S. Navy officials argue, substantially affect the outcome of the war by changing the Soviet calculus of advantage and risk. This change in the Soviet calculus would take the form of both an increased cost in achieving its direct military goals on the central front, and an increased risk of attack on its homeland if the war is allowed to continue. Terminating the war on terms favorable to the Western allies would become more attractive to the Soviet leadership.

Criticisms of the Strategy

A VARIETY of criticisms can be (and has been) made of the Maritime Strategy.[2] While the Navy's approach to strat-

[2] For a powerful critique, see John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security,* Volume 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–57.

For some cogent defenses, see Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy" *International Security,* Volume 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58–88; and Ronald O'Rourke, "The Maritime Strategy and the Next Decade," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (April 1988), pp. 34–38.

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egy makes carrier aviation and attack submarines preeminent in contemporary naval force structure requirements (and therefore represents the views of the aviation and submarine communities within the service), critiques of this approach, in offering alternative rationales for operations, give greater relative prominence to other platforms—and to the officer communities associated with them.

On the tactical and operational levels, critics argue that the official Navy position overestimates the efficacy of its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics, and makes convenient—and dubious—assumptions about Soviet naval operations. On the strategic level the critics argue that the threat or actuality of U.S. naval attacks on Soviet naval targets or on the peripheries of the Soviet homeland is unlikely to affect the Soviet calculus of risk and advantage in war or induce them to redirect their efforts away from the European theater.

The Navy's present preferred approach to ASW—long-range detection and kill by offensive forces—differs sharply from the operational experience of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy in both world wars. During these conflicts, both navies engaged confidently in offensive search and destroy tactics against enemy submarines—tactics broadly similar to those proposed by the U.S. Navy today. They soon discovered that these tactics were almost totally ineffective, and were driven reluctantly to rely on convoy escort as their principal ASW tactic. Detection, localization, and destruction of submarines is simplified under the convoy escort, because the submarine obligingly comes to those hunting for it.

Current U.S. Navy ASW tactics rely on long-range detection and kill at ASW barriers, and offensive strategic ASW against the Soviet SLBM force, to ensure the protection of the North Atlantic supply lines against submarine attack.

Even under the most favorable conditions, however, an ASW barrier is far from an impenetrable screen, exacting instead a cumulative level of attrition from successive waves of submarines attempting to transit. Its effectiveness is crucially dependent upon long-range detection. The viability of long-range detection when Soviet submarines are made increasingly quieter is widely questioned.[3]

These difficulties in long-range detection would seem also to make success in the anti-SLBM campaign more problematical, especially as U.S. attack submarines would be operating without assistance from other forces, in relatively confined regions where the Soviets exercise complete aerial and surface control.

Western strategists assume that interdiction of sea lines of supply is a relatively minor goal for the Soviet Navy, secondary to the defense of SLBMs in their "bastions" in Soviet coastal seas, to defense of the Warsaw Pact littoral, and to direct support for military operations on land. Yet the potential gains from attack on the sea lanes—especially during the first weeks of a war—must be obvious to Soviet planners. Operational experience in the two world wars suggests the havoc that could be wrought if only a small fraction of the Soviet submarine force were to break through into the North Atlantic. Insofar as the Soviets share the doubts about the efficacy of the U.S. anti-SLBM campaign just suggested, they would discount any quick catastrophic threat to their SLBM force from the U.S. offensive ASW campaign. Thus the resources they would be likely to make available for an attack on the sea lanes—and shore facilities on both sides of the Atlantic—rises, and the problem for NATO becomes even greater.

One must also question whether the Soviet SLBM force occupies the same position in their strategic forces doctrine as the U.S. SLBM force has in ours. The land-oriented Soviet high command might, after all, be prepared to accept somewhat greater risks to its SLBM force than assumed, if these risks would buy interdiction of the Western reinforce-

[3] See, for example, Norman Friedman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," *International Defense Review,* October 1985.

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ment process in the early stages of a war in Europe.

Paradoxically, if the U.S. Navy's assumptions—about the Soviet view of the strategic role of its SLBM force, and about the efficacy of U.S. ASW tactics against that force—were in fact justified, a vigorous anti-SLBM campaign might increase Soviet incentive to escalate to the nuclear level. If the Soviets were to confine that escalation to the sea, however, public U.S. doctrine suggests we would not confine our response to the maritime region. It is difficult, however, to determine what level of nuclear response would be advantageous to the West.

From a strategic perspective, while naval strikes and amphibious landings on the Soviet periphery could certainly damage the Soviets, it is not at all clear that such operations could be mounted at a level sufficient to deflect Soviet resources away from their main thrust in Western Europe.

Few of these operations could be mounted with enough resources to produce sustained damage or long-lasting detachment of territory. The Soviets may indeed proclaim the equal inviolability of every inch of the homeland. However, it should not be assumed that in wartime they would be incapable of distinguishing between decisive and secondary theaters, nor that they ignore the elementary strategic maxims enjoining concentration of force. It is unlikely that they would risk success in the primary theater to avoid short-term losses in secondary ones.

If the Soviets should indeed mount a substantial campaign against the sea lanes early in a conflict, the carriers would likely be used early on to provide direct protection for the reinforcement convoys; or they would be kept out of harm's way so that escort vessels could be diverted from protecting carriers to protecting convoys. It is presently assumed that our allies' navies would handle port and convoy protection, while freeing U.S. forces for offensive operations. If the Soviets did mount such a campaign, however, it is certain that allied forces would be unable to provide sufficient protection on their own.

Force Structure and Doctrine.

THE FORCE STRUCTURE and doctrinal emphasis of the present Maritime Strategy were made possible by the defense budget increase under the Reagan administration. It is clear that both the growth rate of defense spending and the relative priority given to the Navy within the defense budget will decline in the future. Indeed, these trends are already apparent.

We can expect important shifts to occur fairly quickly, in both the influence that different officer communities within the Navy hold, and the doctrines for operations which dominate. Longer-term changes in force structure will also follow as current procurement priorities shift. Influence will shift to the surface and patrol aircraft communities. These communities tend to favor operational doctrines which emphasize sea control and give priority to protection of supply lines to the European theater of operations, primarily through convoy protection and localized defensive ASW operations.

Force structure will shift slowly, owing to the long service lifetimes of ships entering the stockpile during the 1980s. It is therefore likely that large carrier battle groups will dominate the Navy's structure into the next century, whatever shifts in procurement might occur in the near-term. However, the number of carrier battle groups available for deployment will decline—perhaps by two or three. As missions shift, aircraft and weapons loadings can, of course, be changed much more rapidly. Near-term procurement shifts will emphasize surface escort vessels, small helicopter or short take-off carriers, and maritime patrol aircraft. Attack submarine procurements will probably include new categories of smaller boats, possibly employing diesel propulsion, suitable for coastal and shallow water ASW operations, and escort operations.

The weight of Navy operations will shift toward localized defensive ASW and anti-air operations. These operations will center upon choke-points, port approaches, and convoy

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protection. The goal of these operations will be minimized disruption to the transatlantic supply and reinforcement process in the initial stages of a conflict. If these measures could indeed force a protracted stalemate on the central front, the U.S. and its allies would then be in a position to benefit from their superior mobilization base. If the stalemate on the central front were to last in excess of three months, major new combat formations would begin to arrive, and military equipment pipelines would begin to turn out large quantities of equipment.

This infusion of resources would be less significant for the Navy than for the other services. Construction of major warships is a process measured in years rather than months. Some additions to the Navy's force structure would, however, be possible in this time frame, as the "mothball" fleet is activated. The extended mobilization process would allow major operations to be opened and sustained on new fronts. The Navy could provide direct support for these operations, especially at the initial stage, and protect their supply lines thereafter. The object of these operations would not be to produce dramatic diversions of Soviet resources, but rather to gain incremental leverage over their decision-making through an extended process of mutual attrition, a process in which the Soviets would be at a disadvantage. This leverage could eventually threaten Soviet internal and bloc cohesion, and could bring an end to the war on terms favorable to the West.

It is only in the context of such an extended time frame, however, and only through the provision of support for land operations, that a substantial naval role in shifting the Soviet calculus of advantage and risk in a general conventional war can be foreseen. The notion of an early and independent naval role in producing such a shift is a chimera which, if given status, could contribute to an early disaster.

THE ANALYSIS thus far assumes that a war with the Soviets would remain confined to the conventional level for a protracted period. It should be reiterated that this assumption is not the invention of the Navy. However, many naval officers find it congenial since it provides a scenario in which naval forces other than the SLBM forces arguably could play decisive roles in the conflict.

On the other hand, if we postulate escalation to the nuclear level, a variety of additional criticisms of the Maritime Strategy assume relevance. In essence, it can be argued that the Maritime Strategy in operation would leave the Navy maldeployed for the following levels of nuclear exchange: tactical nuclear operations at sea; the naval role in theater nuclear strikes; and the naval role in the strategic nuclear reserve during and after a general nuclear exchange.

Forward operations as part of the Maritime Strategy require massing of forces to achieve more effective conventional ASW and anti-air defenses. They also obviously would bring U.S. forces closer to sources of attack. If the Soviets should opt for tactical nuclear strikes against U.S. naval forces, Soviet force structure and doctrine suggest that they would attempt to surprise us with a massive, coordinated "first salvo." Effective defense against a nuclear salvo would require distance, deception, and dispersal of forces. All these conditions are precisely the opposite of those required for effectively engaging in operations of the sort envisaged in the Maritime Strategy.

If the U.S. should decide to launch theater nuclear strikes—following Soviet nuclear or chemical attacks, or to avert collapse of the Western conventional defense—such strikes might include those launched from U.S. naval surface forces, aircraft, or attack submarines. All such platforms are general purpose units on which nuclear and conventional weapons loadings, and missions, vie for space. Because of the relatively small number of such platforms, the Navy has historically resisted any suggestion of a force dedicated to nuclear missions. Forward conventional operations would produce maldeployment of nuclear-capable platforms in terms of the geographic

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and communications requirements for launching effective, coordinated, and timely theater nuclear strikes.

The same general purpose character of the platforms—and the lack of a force effectively dedicated to nuclear missions—adversely affects the ability of many naval platforms to perform their roles as part of a strategic reserve during and after a general nuclear exchange, and for many of the same reasons.

Difficulties relating to the naval role in theater nuclear strikes and in the strategic reserve could in principle be eliminated by the introduction of a force dedicated to nuclear missions. But any such force would be fiercely resisted by the Navy's leadership. Such platforms would not be cheap, given the requirements for survivability and seaworthiness, and the establishment of any such dedicated force would severely restrict naval flexibility to perform other missions.

An alternative method of alleviating these difficulties—without making major changes in force structure—is possible. This would involve mandating operational priority at all times for nuclear missions. Any other operations would be allowed only if they did not impact adversely the Navy's ability to perform nuclear missions. This would, however, restrict substantially its capability to mount the sort of conventional forward operations envisioned under the Maritime Strategy. Still, one wonders if the Navy will not face increasing pressure to move in this direction once the reductions in land-based theater forces under the INF treaty come into force.

Conclusions

FORCE STRUCTURE and doctrinal trends within the Navy respond to an important degree to budgetary constraints and the balance of influence among officer communities within the Navy. The Maritime Strategy, one of early offensive movement, is preeminently a strategy favored by the carrier air and submarine communities, facilitated by an environment of relative budgetary plenty for the Navy. Doubts about its efficacy in general conventional war exist. Furthermore, should escalation to the nuclear level occur, the strategy would make it difficult for the Navy to fulfill its tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear reserve missions.

It is likely that budgetary pressures, as well as doubts about the efficacy of the Maritime Strategy in war, will replace it with a strategy emphasizing defensive sea control in support of the land battle, an approach reflecting greater relative influence by the surface and patrol air officer communities. These strategic changes will be followed more slowly by a shift in force structure emphasis, from big carriers and large attack submarines to surface and submarine escort vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft. Finally, the reductions in ground-based nuclear forces mandated by the INF treaty may force the Navy to take more seriously its role in NATO's declared strategy of "flexible response" to the nuclear level in the event of a conventional collapse. This is likely to restrict even further the Navy's flexibility to engage in independent operations.

At this juncture, with much talk of "the end of the Cold War" and optimism about the transformation of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, it may appear fanciful to contemplate the prospect of war with the Soviet Union—conventional or nuclear, short or long. Still, prudent strategy and the forces to support it may make the improbable even less so. Military history offers few examples of maritime powers prevailing over continental ones by independent naval operations. It is only through the prospect of effective military operations by their opponents on land that continental powers have been held in check. The demise of the Maritime Strategy should enable our naval forces to return to a concentrated focus upon the support of such operations. Such a return can only strengthen the constraints against any assault upon the Western alliance.

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Strobe Lite

Richard Perle

WITH ANY LUCK, *The Master of the Game* will complete Strobe Talbott's writings on arms control.* The unifying theme of his trilogy on the subject is not one of substance—although Talbott's unqualified enthusiasm for arms control is evident in the most recent volume as it was in his earlier *Deadly Gambits* and *Endgame,* all of which deal with U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations.

That theme has to do with the way Talbott sees the game of arms control and those who play it. He sees that game, which his titles liken to chess, as a modern geopolitical morality play, good versus evil, the arms controllers versus the anti-arms controllers, the good guys against the bad guys. But the only thing about *Master of the Game* that convincingly evokes an image of chess is the contrast between the black pieces and the white ones. For that is how Talbott sees the world. The actions covered in the book fall into two categories: those of which Talbott approves, and those of which he disapproves. When he agrees with the actions he describes they are the deeds of enlightened, constructive, thoughtful, conscientious public servants. When he disagrees they are the machinations of dark, destructive, short-sighted, petty, malevolent forces.

So, for example, Talbott describes the "factions" he thinks he discovered among the advisers to President Ronald Reagan as follows:

> For one faction, the real objective was ... traditional arms control. For the other faction, a bonus of the SDI program, if not the real objective, was the liquidation of arms control in any guise.

The purpose of the competing factions, according to Talbott, was "either to advance arms control or to stop it dead in its tracks." Nowhere is the reality even considered: that differences among Ronald Reagan's advisers had something to do with choices among competing approaches to arms control, not all of which could be counted upon to improve our security in equal measure, if at all. But Talbott is such a true believer in the efficacy of arms control per se that he believes that anyone in the least critical of specific arms control proposals must have had in mind its "liquidation in any guise."

As its subtitle, "Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace," indicates, much of the book has to do with the career of Paul H. Nitze. Because this is a review of a book in which my own views and actions are prominently featured, usually in contrast to Nitze's, I think

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* Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 416 pp., $19.95.

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I should, before proceeding further, make my own prejudice known. Because in a number of places Talbott purports to describe how I felt about Paul or how he felt about me, the reader could be forgiven for gathering the impression that we were constantly at war, and even that our policy battles reflected personal animosity. This is simply false, on both counts.

Paul Nitze's public career is an extraordinary example of intelligent and effective public service. He has been a model for many of us who came to Washington to work on national security policy, myself included. I am proud to have worked with Paul Nitze, whom I regard with respect, admiration, and affection. But one would never know that by reading Strobe Talbott. In *Master of the Game,* as in *Deadly Gambits,* Talbott blows up out of all proportion some policy differences between Paul and me—differences that are minor compared to the vast area about which we not only agree, but with respect to which I can best describe Paul Nitze as my teacher.

ONE SUCH DIFFERENCE, treated at length in *Deadly Gambits,* is glossed over in *Master of the Game.* This has to do with a difference between us over the negotiability of the "zero option," the proposal by President Reagan in November 1981, to eliminate entirely the category of medium range missiles. Even here Talbott overdoes it. Working without gray, everything is reduced to black or white, with the result that important points are lost entirely. For example, Talbott argues that in testifying before a Senate committee following the President's unveiling of the "zero option," I discussed the possibility that the United States harbored fallback positions in a manner that suggested a warning to, and an effort to intimidate, Nitze—who had argued for a more ambiguous proposal within Administration councils.

If Talbott had even a rudimentary appreciation of the art of negotiation (a good idea for a man who writes books on the subject), he would understand that hints from the State Department that the United States had prepared a fallback position even before the negotiations began would guarantee the collapse of the President's position. Of course I testified (truthfully) that we had no fallback position. I sought to discourage the many rumors, some of which appeared in print, that we were not serious about our own proposal. And in citing Sir Samuel Hoare's reflection on the deterioration of the British position at Munich, I wished to reinforce the point that it was easy, as negotiations progressed, to lose sight of one's original objective—a point with which I am quite certain Paul Nitze would agree. The idea that I "seemed to be putting [Nitze] on notice [that] if he became the Administration's principal advocate for compromise in INF, he ... would be open to the charge of appeasement" is Talbott's, not mine. It would never occur to me to associate Paul Nitze with appeasement. And while fallbacks are an inevitable part of the negotiating process, it does seem to me that one should at least offer one's opening position before indicating a willingness to retreat.

There was, to be sure, a difference between the Departments of Defense and State, and between Paul Nitze and me, over how to handle the INF negotiations, both at the beginning in the fall of 1981 and later as the first deployment of Pershing II missiles in Germany became imminent. He believed that the Western position would collapse under the pressure of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe, especially in Germany, and was thus more willing to make compromises prior to 1983 than I was. The so-called "walk in the woods" was one example—a proposal by Nitze that abandoned some features of the "zero option" in favor of an earlier agreement.

My own view at the time, which Talbott has failed to comprehend in both books that deal with it, was that the Soviets were not about to accept *any* deal that allowed *any* American missiles prior to the German elections. Therefore, any compromise, anything short of the "zero option" put to them before they tested the resilience of the Western position in the German elections, would be rejected by the Soviets. But if a compromise was

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proposed that abandoned essential elements of the Western position—say, by allowing the Soviets to keep their missiles in Asia—we would never regain that ground. So we would end up with a weakened position and no treaty. These were differences of political judgement, not a choice between St. George and the Dragon. As subsequent history shows (with, perhaps, a bit of luck on my side) it did indeed prove possible—contrary to the belief of virtually all the experts (including Strobe Talbott)—to gain Soviet approval for the "zero option." Under the circumstances, one would expect just a touch of humility from Mr. Talbott as he jumps to the conclusion that those of us who were right must nevertheless have had some evil purpose.

Talbott's mistaken interpretation here is but one example of the consistent distortion that results from attributing malevolent motives to anyone who doesn't subscribe to the Talbott school of early compromise and limitless flexibility.

The differences between Paul and me are trivial compared to those between Talbott and Nitze (or, for that matter, the United States and the Soviet Union) on almost every major issue on which Paul Nitze has compiled a public record, including arms control. On the fundamental issue of the nature of the Soviet Union and Western policy for dealing with it, Talbott rejects virtually everything that Nitze had said and written and done for the last 30 years. The single exception is Nitze's recent thinking on arms control—but even here Talbott rejects the substance of Nitze's views on such crucial issues as the ABM treaty of 1972, the SALT I and SALT II treaties, and the utility of anti-ballistic missile defenses in strengthening deterrence.

Most of the differences I had with Paul during the period of the Reagan administration had to do with political judgments—judgment about the probable reaction of the Soviets or our allies or the Congress to policy choices faced by the Administration; about the efficacy of negotiating strategies or matters of timing; about the appropriate balance between American leadership and the search for consensus within the Western alliance. Alongside the sweep of postwar history and the role of American military strength in protecting the Western democracies, none of these was fundamental; most were temporary and tactical, none was philosophical. And none of the differences, despite an occasional flash of anger from one side or the other, diminished in the least my profound respect for Paul, his world view, or his public career.

INDEED, the trilogy's most serious defect is the breezy way in which Talbott purports to know what was going on in the minds of the people he writes about. The journalistic formula by which the trilogy has been wrought is something like this: (1) Obtain an account from a "good guy" participant of the actions and motivations of a "bad guy" participant (or, failing that, a second- or even third-hand account). (2) Assume (tacitly, of course) that because it comes from a "good guy" it must be right; but (3) in the interests of "objectivity" interview a "bad guy" and get his side of the story. Then, (4) disregard the "bad guy" by assuming he was really out to scuttle arms control but won't admit it. And finally, (5) describe the "good guy" version in minute detail calculated to achieve an appearance of verisimilitude. This Talbott does repeatedly on a range of issues, including the interpretation of the ABM treaty, the verification of mobile missiles, adherence to SALT II (after Soviet violations of it), SDI, and the like.

Reading Talbott is like listening to the State Department view expressed at an interagency meeting—although Talbott, who is a good deal more articulate than the typical State Department official, is at least clear about his preferences. Again and again Talbott argues the State Department position, often with majestic tendentiousness. (He is equally solicitous of the Soviet position which is almost never questioned or analyzed but is taken as given.) On Talbott's chess board, it is only the activity of the black pieces that merits scrutiny.

A few passages, drawn almost at random

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from a score of possibilities, will illustrate the nature of Talbott's argument:

> The biggest obstacle to *real* negotiations with the Soviets on SDI was still the Reagan Administration's inability to overcome its internal divisions and the resistance of the President himself [emphasis added].

By what standard of judgment does Talbott declare that the Administration's conduct of negotiations on defensive systems was not "real"? Because Talbott doesn't like the negotiating policy—described by the word "resistance"—decided on by the President? Because the President was not prepared to enter into the sort of deal that Talbott would have preferred?

> Perle tried to persuade Akhromeyev that there was no need for special verification measures on SLCM [sea-launched cruise missiles] . . . Akhromeyev replied, 'we have constraints on ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] . . . we can do the same sort of thing with SLCMs.' This was a telling, ironic exchange, since Perle had been, and would continue to be, a stickler for the toughest verification measures when the weapon system in question was one in which the Soviets enjoyed an advantage.

Here, two points need to be made. First, Talbott is simply wrong in saying that I tried to persuade Akhromeyev that there was no need for special verification measures on SLCMs. I believe, and so said to Akhromeyev, that there is no practical, acceptable way to verify SLCMs and that it was pointless to insist that we abandon them, which we were not prepared to do. I also argued that unverifiable provisions were unacceptable and that, therefore, there should be no limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. Second, there is no irony in insisting that the provisions of arms control treaties should be verifiable and that those that cannot be made verifiable should not be negotiated. The United States needs sea-launched cruise missiles for the defense of the fleet. We should not be pushed into giving them up, even if it means that there will be no agreement. (If, like Talbott, one regards an arms control treaty as an end in itself, this argument will of course be unpersuasive.)

> Weinberger had chosen his moment carefully. The holidays had begun. Shultz was attending a Christmas party at the State Department. The National Security Council staff—which was supposed to referee disputes between the State and Defense departments and prevent one agency from sneaking its preferences past another—was in greater disarray than usual because of the Iran-Contra affair.

This passage illustrates in an only slightly exaggerated form the book's chronic and sometimes absurd tendency to attribute the darkest of motives to the "bad guys." The passage refers to a December 17, 1986 briefing of the President on progress in the SDI program. The notion that Weinberger "had chosen his moment carefully," arranging a meeting when the hapless Secretary of State was at a Christmas party and thus unable to attend the briefing, is ludicrous. For one thing, the briefing had been postponed at least twice. When it was finally fitted into the President's program it was without knowledge of anyone else's schedule. The time was selected by the White House—indeed, by the same NSC whose disarray is implied by Talbott to have been exploited by Weinberger. Moreover, no decision was requested at the briefing, which was available to the Secretary of State. Talbott's later suggestion—that Weinberger was "caught momentarily off guard" when the President asked how progress on SDI "squared" with his proposal at Reykjavik to delay deployment of SDI—is nonsense. The Soviets rejected the American proposal at Reykjavik and the President was determined to go full speed ahead with SDI.

But what is perhaps most striking about Talbott's treatment of this incident is the way in which he quotes Nitze as being "outraged" at the "treachery" of the Pentagon. I simply don't believe that Paul Nitze, after half a century of experience in government, would use the word "treachery" to describe an end-run within the bureaucracy, even if he believed that one had taken place. Secretaries of state

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routinely seek one-on-one meetings with Presidents with a view to influencing them in the absence of other cabinet officers who might disagree with their recommendations. So do secretaries of defense. The mock horror with which Paul is said to have responded could only have been that. It reminds one of Claude Raines, shocked to discover that there was gambling going on in Rick's Café in Casablanca.

> However, Iklé and Perle had recently hired a lawyer of their own, one who was more likely to reach a finding that supported their case.

Talbott's insinuation that Phil Kunsberg, the lawyer to whom he refers, had been hired because he would support a particular point of view on the issue in question—the interpretation of the ABM treaty—is both false and unfair. The fact is that Phil Kunsberg was brought into the Defense Department to do something entirely different. It was quite by accident that he was asked to study the ABM treaty. I assigned that task to him without any idea of what he would find, and Kunsberg had no idea how I viewed the issue of treaty interpretation. Indeed, Kunsberg's interpretation, later confirmed by Abe Sofaer, legal adviser to the Department of State, surprised everyone, me included. But like Paul Nitze I came to be persuaded that Kunsberg's was a more accurate reading of the treaty and negotiating record than the previous interpretation. Talbott is such an intense proponent of one interpretation of the ABM treaty that he refuses to consider that others might honestly arrive at another view. He even disparages Nitze's endorsement of the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM treaty.

WHICH BRINGS ME to my final point. In the end, Talbott's portrayal of Nitze is unflattering and unfair. It is true that he recognizes—and doubtless admires—Nitze's brilliance. But so skewed is Talbott's own view of international affairs and of U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control that he continually offers excuses for those of Nitze's views with which he disagrees. The principal excuse with which Talbott seeks to explain Nitze's reservations about the SALT II treaty, for example, is that he was reacting to his exclusion from the councils of the Carter administration by gratuitously opposing Carter's treaty. And elsewhere as well Paul Nitze is portrayed as a man whose policies are driven by personal vanity—whenever those policies differ from Strobe Talbott's.

That is not the Master of the Game with whom I have worked for nearly twenty years.

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Shawcross and the Shah

Peter W. Rodman

REPORTS THAT William Shawcross has mellowed in his middle age are still a bit premature. His latest book, a dramatic and sometimes moving description of the exile, illness, and death of the Shah of Iran, shows a remarkable personal sympathy for the fallen Shah—shunned by former allies, exploited by hangers-on, ill-treated by constantly changing teams of doctors, and yet retaining an incredible dignity to the end.* Regrettably, brilliant journalism and elegant writing are marred here by a clichéd political analysis when the author delves into the deeper subjects of the Shah's rule, his downfall, and American policy.

Shawcross, British journalist and son of the eminent jurist Hartley (later Lord) Shawcross, declares an interest in Iran dating back to the 1960s—his father was once president of the Iran Society in Britain—and his contacts and sources on the life of the Iranian court are clearly extensive. From hundreds of interviews he has pieced together the tragic story of the Shah's ordeal from his flight in January 1979 to his death in July 1980, as he sought a haven first in Egypt, then in Morocco, the Bahamas, Mexico, the United States, Panama, and then back again to Egypt. Except for Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, who welcomed his fallen friend with loyalty and courage, most of the countries on that list were notable for their eagerness to get the Shah out quickly or to exploit his presence for some financial or other benefit. In Panama came the ultimate embarrassment of being the guest of strongman General Omar Torrijos, who counted on some political payoff from doing the Carter administration this favor, toyed with the thought of extraditing the Shah back to Iran, and fantasized about seducing the Empress Farah while she and her ill husband were virtually captive in Torrijos's island retreat. Torrijos's henchman was a promising young colonel named Manuel Noriega.

As for medical treatment, Shawcross presents one of the most striking recorded examples of the apparent truth that the rich get the worst medical care possible. Eight teams of doctors of varying nationalities, one after the other, provided their services and conflicting advice, elbowing and denigrating each other in what the Shah himself called a "medical soap opera." He died of cancer, in circumstances that lead one to believe his life might have been prolonged with better treatment.

Shawcross muses on the nature of political loyalty, highlighting the courage of Sadat (who was the most forthcoming, and at the most risk to himself) in contrast to the cold calculation of other world leaders who had been allies, even fawning allies, of the Shah while he ruled but who turned their backs as he wandered in exile like the Flying Dutchman of legend. For these leaders and their countries, Iran's strategic importance remained, no matter who governed it, and their need to cultivate good relations with the new

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* William Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 463 pp., $19.95.

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regime outweighed personal loyalty to the departed emperor.

SHAWCROSS'S sympathetic portrayal of this sad drama has already earned him a blast from *The New Republic* for selling out. It's the sort of book that Shawcross's old target Henry Kissinger would approve of, jibed Fouad Ajami in his review. I doubt it. It's not merely that Shawcross can't resist taking petty potshots at Kissinger, even while crediting him for his personal crusade on behalf of admitting the Shah into this country. More serious is the disappointingly clichéd account of the Shah's rule, told here in flashbacks that cover the highlights of Iran's modern history and relations with the United States. The book is weak in its attempt at strategic analysis of what accounted for the warm mutual embrace of the two countries. Likewise in its analysis of the Shah's downfall. While the centerpiece of the book is the Shah's final journey in exile, the prior history makes up much of the book's length—as well as providing its moral backdrop—and the weakness of that history is a major and distracting flaw. It is journalism, not profound historical or political analysis, that we are getting here.

This book, like many other accounts, attributes the Shah's overthrow to his megalomania and the corruption and brutality of the system over which he presided. Shawcross gives the Shah credit for the enlightened aspects of his modernization (industrialization, education, land reform, health care, women's rights), noting the opposition that these policies provoked from the most reactionary elements of the society. An extraordinary celebration staged amid the historical ruins of Persepolis in 1971, to mark the supposed 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire, is (rightly) cited for its decadence, hubris, and ill-fated provocation of the conservative Shiite clergy.

The clichés have to do with the American role in fostering this megalomania, which is much asserted here, though with an argumentation that remains obscure even with repetition. Much weight is put on the visit of Nixon and Kissinger at the end of May 1972 and the subsequent U.S. decision to permit the Shah to select from the U.S. conventional arsenal to build up his own military force. According to George W. Ball, this U.S. policy "inadvertently encouraged the megalomania that ultimately contributed to the Shah's downfall." In Shawcross's excited telling, "the implications were to be catastrophic."

On closer inspection, Nixon's decision on arms supply turns out to be something rather less apocalyptic. At issue, in fact, was the American bureaucracy's traditional reluctance to sell its most advanced technology to any but NATO allies; that is, the Pentagon experts' preference (in those days) to encourage Third World customers to buy less sophisticated U.S. equipment which we presumed they would be better able to man, maintain, and protect. Nixon and Kissinger disagreed with the Pentagon experts, seeing little reason to prejudge or dictate which particular systems were or were not within Iran's capability when the geopolitical value of Iran as a strategic bulwark in the Gulf was the basic premise of our policy.

Only a few years earlier, in 1968, Britain had announced its historic and stunning decision to depart from the Gulf and relinquish its protectorate arrangements and all bases east of Suez by the end of 1971. Shawcross discusses this event, but briefly and superficially. British withdrawal from the Gulf promised to leave a yawning strategic vacuum in a region of vital importance. In those days—at the height of our Vietnam trauma and global military retrenchment—the idea of the United States replacing Britain as protector of the Gulf was out of the question. As the fractious emirates of the lower Gulf lurched toward independence, and border disputes and tribal rivalries festered, the stability of the Gulf area was no foregone conclusion. The U.S. government studied the question, as Shawcross notes. Its conclusion was that Iran and Saudi Arabia, both staunch friends of the West, were the natural legatees to share the British tutelary role; for all their own rivalry, they shared an overall strategic perception of

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the threat of radicalism and Soviet interference and the vital tie with the West.

This was surely the only sensible solution. Years afterwards, in the late 1980s, the United States was indeed forced to expand its own military role in the Gulf, and had the fortitude to do so despite residual nervousness in Congress. But this was hardly foreseeable in 1972, nor likely then to be thought desirable; it occurred only in crisis circumstances that were, indeed, part of the continuing unfolding consequences of the Shah's departure.

When Nixon visited Tehran in May 1972, the strategic trends in the broader Near East region five months after British withdrawal from the Gulf were even worse than might have been anticipated. Egypt was still a Soviet ally, with a Friendship Treaty and 15,000 Soviet troops. Syria had invaded Jordan, with Soviet support, a year and a half earlier. The Soviets had more recently signed a Friendship Treaty with Iran's arch-rival Iraq (the same Iraq that later did invade Iran). The case for expanded military support for Iran was powerful—and the French and British were ready and eager to sell advanced equipment if we were not.

Whoever was right in the 1972 argument with the Pentagon, the idea that the Shah's purchase of older aircraft or somewhat fewer of them would have prevented the Iranian revolution has to be one of the silliest of the notions that have become current on this subject in the last ten years.

The claim is not made that these military purchases impoverished the country; on the contrary, the oil wealth later to come was enough to fuel a modernization that, by all accounts, went too fast. Rather, the theory of Ball and Shawcross is an elusive psychological hypothesis about fueling the Shah's "messianic mission," loss of his "sense of proportion," "megalomania," and other abstractions about his mental state which are singularly not susceptible to proof or substantiated by any concrete indicia of cause and effect. Even Shawcross admits the difficulty of explaining the Iranian revolution by "isolat[ing] factors from one another."

The causes of the revolution were indeed manifold, and Shawcross is not wrong to speak of regime corruption, SAVAK cruelty, social dislocations and unfulfillable expectations, the Shah's isolation, vacillation, hesitancy, and other flaws. As Kissinger later pointed out, however, the Shah's political failure represented a failure of Western liberal thought as much as of anything else. The Shah followed all the best progressive advice in modernizing; few developing societies have been able to combine rapid industrialization with simultaneous political development toward democracy. Those who brought him down, of course, did not replace his rule with democracy but with a more barbaric tyranny that undid most of his social reforms. By these people, in Kissinger's words, the Shah was "despised less for what he did wrong than for what he did right." Humility ought to dampen any temptation to second-guess how he should have gone about his country's political maturation in step with its rapid economic growth.

In retrospect, the Shah probably erred in not developing or permitting the evolution of political institutions that would have given at least the middle class, the natural allies and supporters of modernization, a political stake in the system. He flirted with the idea occasionally—apparently his wife was a strong advocate—but, in the end, the classes of society that ought to have been his natural allies against obscurantism were disaffected and demoralized (as well as blissfully ignorant of what they were helping to bring about by their desertion of him).

Even so, it is still not self-evident that the outcome was foreordained, particularly given the many tactical blunders made by the Shah himself and by the Carter administration over the protracted period in 1978–79 during which the final crisis gradually unfolded. Shawcross telescopes this period, leaving us little basis for judging whether, for example, the Shah's hesitancy in the initial phases let matters get out of hand, or whether a stronger initial reaction might have permitted a different evolution.

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SHAWCROSS is a journalist of some range and style, and genuine talent. There can be no doubt he is a man of the Left, yet he has the virtue of not being entirely predictable. Whatever this book's analytical lapses, its sympathy for the Shah is more than has been fashionable. Shawcross's two earlier books on Eastern Europe—one on the Dubcek experiment of 1968 and another on Hungary after 1956—cannot be faulted for their portrayals of Soviet brutality. His first book on Cambodia, *Sideshow,* while unreliable if not discredited in most significant respects,[1] at least acknowledged the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge at a time when some on the Left were still denying them. (More recently he has even begun to edge away from *Sideshow's* absurd thesis that U.S. policy was the principal cause of the Cambodian genocide.) Later, when Hanoi turned against the Khmer Rouge and it became more fashionable to condemn the latter, Shawcross produced a second book on the Cambodian holocaust, *The Quality of Mercy,* which condemned *both* Vietnamese and Cambodian communists in full measure. In that second book, an American official—our ambassador to Thailand, Morton Abramowitz—is even one of the heroes, for his exertions on behalf of Cambodian refugees. Anyone who has earned the wrath of Noam Chomsky for his Indochina writing, as Shawcross has, can't be all bad. The extraordinary openness of our government to journalistic and congressional enquiry has, of course, been of great benefit to Shawcross, and he has had the grace (in the foreword to *Sideshow*) to express his admiration of a society in which such freedom exists. This, too, is not the conventional wisdom of the Left.

Yet, when all is said and done, there is in his work a cynicism about American policies, and even Western political values, that he cannot completely suppress. It goes far deeper than just an aversion to geopolitics. His intellectual restlessness has taken him in strange directions. In his 1970 book *Dubcek,* he lamented the crushing of the Prague Spring—as not only a Cold War tragedy but the snuffing out of an ideal:

> For Dubcek was trying to create a Marxist democracy genuinely responsive to the wishes and aspirations of its people. If he was succeeding, he has then provided the world with a real alternative to the blind arrogance of American capitalism, to the apparently endemic marriage of inefficiency and dissatisfaction of the bourgeois-democratic mixed economy, and to the mindless inhumanity of the Soviet dictatorship.

An extraordinary passage, albeit written nineteen years ago. Rejecting equally the systems of the "bourgeois-democratic" West and the brutal Soviet Union, Shawcross saw hope in, yes, a more benign form of communism—a system he presumably saw as potentially more efficient and satisfying than the conventional representative governments of the West. His Dubcek book was full of excitement at the role of the intellectuals in the Prague Spring, their ideological commitment, and the heady atmosphere of that period. The democratic West seemed to bore, if not repel him. In his book on Kadar we find also the remarkable assertion that only a minority of the Hungarian people "would consider themselves out-and-out anti-communists." Today, I'll bet he finds the Gorbachev experiment exhilarating, though perhaps his residual (and very European) suspicion of both superpowers remains, and he may be disillusioned there too.

So he is a man of the Left, but probably still searching for an elusive ideal. Unlike many of his brother intellectuals he has had the clarity of vision to recognize some of the horrors that parade under the "socialist" banner. There is a thread of bitterness and disillusionment, though, in much of his writing, as well as a certain naiveté about how the disasters he writes about with such passion might have been avoided. His is a restless mind, and not entirely a closed one; a spirit that perhaps is doomed, like the Shah, to continue to wander in vain in search of a resting place.

[1]See my debate with Shawcross in *The American Spectator,* March and July 1981.

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Through the Fog of War

Eliot A. Cohen

OF ALL THE PRINTED products of the academic world, few promise as little and deliver less than the typical edited volume of essays by assorted authors. In the case of *Military Effectiveness,* however, we have a remarkable exception.* Ohio State University historians Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray have organized their study to address one large and complex question: "What makes military organizations effective?" To that end they devote a volume each to World War I, the interwar period, and World War II, and have tapped some of the best scholars writing on military history in the English language today. Indeed, the list of contributors to *Military Effectiveness* reads like a "Who's Who" of contemporary English language military history, and their essays show these historians in fine form. Each volume consists chiefly of historical case studies of the experience of particular countries, but includes as well one or two theoretical or summary essays.

The result of this collaboration is an extraordinarily rich and provocative work. *Military Effectiveness* deserves—and was designed for—a larger audience than that of professional historians. The preface informs the reader that the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense funded these volumes, which suggests that something considerably larger than antiquarian interest drove it. Non-historians have three reasons at least to sample this work, if not to consume it in its entirety: first, it treats *in extenso* the enduring question of how and why military organizations succeed and fail; second, many of the constituent essays will correct loose contemporary thinking based on superficial or inaccurate historical analogies; third, the work as a whole suggests ways in which historical research can illuminate important problems in strategic thought. To examine these three contributions to the literature, we must first consider the conceptual framework of *Military Effectiveness.*

The co-editors of *Military Effectiveness* imposed on their collaborators an analytical framework presented in the very first essay of the book: an early draft of this essay was apparently distributed in advance of a series of conferences and drafting sessions at which the other papers were prepared. In it, Millett and Murray (and their co-author Kenneth Watman) first define their terms:

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* Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness,* 3 vols. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), $150.00.

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> Military effectiveness is the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of efficiency. Combat power is the ability to destroy the enemy while limiting the damage that he can inflict in return. The precise amount of necessary damage depends on the goals of the war and the physical characteristics of armed forces committed to its prosecution.[1]

Although the authors believe that "the basic characteristics of military effectiveness cannot be measured with precision," they do come up with four levels of military effectiveness, and a set of questions to be addressed at each level.

The first they call *political effectiveness* and in it include the ability of a military organization to secure adequate fiscal, material, and human resources. The second level is that of *strategic effectiveness.* Here they look at the relationship between the policy objectives of a government and the means—the strategy or strategies—evolved by military organizations. At this level they also ask whether military leaders were able to "communicate with and influence the political leadership to seek militarily logical national goals," size and structure their forces to meet those goals, integrate their strategy with those of their allies, and place national strengths against enemy weaknesses. At the third, or *operational level* of war, the editors stress the planning, preparation, and conduct of specific campaigns. They ask whether an organization has a "professional ethos and integrity" that enables it to confront such tasks successfully, whether it integrates different branches of an armed service (e.g. infantry and artillery) and different services (e.g. air force and navy). At this level Millett and Murray also insist that one must measure an organization's mobility and flexibility, its adaptation to available technology, and the smooth functioning of supporting systems such as intelligence, supply, communications, and transportation. They further ask whether the operational concepts of a military organization harmonize with the strategic objectives assigned to it, and whether operational doctrine—like strategic choice—places a country's strength against its enemy's weakness. The editors' fourth and final category is that of the *tactical level* of war. Here they again ask whether harmony exists among strategic choice, operational concept, and tactical doctrine, and ask whether a military organization integrates all arms, places strength against weakness, emphasizes flexibility and the use of surprise, and whether the support functions reinforce or work at odds with military doctrine. But they focus on different questions as well—whether, for example, a tactical system is consistent with high morale and cohesive units, and the extent to which training matches tactics.

IT IS A DAUNTING path they have blazed. These two formidable military historians (field grade officers in the Marine Corps and the Air Force reserves) generally succeed in the difficult task of trying to keep two dozen independent-minded experts marching together, if not in lockstep, at least in the same direction. Most of the contributors strive manfully to stay together, but a few straggle and one or two even mutiny. Thus, although Millett and Murray reject the notion that *ultimate* victory is the basic criterion of military effectiveness, Holger Herwig, in his essay on Germany in World War I, declares defiantly that "the historian of the military in time of war has a simple test of effectiveness: victory or defeat."[2] In a couple of cases the authors seem bewildered by the analytical purpose of the editors and end by preparing a fairly straightforward (and at times not so straightforward) narrative of the period they have been assigned. And in some respects the editors themselves appear to have

[1] *Military Effectiveness,* Vol. 1, pp. 2–3.
[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 104–5.

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revised some of their own early assumptions.[3] The essay serves its main purpose admirably, however: it provides a common set of themes to lend the work coherence.

Four aspects of the analytical framework of *Military Effectiveness* merit particular attention. The first concerns the political aspects of military effectiveness solely in political terms: that is, in terms of the policy objectives of a government, and the foreseen or unexpected political costs at home and abroad of military action. To be sure, Millett and Murray (and virtually all of the authors) believe firmly in the primacy of political purpose in war—the resounding if not always clearly understood message of Clausewitz's *On War*—but they do not make it the dominant theme in this introductory study of effectiveness. Their definition of political effectiveness, for example, might be taken to imply that the chief objective of a military organization is securing ever-increasing resources from a stingy civilian leadership. Professor Herwig, however, surely has a point: victory (provided one defines it as the achieving of political ends) is the ultimate measure of *effectiveness*, although perhaps not of *efficiency*. "Fighting power" is instrumental, relevant to "effectiveness" only insofar as it advances the aims of policy.

A second question follows from this. The editors have chosen to focus on military organizations rather than political leaders. But some of the questions they address (e.g., those of resource allocation) fall more in the sphere of the political leadership than they do of military organizations. Similarly, strategic and even operational effectiveness rest as much on the skill and wisdom of statesmen as they do on military leaders and commanders. It is probably inadequate, then, to evaluate the competence (and in particular the strategic abilities) of military organizations without examining the role of statesmen as well.

The third issue arises from the editors' *a priori* assumptions about the nature of military effectiveness. Consider the matter of placing "strength against weakness": is it always true that this is a sound strategic or operational (and in some cases, even tactical) practice? Some of the essays would appear to suggest not. In World War II the British night time bomber offensive against German cities certainly attacked a German weakness, but contributed less to victory than the American daylight campaign against well-protected industrial targets. In World War I, most of the historians writing in *Military Effectiveness* seem to agree, no country had a decisive option outside the Western Front—a classic case of strength butting into strength. Or take another example: military organizations do not merely adapt well or poorly to "available technology," they also decide which technologies to push further, even in the course of a war. A classic example of failure to insist on the development of appropriate technologies appears in Anglo-American tank design programs which, until almost the very end of World War II, invariably produced weapons inferior (on a one-for-one basis, at least) to their German counterparts.

Finally, the analytical framework of *Military Effectiveness* assumes that peacetime and wartime military effectiveness are the same, or at least similar. Yet is this so? In a period of prolonged peacetime competition military organizations may decide, for example, to delay large-scale acquisitions and retraining of their forces in order to avoid mass obsolescence. In the early 1930s this fate befell the Italians, who invested large sums in aircraft and tanks that, although fine at the time, were inferior to British and German equipment by the end of the decade. During all-out wars such as those of 1914–18 or 1939–45, military establishments have little difficulty in securing vast resources from their societies, although how they allocate them is a different matter. In peacetime, particularly in democratic states during this period, they have to wheedle and lobby for the sums they need, or think they need. At the tactical level, in war it is far easier for a high command to assess

[3] See Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, "Lessons of War," *The National Interest*, No. 14 (Winter 1988/9).

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its own military effectiveness; in peace all maneuvers and war games are, of necessity, artificial to greater or lesser degree.

These controversial aspects of the theoretical structure of *Military Effectiveness* reinforce rather than diminish its essential value. Millett and Murray do a large service by forcing their reader to think through what military effectiveness is or should be; their pungent argument is usually convincing, and when not, it is at least clear and stimulating. Moreover, despite its flaws, their analytic framework has important merits. The distinctions they draw between strategy, operations, and tactics are useful and important. Particularly in their delineation of the operational or campaign level of war they help the English speaking and reading world understand a concept central first to German and now to Soviet military thought. And in any event, their avowed purpose appears in the laying out of an agenda rather than the dictation of a checklist, and the best of the essays in the book treat the introductory essay in that light. In most cases the authors reach an eminently satisfactory compromise between their individual approaches to a topic and the demands of a common perspective.

EACH OF THE volumes has particular strengths and weaknesses. The first, which deals with World War I, is the most uniformly excellent of the three. After the introductory essay discussed above, it includes chapters on Britain, Germany, the United States, Italy, France, Japan, and Russia. One wishes that the chapter on Japan—an altogether minor player in the war—had been replaced by one on Austria-Hungary, which in some respects did far better than its faintly comical reputation might suggest. Paul Kennedy, in addition to writing the chapter on Great Britain, contributed a concluding essay on "Military Effectiveness in the First World War," which is particularly interesting on the relationship between strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness.

In a pattern that recurs throughout the three volumes, authors seem inclined to throw their weight against the historical stereotype of their chosen nation's military performance. Holger Herwig is eloquently damning on German military performance; conversely, David Jones is equally convincing on the little-known successes of the Russian army until 1917. In this as in the other two volumes, the authors occasionally succumb to one of two temptations: either to grade the military organizations they are studying (one essay actually awards A's through F's), or to drag the participants before the bar of military history, there to convict or clear these organizations of charges of incompetence. In moderation such approaches have their uses. Particularly in dealing with countries whose military experience has been reduced to stereotype—Germany is a case discussed below—the historian as schoolmaster, district attorney, or counsel for the defense makes a valuable contribution. More fundamentally, such an insistence on passing judgment reflects the seriousness with which these writers treat their topics. *Military Effectiveness* is pervaded by the awareness that when military organizations fail, men die and nations suffer.

The authors of the volume on the interwar period had a more difficult task than their colleagues in Volumes I and III. The best essays are those by Robert Doughty, a U.S. Army colonel on the faculty at West Point, on the French armed forces, and Alvin Coox's summary essay, which offers a fine analysis of the constraints and challenges faced by the major military powers in the interwar period. This was, let it be noted, a period of ferment and innovation, as well as perplexity in some cases and stagnation in others. The Soviet Union in the 1930s had begun the most audacious experiments with new military technologies, as Earl Ziemke's essay points out. Large paratroop drops (a Soviet first) and experimentation with large mechanized and armored formations were incorporated in a Soviet doctrine of "deep operations"—an operational concept very much alive and well today, and no small concern to NATO defense planners. The purge of the Soviet military by Stalin in the late 1930s claimed the careers

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(and in many cases, the lives) of three of five Soviet marshals, all corps commanders, almost all divisional and brigade commanders, and nearly half of all regimental commanders. These included many of the most creative and capable generals, most notably Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and led to a period of regression in Soviet military thought, and, in no small measure, to the woeful events of the summer of 1941.

The Soviet doctrinal retreat from large-scale mobile warfare in the late 1930s gained impetus, interestingly enough, from Soviet reading of the experiences of the Spanish Civil War. It is a fascinating sub-theme of this volume that most competent observers believed that the experience of the Spanish Civil War indicated the superiority of the tactical defensive, not (as it is sometimes thought) the merits of lightning war. This suggests not the incompetence of military observers but the intrinsic difficulty of abstracting lessons from small wars for big ones. It might even suggest that the notion of the dominance of offense or defense at different periods in history requires some re-examination, if it should not be discarded altogether.

THE THIRD volume of *Military Effectiveness* deals with World War II, and is the most uneven of the three. Some essays, such as Alvin Coox's treatment of the Japanese military establishment in World War II, are superb, and would stand by themselves as masterly surveys of the principal countries at war. Other contributions are less thoughtful and less well-researched. One essay, Russell Weigley's summary discussion of "The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness," is at once brilliant and perverse, and occupies a category of its own. It looks back at all three volumes, and makes some extremely acute points. Weigley points out, for example, that scholars have greatly exaggerated the extent of anti-militarism in American life, and argues that in fact American military organizations have had a far more intimate and far less adversarial relationship to the American polity than often assumed. On the other hand, he begins his essay with an argument that gains little force from repetition and elaboration:

> War in the twentieth century is no longer the extension of politics by other means. It is doubtful whether the aphorism affirming that war is such an extension of politics was ever true enough to warrant the frequency with which it has been repeated. [The twentieth century has seen] the emergence of war not as the servant but as the master of politics. Twentieth century warfare sets its own purposes.[4]

This contention is implicitly rejected and explicitly disproved by the essays on the United States and Great Britain in World War II. Millett and Murray, the authors of these essays, argue that the dominance of two political geniuses, Roosevelt and Churchill, accounted in no small measure for the success of the Grand Alliance. One might say the same, in a very different way, of Stalin. Weigley admits much of this, but describes the period of World War II to the present as one of "militarized civilian leadership," a term of doubtful accuracy. On the other hand, his observation that the non-political dynamic of war—the tendency to escalate ends as well as means—can distort, thwart, or transform a nation's original political purpose, is well taken. It is unfortunate that in dismissing Clausewitz's dictum concerning war and politics he fails to explore Clausewitz's teaching, which covers this matter more fully than one might infer from his essay.

Of the other essays in this volume, the one sure to attract the most attention is Jurgen Förster's on Germany. His partial title—"The Dynamics of *Volksgemeinschaft*"—reveals one of his central points: German military efficiency at the tactical and perhaps even the operational level in World War II reflected the military utility of Nazi ideology. Almost half of all officer candidates between 1939 and 1942 were Nazi Party members, and in a variety of ways the *Wehrmacht's* high command

[4] *Military Effectiveness*, Vol. III, p. 341.

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made certain that Nazism—including a willingness to butcher certain categories of prisoners of war—would animate their armies. Indeed, Förster doubts that the German Army officer corps could have maintained its quality while managing its sixty-four-fold expansion from 1933 to 1943 had Hitler's men not believed in their cause.

This is unsettling news, particularly from an officer in the *Bundeswehr* and one of the most talented historians at the *Bundeswehr's* military history research office. Indeed, one contributor to the volume, Lieutenant General John Cushman (U.S. Army, ret.) finds it "repugnant to think that Hitler's evil notions had anything to do with the high quality of German operational and tactical performance in 1939–45," although he yields to Förster's evidence. It is, as this writer can testify from personal experience, a view that goes down poorly with many American officers and would-be military reformers, who would like to mimic the *Wehrmacht's* undeniable tactical virtuosity. The notion that German skill had something to do with the barbarity that enfolded and animated it is indeed "repugnant," and hence likely to be resisted.

Indeed, Förster's essay goes further in shattering the image of German military proficiency, particularly at the strategic level. He notes that Hitler's generals did not oppose the invasion of the Soviet Union, nor did their planning take into account certain gross, and one would have suspected obvious, logistical considerations. In contrast to the "if-the-Führer-had-only-listened-to-me"[5] interpretation purveyed in the memoirs of German commanders, he paints the portrait of a parochial and arrogant corps of generals who knew how to lead panzer corps and armies, but not how to wage global war. We sometimes forget just how much of our view of the strategic and operational side of World War II remains influenced by German accounts. This is particularly true of the war in the East, where Soviet strategic and operational skill has been masked by the self-serving or distorted picture purveyed by some German veterans of the battles there.

WHAT, IN THE END, does *Military Effectiveness* tell us about the phenomena its editors sought to study? Perhaps most striking is the complexity of the relationship between the different levels of war (strategy, operations, and tactics) and the absence of a single case in which a country has excelled at all three. For a variety of reasons the Germans in both world wars excelled at tactics and, to a lesser extent, in operations, but performed miserably at the strategic level. The British displayed limited tactical skill but far greater strategic acumen. The American experience falls somewhere in between. In any case, it is the considered opinion of the editors of the volume that "strategic wisdom, however derived, is more important than operational and tactical effectiveness."[6] Most of their collaborators appear to agree.

An additional service of *Military Effectiveness* is its shattering of stereotypes. The reputation of Germans for excellence in war in the first half of this century is the most noteworthy case. Indeed, a reader of the three essays on German military effectiveness might be forgiven for thinking that the only interesting question remaining is why it took so long for powerful nations to defeat such a collection of strategical ninnies, albeit tactical wizards. Churchill's judgment on Germany in the first World War serves as a useful corrective:

> Yet in the sphere of force, human records contain no manifestation like the eruption of the German volcano. For four years Germany fought and defied the five continents of the world by land and sea and air. The German armies upheld her tottering confederates, intervened in every theatre with success, stood everywhere on conquered territory, and inflicted on their enemies more

[5] I am indebted for this phrase to Dr. Brad Meyer, an acute student of German military history. Herman Wouk's fictional General Arnim von Roon in *The Winds of War* captures the mentality of such officers quite nicely.

[6] See Millett and Murray, "Constraints on the Waging of War," p. 10.

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than twice the bloodshed they suffered themselves. To break their strength and science and curb their fury, it was necessary to bring all the greatest nations of mankind into the field against them. Overwhelming populations, unlimited resources, measureless sacrifice, the Sea Blockade, could not prevail for fifty months. Small states were trampled down in the struggle; a mighty Empire was battered into unrecognizable fragments; and nearly twenty million men perished or shed their blood before the sword was wrested from the terrible hand. Surely, Germans, for history it is enough![7]

Alas, it was not. As Paul Kennedy points out, "Impetuous youths have boasted of taking on 'the four corners of the earth in arms'; only the Germans have made a practice of it . . . "[8] The German campaigns for hegemony in Europe—launched, in one case, by one of the most wicked tyrannies that have darkened this century—failed each time, and ruinously. This fact does not, however, make the *Reich* of Kaiser Wilhelm or of Hitler look to have been anything other than formidable in the extreme.

Other, less stark but no less inaccurate stereotypes crumble under close examination. The sympathetic portrayals of the French military by Douglas Porch and Robert Doughty, and the balanced discussions of the Italian military by John Gooch, Brian Sullivan, and MacGregor Knox, serve as useful correctives to the common portrait of mindlessness and stagnation in the one case, and pervasive cowardice on the other. The authors of these and other chapters serve not only the community of military historians but social scientists, professional officers, and the broader public of military affairs by providing a fine-grained look at each of these countries. Much of the intellectual structure of contemporary strategic studies has emerged from our understanding of the experiences from 1914 to 1945. When one turns to studies of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance, for example, analogies drawn and lessons learned from this period continue to shape contemporary debates.

Military Effectiveness stimulates the reader's curiosity about comparative studies of these issues, since military effectiveness and military efficiency are relative, not absolute terms. The thematic essays in each volume try with mixed success to provide this broader view, but, as the editors point out, more work remains to be done. In this as in many other respects, *Military Effectiveness* is as useful for the lines of inquiry and reflection it opens up as for the answers it provides. For *Military Effectiveness* is not, and does not claim to be, a definitive work. Its editors seek to raise, define, and explore an important set of issues, and they have succeeded brilliantly. One hopes that the editors of and contributors to these three volumes, as well as others, will pursue the many problems and questions raised by this work in its parts and as a whole. Meanwhile, Millett and Murray have made a large and durable contribution not only to the historical profession, but to all who think about what makes a nation militarily powerful.

[7]Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. IV, *1916–1918, Part 2* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 276.

[8]*Military Effectiveness*, Vol. I, p. 343.

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Pakistan and the Asian Balance

William E. Odom

SINCE ITS CREATION, Pakistan has alternately enjoyed favor and disfavor in U.S. foreign policy. As the Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistani senior officials fear another turn to disfavor, another repetition of the periodic cycle in U.S. policy. Optimists among them hope that it will only be a turn to neglect rather than scorn, merely a loss of American attention. The pessimists foresee a return to severe tensions as American attention shifts from Pakistan's aid to the Afghan insurgents to domestic politics in Islamabad.

It would be a serious error for the U.S. to allow this cycle to continue its traditional pattern without pausing to consider the implications. Whether by calculation, subjective inclination, or absentmindedness, American strategy on the Asian mainland has given a key role to Pakistan. To ignore this strategic fact while focusing wholly on the traditional sources of tension—the Pakistani nuclear program, the lack of progress toward liberal democracy, and the lingering fondness in some circles for better relations with India—could lead to a setback for an incipient balance of power on the Asian continent.

The strategic situation on the Asian mainland is easiest to grasp if we consider its two intersecting axes. The first, linking Moscow and New Delhi, has developed over the course of more than two decades. Though U.S. policy has sought to dissolve, undermine, or at least limit this axis, India has consistently resisted American courtship even as it has pocketed U.S. diplomatic and economic aid concessions.

The second axis extends between Beijing and Islamabad. The Nixon administration used this connection in the early 1970s to begin the opening with China. It was the Carter administration, however, that actually built American strategy on this axis, first by normalizing relations with China and then by reversing its policy toward Pakistan in 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The second move was neither a happy one nor a unanimous one for Carter policy aides. The Administration's arms transfer policy, its human rights policy, and its tough nuclear proliferation policy all had to be excepted in Pakistan's case. Moreover, the move was bound to spoil President Carter's initiative towards India. At the same time, Moscow and New Delhi exacerbated matters with a Soviet promise of a billion dollars arms sale to India, making the U.S. offer of about $70 million in arms for Pakistan look paltry. With General Zia's advisers split on the wisdom of turning to Washington rather than trying to accommodate Moscow, the U.S.-Pakistani tie seemed off to a shaky start. It nonetheless prospered, particularly as it made possible a

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de facto political coalition of China, several Arab states, and the U.S., with all providing support to the Afghan resistance.

This strange coalition certainly had no ideological binds. The mere idea that a liberal democracy, a Marxist regime, and several Islamic states could cooperate successfully against the Soviet Union for most of the 1980s seemed preposterous on the face of it. For all that, however, the coalition succeeded in creating a situation in Afghanistan that produced a major strategic defeat for Moscow. It also revealed implicitly the strength of the balance-of-power relationships along the intersecting Moscow-New Delhi and Beijing-Islamabad axes.

India, to be sure, has not inclined politically toward communism; nor is it likely to do so. It is behaving as a would-be great power, desirous of expelling American and Chinese influence from the region and quite willing to expand its territories in the subcontinent at its neighbors' expense. India's democratic political system has not moderated this imperial behavior, and it seems unlikely to do so in the near term. In 1987, the value of its arms acquisitions from the USSR alone totalled more than the entire Pakistani defense budget. A nuclear-powered submarine, part of the Indian purchase, does not suggest a modest national military ambition, particularly when India's per capita annual income is only about 60 percent of Pakistan's. India's nuclear weapons development, which proceeds in blatant disregard for the non-proliferation pleadings of Western states, likewise confirms a sustained preference for greater military power.

What are the U.S. choices implied by these strategic facts? We have already made them. We have chosen to play on the Beijing-Islamabad axis. Yet occasional inclinations, policy recommendations, and even actions seem predicated either on a failure to understand the strategic structure or a belief that the U.S. can play on both axes simultaneously. At times, we seem to believe that we can return to browbeating Pakistan or that we can have equally good relations with both India and Pakistan at Moscow's and Beijing's expense. A sensible basis for these policy inclinations is difficult to discover. The former is not in our interests and the latter not a practical option.

Do these strategic realities mean that the U.S. must abandon support for democracy in Pakistan? Not at all, but they do mean that the way we express that support and our expectations concerning the tempo of progress must change. Pakistan is ethnically fragmented and beset by high rates of illiteracy and poverty. Over three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan have created the largest refugee problem for any single country in the world. Furthermore, terrorism sponsored by the Afghan government and the Soviet Union caused over 1,700 incidents in 1987, more than in the rest of the world combined. Notwithstanding these enormous problems, the Pakistani economy has grown at about 5 percent a year for a decade; modest progress toward democratic government has also been made. Setbacks, even reversion to martial law, should not bring us to complete despair. At its creation, Pakistan did not make sense as a nation, only as a religious idea. Its transformation to a modern secular democracy will neither happen quickly nor primarily because of foreign urging. Unless Pakistan's security can be maintained, democracy there has no prospects at all.

A SECURE and stable Pakistan will inevitably contribute to the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Asia. Whatever one's sentiments about General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, it must be conceded that he managed Pakistan's security skillfully, under trying circumstances. He understood, unlike many of his advisers in 1980, that a deal with Moscow was not in Pakistan's strategic interest although in the short term it held tactical appeal. As the Afghan refugee problem grew, as Soviet covert action in Pakistan became bolder, as India's military edge over Pakistan widened, and as domestic pressures for political democracy grew, Zia balanced the competing threats and demands with a talent

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matched by few modern political leaders. Without strong U.S. support, however, he could not have succeeded. Other states—China and some Arabic countries—also helped, but U.S. policy has been critical.

General Zia's tragic death could not have come at a more unfortunate time. Great uncertainties confront the government on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. Domestic difficulties were reflected in Zia's decision to dissolve Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo's government in late May 1988. The full story is yet to be told, but it would surely reveal the fragile nature of Pakistan's effort to move toward a genuine elective system of government. Foreign policy difficulties emerged during the negotiations in Geneva over the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Zia pushed the prime minister and his government to take more of a role in the decision process, and that put strains on Junejo as he tried to square his domestic political interests with a key role at Geneva. American policy, the obvious force of the Moscow-Delhi axis, Zia's experienced strategic perspective on Afghanistan—all these formed an excellent counterweight to Junejo's greater concern with Pakistani domestic affairs and his comparative inexperience in the international arena.

Despite Zia's death—almost certainly by assassination—developments on the domestic front have thus far been a pleasant surprise from the American viewpoint. The military insured that the elections went ahead on schedule, and the results, hardly what the military desired, have been accepted in an orderly fashion. Pakistan has been blessed with yet another potentially able and talented leader in the form of Benazir Bhutto, a sophisticated and intelligent woman. Pakistan is lucky to have her in the government at this juncture, rather than in opposition where she might prove a destabilizing factor. Nonetheless, as prime minister, Bhutto brings inherent tensions to the political system. She never forgave Zia for executing her father. It remains to be seen whether she will forgive the military leaders who formed Zia's primary support. Moreover, her Sindi-based People's Party inevitably will present a challenge to the Punjabi-based military. The regime's stability will depend on the degree of trust and mutual accommodation she and the generals work out. Given the young prime minister's apparent political skills and wisdom, we should expect her to overlook past wounds and to exploit the present opportunities for democracy. In any event it will be a difficult course, and success is far from guaranteed. There is little reason for American policy-makers to relax their concerns over Pakistan's internal stability.

A secure and stable India is also essential to a strategic balance in Asia. But are the internal and external threats to India as great as to Pakistan? Hardly, although India's ethnic and religious fragmentation as well as mass poverty pose a frightening political challenge for any one in charge of that country's affairs. American support has not been critical for India, and that is perhaps part of the reason India accepts U.S. favors with ambivalence at best, with cynical ingratitude at worst.

THE KEY POINT is clear. American support is much more important for Pakistan than for India. This is not to suggest a hostile U.S. policy toward India. India could break up the strategic structure in Asia and shift its major orientation from Moscow to the West. To be sure, India's quest for economic development pushes it toward better relations with the U.S., but free market interaction with the West does not require it. India's political ambitions for great power stature seem likely to prevail over U.S. economic assistance if New Delhi is forced to choose. Moreover, the U.S. has yet to confront India with denial of having it both ways. The U.S. should keep the door open to India, but without any illusion that it will pass through it soon.

Other strategic considerations weigh heavily in favor of a healthy U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Iran is showing strong signs of a reassessment of its foreign policy. If the

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cease-fire with Iraq holds and a peace settlement is reached, Iran is likely to seek a rapprochement with the West. Even in isolation, Iran did not achieve a strategic relationship with Moscow despite official noises in late 1987 about such a course in reaction to the U.S. protection of Kuwaiti shipping in the Persian Gulf. Coming out of isolation, Iran is likely to improve relations with Pakistan and eventually with the U.S. That development would mean an extension of the Beijing-Islamabad axis to include Tehran, and perhaps Ankara. Those who recall CENTO and the old "northern tier" of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan of the 1950s, when we were implementing the "containment policy," may wrongly assume that this would be a return to that strategy. The nature of the competition in Asia has changed. It is only partly about the containment of the Soviet Union. Moscow's defeat in Afghanistan, India's imperial behavior, and China's re-alignment from the Soviet bloc to a position between the East-West alliance systems have changed the structure, both geographic and ideological, of the competition. It is much less dictated by ideological concepts–although ideology is not wholly irrelevant, especially the American concern with expanding liberal democracy and that of Southwest Asian states with spreading Islam–and more defined by traditional balance of power considerations.

There is good news in this strategic transformation from containment to balance of power. Containment policy was expensive. We were committed to defend everywhere along the containment line. Striving to maintain an Asian balance of power should be cheaper for the United States. This is already evident from the U.S.-PRC normalization of relations. For the first time in this century, we have reasonably good relations with both China and Japan. That condition has reduced our military requirements in East Asia except where they face the Soviet Union and North Korea.

In Southwest Asia, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a secure Pakistan, and an Iran not viscerally hostile to the West could reduce the military requirements for U.S. forces in that region. India will not, and probably could not, deliver that benefit to U.S. strategy in Southwest Asia; Pakistan and Iran can.

To gain the economies of a balance of power policy in Asia, we must choose correctly the places to spend our resources. Spending them in Pakistan has already paid handsomely, and the outlook for high returns from future support is good. Our traditional policy instincts, unfortunately, are against recognizing these investment opportunities. The Afghanistan resistance movement kept our attention and won our resources. Soviet withdrawal can easily prompt a sense of premature relief on our part; worse, it could encourage us to ignore Pakistan and Afghanistan in the future.

SUCH AN OUTCOME would spell disaster for American interests in the region. The containment game may be over, but the balance of power game is just beginning. Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan do not mean that Moscow is withdrawing politically from Kabul. The balance of Soviet and Western influence in Kabul will remain a struggle. Pakistan's role in this struggle will be critical, and will shape the options for U.S. policy.

Moscow clearly understands the changed structure of the Asian competition. In deciding to withdraw from Afghanistan, Gorbachev surely realized he might be able to undercut the good relations between Washington and Islamabad. Furthermore, Gorbachev has vigorously pursued a diplomatic attack on the U.S. tie with Beijing. His Vladivostok speech announced a major policy objective of improving Sino-Soviet relations, and he is paying the price with troop withdrawals from Mongolia and movement toward a settlement in Cambodia. China has responded by agreeing to a Gorbachev-Deng summit. What is more, Rajiv Gandhi's latest effort to improve India's relations with Beijing looks like part of a coordinated Moscow-Delhi tactic to weaken the U.S. position on the Beijing-Islamabad

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axis. Were it to succeed, Moscow would have a better chance of salvaging something of its influence in Afghanistan and of keeping pressure on Pakistan.

The worst course for Washington is to drop out of the competition in order to dwell on our traditional points of friction with Islamabad. We should subordinate those issues to reconstruction in Afghanistan. Without a large multilateral Western economic aid effort for Afghanistan, will the refugees in Pakistan go home? Will not Soviet influence remain high? Will not Pakistan's internal security and economic performance be reduced? Unfortunately, tribal Afghanistan is unlikely to become peaceful and prosperous even with vast amounts of Western aid. But without sustained U.S. and Western involvement, the Beijing-Islamabad axis will be weakened, and the Tehran link will be slower in coming.

FORTUNATELY, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been reasonably sound and consistent since 1980. Pakistan's leaders, however, are right to be apprehensive about the future. Will the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan ruin the bipartisan character of our present policy? Even if our professional diplomats work to sustain it, will they succeed as the Bush administration comes into office? Far more questionable, will they enjoy congressional support? During the coming months, policy-makers will face at least three obstacles as they attempt to stay on course.

First, the Pakistan nuclear program enjoys such broad popularity in Pakistan that even Benazir Bhutto could not disavow it during her visit to Washington last spring. Eventually, the United States may have to weigh Pakistan's value as an ally against our nonproliferation policy goals. That will not be an easy choice, and a wise Pakistani government will avoid forcing the choice, even if it does not abandon the program outright.

Second, while democracy in Pakistan seems to have a new chance, a setback is not impossible. Given the traditional ethnic rivalries and the likelihood that economic growth may not stay on its previous course, we should not assume that our differences with Pakistan on this point are permanently settled. If these differences re-emerge, warm congressional sentiments toward Pakistan will be difficult to engender or sustain, particularly if the contrast with India is sharp.

The problem should be manageable, however, if the U.S. distinguishes between solidarity with Pakistan as a state in Asia's balance of power and loyalty to Pakistani ruling circles. To be sure, our relations with Zia were close, even personal in some cases, but the late American Ambassador Arnold Raphel dealt openly with Benazir Bhutto and other political leaders opposing the regime, making it clear that the U.S. connection is not wholly the monopoly of a person or a clique. We can support a balance of power in Asia without abandoning our principles, but it will not be easy. Such a policy calls for more nuance and subtlety than is characteristic of us.

Third, serious arguments will continue to be made that the U.S. would be wiser to anchor its strategy in New Delhi. India is not only a democracy, but is also showing signs of economic progress. And it clearly is the "local Leviathan" that the Carter administration identified it as being. (It was this idea, in fact, that in 1977–78 provided the rationale for seeking strong ties with New Delhi and for neglecting Islamabad.)

The flaw in these otherwise attractive sentiments is that U.S. strategy must be based on an Asian premise, not primarily a regional or South Asian premise. The Moscow-New Delhi axis transcends South Asia. It affects China, Pakistan, and other Southwest Asian states. India will do nothing for U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region. Pakistan will. India would make our ties with China more troublesome. Pakistan will not. Finally, some ASEAN states are taking disturbed note of the growth of India's naval power. "Local Leviathans" can be good allies, more economical than weak regional powers in need of large amounts of aid, but they can also be troublesome allies. Regional aspirants to great power status may not share enough common inter-

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ests with the U.S. to make it worth supporting their ambitions.

In the course of this year, with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan complete and a new President in the White House, U.S.-Pakistani ties will seem unimportant to the wider public and much of the Congress. Whether through neglect or through active indignation over Pakistani domestic policies, the traditional policy cycle could make another half turn. A thoughtful review by opinion-makers and policy-makers could break the cycle, surprise both the optimists and the pessimists in Pakistan, edge Pakistan toward more democratic government, and underscore the wisdom of a bipartisan American foreign policy.



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Funny Business

Stephanie Abbajay

IN JULY OF 1986, Mr. Richard A. Landkamer, a Houston-based freelance journalist, wrote to the FBI requesting information about the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), a private, nonprofit organization established by a U.S.-USSR protocol in 1973. USTEC's purpose, according to the protocol, is to expand peaceful, non-strategic trade between the two superpowers. Acting under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Mr. Landkamer requested copies of all documents in the FBI files regarding this joint U.S.-Soviet organization.

In August of that year the FBI responded to Mr. Landkamer's request by saying that the documents in their files pertaining to USTEC amounted to approximately 400 pages and that his request had been assigned for processing. Two months later, however, Mr. Landkamer received notification from the FBI that all USTEC documents in its possession were "classified in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy," and therefore privileged from disclosure.

Mr. Landkamer, claiming that the government did not provide sufficient information to justify the classification of the USTEC file, subsequently filed suit against the FBI and the Department of Justice to obtain the documents he had requested. His position was that the government's refusal to disclose the documents was unreasonable.

Previous court rulings require agencies claiming exemption from FOIA requirements, if challenged, to disclose the identity of and/or description of each document and the reason for refusal to disclose. This is known as a "Vaughn index," and Mr. Landkamer filed a motion for the government to provide one. After two years, he has yet to receive such an index regarding the FBI's classification of USTEC documents. The matter is still pending.

On the surface there is nothing very exceptional about Mr. Landkamer's case. Suits regarding the FOIA are common enough, and in most instances there is little room to argue over the FBI's, or any other government agency's, privilege to classify.

What is exceptional in this case though, is the story behind USTEC and the controversy that surrounds it. An investigation of USTEC would be largely irrelevant were it not for the fact that this private group of American businessmen, working with Soviet officials, represents a central and increasingly powerful component of American trade policy with the Soviet Union. The policy that USTEC advocates consists of loosening export controls, increasing trade as a "bridge to peace," and helping to build the Soviet industrial infrastructure—a policy not always congruent with congressional and State and Defense Departments' concerns.[1]

Stephanie Abbajay is an assistant editor at *The National Interest.*

[1]For example, in an interview over Radio Moscow on March 7, 1984, William Verity, then president of USTEC said: "I think the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was one of the terrible mistakes that was made by American politicians." USTEC has lobbied for the repeal of this amendment which bars granting Most Favored Nation status to countries in violation of human rights.

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This trade policy has blossomed under USTEC, has been endorsed by every executive office since President Nixon (who created the organization), and was given its strongest support ever with President Reagan's selection of William Verity—the longest serving president of USTEC—as secretary of commerce in 1987. Although ostensibly a private organization, USTEC has all the trappings of a quasi-governmental body, from a high-powered membership that includes both leading American businesses and representatives of both the U.S. and Soviet governments, to official endorsements by Soviet and American officials from the General Secretary to the President.

The controversy over USTEC stems in large part from two facts. First, this private, non-profit council is highly secretive. A request to USTEC's office in New York will get you neither a membership roster nor one of USTEC's quarterly journals; both are confidential and for members only. The Departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce claim not to maintain a members list, nor will they release USTEC journals. Second, in a 1987 State Department report based on a classified CIA study of the USSR Chamber of Commerce, USTEC was labeled a center for KGB technological and industrial espionage.[2] In light of such charges, it is worth reviewing what little we do know about USTEC's organizational makeup and operations.

USTEC was established as a result of a diplomatic protocol signed at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Washington in June 1973, by the secretary of the treasury, George Shultz, and the Soviet minister of trade, Nikolai Patolichev.[3] The organization was initially named the U.S.-USSR Chamber of Commerce, but was subsequently re-named the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council.

On July 12, 1973, the new council was described in a press release by Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent as a "focal point to which American business could turn in its pursuit of commercial dealings with the Soviet Union." Secretary Dent outlined some of the duties of the new council, including collecting statistical data on member firms, providing information on economic developments of both countries, and disseminating information on market potential and business opportunities.

The Department of State filed a certificate of incorporation for USTEC in the state of New York on September 10, 1973 as a non-profit organization, and it opened for business on December 23, 1973. A background paper, prepared by USTEC and delivered to the Congressional Research Service in May 1974, described it as a "unique organization" whose "mission is to bring together private American businessmen and Soviet government officials so that they can develop and implement trade in a climate of mutual trust and understanding."

The structure of USTEC is indeed unique. According to the 1974 background paper, the Council maintains offices and a bi-national staff in New York and Moscow. The president of the Council is required to be an American national and is responsible to a board of directors through an executive committee. There is an equal number of Soviet and American directors.

The American directors have been and continue to be chief executive officers of large American corporations and financial institutions. The first president of USTEC was Donald Kendall, chairman of PepsiCo. From 1977 to 1984 the office was held by William Verity, then president of Armco Steel, Inc. Up until

[2] *Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry,* prepared by the U.S. Department of State, 1987.

[3] Established under the same protocol was the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC), a U.S.-Soviet trade commission under the direction of the Department of Commerce whose purpose is to oversee the development of trade between the two countries. USTEC is described as the private sector equivalent of the JCC by USTEC's former president James Giffen. Traditionally, the two organizations meet simultaneously in either Washington or Moscow.

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December 1988, USTEC's president was Mr. James Giffen, a former vice president of Armco Steel under Verity and now chairman of the Mercator Corporation, the financial institution behind one of USTEC's offshoots, the American Trade Consortium. Until a new president is named, the acting president is USTEC's director of communications, William Forrester. Mr. Forrester has been director of communications since the Council's inception and has no business affiliation.

Membership dues are based on a company's annual sales. Membership is comprised of private U.S. businesses and financial institutions, the USSR Chamber of Commerce, Soviet foreign trade organizations, and Soviet production plants, manufacturing enterprises, and research institutes. According to a recent issue of the Council's journal, USTEC's U.S. membership has grown to nearly 320 American companies. A 1985 journal proudly proclaimed that American membership in USTEC represents "about 25 percent of the total U.S. Gross National Product, with annual sales exceeding $375 billion," and that "[f]rom chemicals and heavy machinery to computers, energy, transportation, pharmaceutical and perfumes, there is hardly a field not represented by Council membership."

Indeed, a list of the members of USTEC reads like a Fortune 500 roster: IBM, Honeywell, Rockwell International, Chase Manhattan Bank, Westinghouse, Philip Morris, E. I. duPont de Nemours, Archer Daniels Midland, Coca-Cola, Eastman Kodak, RJR Nabisco, Occidental Petroleum, Chevron, Johnson & Johnson, Union Carbide, General Electric, etc. Some of USTEC's members are major U.S. defense contractors: for example, General Electric manufactures components for nuclear weapons, and Union Carbide is a supplier of enriched uranium for the hydrogen bomb.

This is not to suggest, of course, that these companies are selling U.S. defense technology or other sophisticated high-technology to the Soviets. But here we encounter one of the major problems with USTEC: no one knows what exactly USTEC's members *are* trading. Commerce and State say that because USTEC is a private organization they do not monitor its activities or maintain member lists. And again, the USTEC headquarters in New York is anything but forthcoming when asked what type of business they are engaged in, how profits are earned, and who their members are.

The only people who have authorized access to USTEC's journals are the American and Soviet members of USTEC. (The Treasury Department says that they receive complimentary copies but are restricted by copyright laws from reproducing them; Commerce and State are evasive as to whether they have them or not, and the FBI simply doesn't say.) But it is only by looking through USTEC journals, acquired with considerable difficulty if one is not a member, that one is able to learn who the members are and what type of business transactions are going on.

UNDER THE HEADING "Newsfront," the journal lists new trade activities, negotiations, contracts, seminars, trade shows, and exhibitions. A look through recent issues suggests that the amount of trade is actually fairly small and that the number of joint ventures is even smaller. Examples of things being traded by American companies include automated factory assembly lines, pumping equipment for gas pipelines, printing presses, and computerized medical equipment.

Since the Soviets began allowing them in January 1987, there have only been three joint venture contracts signed. According to USTEC journals, in April 1988, Honeywell signed an agreement to design automated factory control systems, and Occidental Petroleum signed a billion dollar contract for the construction and operation of two petrochemical plants in the Ukraine. In November 1987, Combustion Engineering of Stamford, Connecticut signed a contract to install the instrumentation and control systems at a Soviet oil refinery. There are many mentions of negotiations and "agreements on agreements" for the formation of joint ventures, but few actual contracts. This lack of trade activity

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does not represent an impressive success rate, but given what is known about Soviet bureaucratic obstacles, the inconvertible ruble, and COCOM export restrictions, that is not particularly surprising.

Also found in the journal are transcripts of speeches by American businessmen (like Dwayne O. Andreas, chairman of Archer Daniels Midland and co-chair of USTEC) and by Soviet bureaucrats lauding trade potential, and recently letters of encouragement and support from General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. Transcripts are printed in Russian and English. More than anything else, there are announcements of exhibitions, trade shows, seminars, and meetings.

Looking at the journals, there doesn't seem to be much to hide. Why then all the secrecy? Why aren't the journals available to the public? Why has the FBI classified all USTEC documents? One answer may be found in the 1987 State Department report on the USSR Chamber of Commerce. The Soviet Chamber holds roughly half of the Soviet membership in USTEC, and according to a statement by it in USTEC journal Number 1, Volume 13, 1988, the USSR Chamber of Commerce is "the spokesman for the interests of enterprises and the entire national economy in doing business with foreign partners . . . ." The State Department report states that approximately one-third of the Soviet Chamber's members are known KGB or GRU (Soviet military intelligence) agents assigned to keep tabs on and to acquire Western technology.

According to the report, KGB and GRU officers hold over half of the senior management slots in the Soviet Chamber. One of the officers mentioned, for example, is Yevgeny Pitovranov, chairman of the USSR Chamber of Commerce, and chamber member since 1966. Pitovranov is identified by State in the report as a reserve Lieutenant General in the KGB who was at one time (1962–1964) head of the KGB's training school. He currently serves on the board of directors of USTEC.

The report states that the Soviet Chamber's trade promotion activities "involve exploiting or misleading Western business and government leaders by systematically using international trade exhibitions and seminars for economic collection and falsifying end-user documentation during inspection of Western equipment coming into the USSR." This indicates that the Soviets use these trade shows to gather sophisticated Western technology and gain insights on Western advances.

The report documents that the Chamber hosts over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100 business delegations annually, many under the auspices of USTEC. Here are some examples of seminars and exhibitions in Moscow taken from recent USTEC journals. In 1987, Conoco, a subsidiary of E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., held a symposium on chemicals used in the oil industry, and equipment and explosives used in seismic oil surveys. General Electric held a symposium on the automation of machine tool production facilities, robotics, and program control systems. Westinghouse held seminars on the company's technology and equipment for nuclear power plants. And in spring 1988, Sperry Marine held an exhibit and seminar with demonstrations of that company's radar and navigation equipment, including global positioning and communication systems.

Examples of exhibits and trade shows in 1987 include the pharmaceutical field, where over 110 firms displayed lab equipment and research systems at one trade show; the agro-industry field, where over 40 foreign firms from 14 countries displayed scientific technologies related to improving crop yields, and the quality, storage, and distribution of agricultural products; and advanced opticals, where over 300 firms from 20 countries displayed photographic and light sensitive equipment, and microfilm and duplicating equipment.

The Soviets have made it easier and easier for businessmen to come and go. According to USTEC journal Number 2, Volume 13, 1988, the Soviets changed their visa regulations on May 1, 1988 to allow American USTEC members and other invited international businessmen to get visas within forty-eight hours.

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Bearing in mind the findings of the 1987 State Department report, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the envisioned "climate of mutual trust and understanding," this "focal point to which American business could turn in its commercial dealings with the Soviet Union," has become a handy way for the Soviets to facilitate technological espionage.

Again, this is not to suggest that America's largest, most successful, and highly prominent corporations are consciously engaged in the systematic turnover of technology to the Soviets. It must be assumed that these companies do not display their most sensitive technologies. In any event, a great many high-tech goods are restricted by export controls. However, there is a technological grey area. Many technologies that do not appear sensitive do in fact have indirect strategic or military application. For example, the State Department reports that "much of the sophisticated equipment utilized for seismic work [in the exploration of oil and gas] has significant strategic applications in anti-submarine warfare, nuclear research, and weapons development and design" (Ambassador Allen Wendt, Current Policy Paper Number 1128). While Verity claims that billions are lost every year because of export restrictions, the Department of Defense maintains that billions are saved from not having to upgrade our defenses to compensate for having facilitated Soviet technological advances.[4]

IF THE ATTRACTION of the organization to the Soviets seems obvious, what American purposes are served by USTEC? American representatives of USTEC have identified two purposes. Former USTEC president James Giffen stated last April during a phone interview, "This is business, plain and simple. The name of the game is profit." On March 7, 1984, while serving as USTEC president, William Verity said in an interview over Radio Moscow that "trade is an important bridge to peace." Verity later maintained this position as secretary of commerce and made priorities of increasing trade with the Soviets and relaxing export restrictions.

Both of these explanations—profit and peace—are less than convincing. For one thing, the difficulties of engaging in profitable trade with the Soviets far outweigh the advantages. The ruble is an inconvertible currency, and in most cases, Western companies must take their profits in commodities like vodka, cotton, or fuel. Payment in hard currency is reserved for very select trade ventures, like General Motor's frequent sale of large diesel engines. Moreover, the Soviet bureaucracy is renowned for its sluggishness and obstructiveness. Countless companies have negotiated for months, shuttling to and from Moscow, only to lose the deal in the end because of bureaucratic obstacles. When dealing with the Soviets, companies know the risks involved and few have turned a profit.

Undoubtedly, many businessmen interested in doing business with the Soviets look to PepsiCo and Occidental Petroleum as their models. Both companies have made profits trading with the Soviets. But both were doing business there long before USTEC was around: PepsiCo began negotiating with the Soviets in 1959 and finally signed a contract to trade Pepsi syrup for vodka in 1972, and Armand Hammer of Occidental was dealing with the Soviets long before Mikhail Gorbachev was born. In any case, they represent the exception rather than the rule as far as profitability is concerned.

Second, the theory of trade as a "bridge to peace" seems in theory and in practice to be historically groundless. As Europeans found out in 1914, extensive trade links proved to be a feeble barrier to the outbreak of war. At times, in fact, they become positively subversive of overarching national interests.

A recent, well-known example is that of the Kama River truck factory in the Soviet Union. The largest truck foundry in the world, it was built by a West European and

[4]American Foundation for Resistance International, *Resistance Bulletin*, Summer 1988, Volume 1, Number 4, p. 11.

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American consortium (including, for example, IBM and the Ford Motor Company) during the Nixon administration. In 1979 and again in 1980, Larry Brady, then the deputy director of the Office of Export Administration at the Department of Commerce, testified in front of a House Armed Services' subcommittee and a Senate Banking subcommittee that trucks made at this factory were not being manufactured for civilian use. In fact, he reported, its products served as military transport vehicles in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus this venture became a bridge to war, not peace.

Furthermore, U.S. exports to the Soviets reached their peak—$3.62 billion—in the year preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. After the invasion, trade fell to just over a billion dollars a year, where it has remained. Indeed, the contribution to overall U.S.-Soviet relations of companies like PepsiCo and Occidental Petroleum seems arguable, while the contributions of American automated assembly lines seem obvious.

Peaceful, non-strategic trade is one thing, sophisticated technology is quite another. A look at USTEC's membership reveals an abundance of high-tech companies but few producers of consumer goods. The roster includes some of America's foremost high-tech companies—Rockwell, Honeywell, Ingersoll-Rand, Union Carbide, General Electric, Occidental Petroleum, IBM, etc.—who are dealing in sophisticated technology. Ingersoll-Rand, for example, has sold its gas pipeline pumping equipment, Honeywell has sold its factory control systems, and Occidental Petroleum will build two petrochemical plants. Grain and Pepsi are two popular items, but it is clear from USTEC's members and their trade activities that the Soviets are interested in high-tech.

USTEC's very existence raises several key questions: Why is it still officially endorsed by the U.S. government if, according to the State Department and the CIA, it is a known center for KGB technological espionage? Why do America's biggest businesses turn to it if its success rate is questionable and profits are so hard to come by? Whose interests are being served?

Like Mr. Landkamer, those who try to find answers to these questions are routinely stonewalled, and left to raise even more questions.

In the meantime, USTEC continues to embody U.S. trade policy towards the Soviet Union. From the official protocol which established it, to its incorporation by the State Department, to one of its past presidents becoming secretary of commerce, to the yearly endorsements it receives from the U.S. President and the Soviet General Secretary, USTEC bears the marks of an officially sanctioned organization. As such, it is strange that its inner workings are more closely guarded from the American public than are U.S. industrial technologies from the KGB.

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Don't Blame Democracy First

Mary Tedeschi Eberstadt

AS SCOTT McCONNELL observed here four months ago, the election of 1988 has loosed the usual torrent of inquiries into the condition of the Democratic party.[1] By now this ritual has become as familiar as the four seasons and just about as edifying to the ordinary American voter. In fact, only one contender now vies with the Democrats for its indifference to the voting public, and that is the Republican party. For if the Democrats have not exactly profited from their failures, neither have the Republicans learned much from their own repeated victories. This complacency is worth a few words as a Bush administration takes office. At issue are not only the party and its future, but a foreign policy now dominated by a set of objectives bequeathed to the incoming Administration by its predecessor.

The changes those objectives underwent in recent years have drawn much debate, as readers of *The National Interest* know. By the end of their second term, in a transformation much applauded by their former opponents, Reagan and his advisers had thrown off their cold war chains to become pioneers of peace on the global frontier. Thus liberated, they went to work not only on ideas of their own, but on the very picture of the world that Americans had come to take for granted. That world, it turned out, became less threatening and more exhilarating with each official pronouncement. From Moscow to the Philippines, arms control to South America, the Reagan administration found new eras dawning and proclaimed, with mounting excitement, that the order of old was passing away.

The conclusion of the INF accord in December 1987 was said to mark yet another "new era in history," as were such independent developments as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the return to civilian rule by various Latin American states, the diplomatic maneuvers of the moment in South Africa and the Middle East, and the ongoing economic gains among nations of the Pacific rim. Peace and democracy, the official refrain continued, were "breaking out all over"—a theme that reached its crescendo, though certainly not its end, with the President's discovery last year in Moscow that the Cold War itself "may be ending." In sum, as his farewell address had it, "We set out to change a nation and instead we changed a world." By the end of the Reagan years, it was this millenarian spirit that most distinguished the policy of the 1980s from that of Reagan's predecessors.

Not all spectators were convinced by the good news flowing from the White House. Owen Harries, for one, dissented as early as three years ago, when he charged the Reagan administration with "redefin[ing] the world

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[1] "The Liberal Abdication," *The National Interest* No. 14 (Winter 1988/89).

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in more optimistic terms."[2] Soon after, such notable proponents of detente as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger delivered their own sharp critiques, this time over the pace and scope of arms control negotiations. Concern over the growth of U.S.-Soviet trade attracted critics from both parties, including, most vocally, Democratic Senator Bill Bradley. By January 1989, when Reagan officials at last agreed to a longstanding Soviet request to hold a human rights conference in Moscow, skepticism had spread even to the *Washington Post*, whose demand to "Slow the Moscow Express" by then spoke for many beyond the expected quarters of discontent on the Right.

AS DEBATES LIKE THESE took shape, the question of popular attitudes toward the "changed world" of the eighties fell somewhat by the way. It is commonly assumed, of course, that voters care little for foreign policy, and that they vote their wallets rather than their vision of the world. This view has its strengths; in the last national election, as in most, domestic issues like crime and taxes predominated, and even the most controversial of foreign policy issues seldom appeared on the scene. Yet this hardly means that the voters of 1988 had no comment on the subject of American foreign policy. The truth, it turned out, was quite the opposite. The majority of voters had just one word to say about world affairs, and they said it over and over again: defense.

Strength, military might, the willingness to use force—these and other concerns that surfaced in the preoccupation with "defense" were the only foreign policy issues at stake in the 1988 election. Not surprisingly, they were also among the chief differences that distinguished the two candidates in the public mind. Though individual polls may, as is often argued, mean whatever one wants them to mean, the trend throughout the campaign was unmistakable. Before and during the election, a majority of voters found Dukakis to be "weak" on the issues of "defense" and found Bush reassuring by comparison. Even among Dukakis supporters, "defense" was consistently cited as the candidate's signal defect. Thus the electorate, far from affirming popular support for the conciliatory direction of actual policy, in fact asserted a quite contrary preference for an America prepared against any threatening contingency.

Now that is a remarkable fact. These were the same voters, after all, who had been inundated during the Reagan years with claims that a better world had come to pass. Moreover, they were the same voters whose supposed fear of force had been cited repeatedly by opposition Democrats in order to undermine policies like the Administration's support for the *contras*. In 1988, this portrait of the pacific American mind became a fixture of the Democratic campaign. No one believed in it more than Michael Dukakis, whose repeated appeals to an over-burdened, over-militarized America proved more self-defeating with each repetition. Interestingly, Dukakis anticipated as much with his repeated protestations of devotion to military might. While these attempts came to failure (and sometimes mockery, as in the case of the much-maligned tank episode), they only underscored the importance that issues of strength and preparedness had come to assume in the public mind.

Not that Reagan's critics were alone in their view of an America averse to confrontation. The Administration, too, plainly believed in the peace-mongering electorate it had imagined for itself. We might recall as emblematic the still-astonishing spectacle of 1983, when the American Secretary of State made a grave fireside appearance immediately following a television movie (*The Day After*) that was believed to have whipped the public into hysteria over nuclear war. Nothing of the sort materialized. Yet a few years later, that presumably anxious electorate was invoked in turn by the Administration to justify its ambitious arms control policies.

It is an interesting fact that the most left-

[2] "Neoconservatism and Realpolitik," *The National Interest* No. 1 (Fall 1985).

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leaning of commentators and activists have made no such mistakes in assessing the public mood. In left-wing journals and magazines, voters are routinely derided for their reactionary, America-first leanings. That is why the Left is harshest toward Democratic politicians who are hawkish, and why its own agenda has long focused on such non-elected bodies as congressional staffs and federal courts. In 1988, ironically, this view of popular preferences proved closer to the truth than that emanating from the mainstream media, to say nothing of the White House itself. The majority of those casting ballots did just what the Left feared they would. For all the conciliatory policies committed in their name, and for all the talk of "new eras" intended for their ears, the American voters in 1988 clapped their hands and announced that they, if not their leaders, still believed in adversaries.

To all this one might object that the election of George Bush could as easily be taken to signal a popular satisfaction with the status quo. As vice-president, after all, Bush was uniquely identified with the policies of his predecessor; was he not enjoined, by his very victory, to continue with them? But to argue in this way is to overlook the Bush campaign's adroit sidestepping of Reagan's foreign policy. While the INF accord, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and other developments dear to the White House were cast by Bush in a positive light, they were never taken to support the inflated claims of the Reagan years. On the contrary, these and other changes on the world scene were invoked by the Bush campaign precisely in order to affirm the need for caution and experience in global affairs. Bush at times placed himself to the right of Reagan on foreign policy issues—a fact much noted, though little analyzed, by observers of both campaigns.

Thus Bush was presented not as the president to lead America out of the Cold War, but as the only candidate experienced and able enough to stand eye-to-eye with the vigorous Gorbachev. Evidence of Soviet reform was presented not as a development that made American defenses obsolete, but as further proof of the need for a president who could separate wheat from chaff. As the campaign slogan had it, only Bush could determine whether Gorbachev was "for real." This very way of posing the issue drew a sharp line between the campaign and the Administration, which had long since treated the worthiness of Gorbachev's intentions as a foregone conclusion. As Bush and his team understood, whatever value the excitement over "new eras" might retain in official Washington, it was not the stuff of popular victory. By acting on that premise throughout their campaign, Bush and his men not only helped to insure a Republican victory, but cast unintended light on the chasm between popular and elite ideas about foreign affairs.

WHETHER THE BUSH White House will heed the popular preference for strength over exotic promises—a preference, after all, that helped bring Bush to victory—remains to be seen. Not all early signs are encouraging. The decision over the Moscow human rights conference, presented as one of the Reagan administration's last acts, has now cleared the way for work to begin in earnest on a START agreement. James Baker, it is whispered in Washington, strongly supported this decision in the hopes that the Reagan administration would draw any fire for it while the Bush team would be left to commence work immediately. If this is so, it would seem to suggest another four years of diplomacy aimed at grandiose agreements and marked by all the haste and fanfare that have come to seem de rigueur.

For Bush and his team to continue in this fashion, of course, they must first unlearn the message of their own campaign. Or perhaps they need only recall the axioms that the American electorate is notoriously simple-minded about foreign policy, that the average voter can hardly spell the countries of the world (much less grasp them in their geopolitical complexity), that getting votes is one

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thing, making policy another. These ideas express a certain contempt for constituents, it is true, but they are hardly unknown in a Washington where sophisticates of both parties take them as a matter of faith.

On the other hand, a Bush administration may yet spare us the wide-eyed excesses of the Reagan years. George Bush just does not have the mind of a millenarian. Neither the temperament of this self-described "quiet man" nor his wide experience of world affairs seems suited to the Olympian gestures so beloved by Ronald Reagan. Bush lacks as well that mystical bond with "the people" that was both Reagan's greatest strength and, in the field of foreign policy, his most consequential defect. So while a Bush administration may do much as its predecessor did, it may nevertheless lower the volume as it broadcasts the results at home.

Still, there is no getting around the preoccupation with personal "legacy" that has become something of an obsession in official Washington. In such a climate, the distinction between statesmanship and personal popularity has very nearly evaporated. Whether George Bush can resist these pressures and preside over a foreign policy based on long-term American interests, rather than the short-term rewards of the capital, will only become apparent over the next four years.

IN THE MEANTIME, it is worth noting that at least one often-cited obstacle to such a foreign policy has been unmasked yet again as a chimera. Thanks in part to Tocqueville, the idea that democratic governments are uniquely handicapped in pursuing their long-term interests has become something of an unquestioned assumption among observers of foreign affairs. Today that idea appears most often as the claim that we should blame democracy first for the failings of our foreign policy. It is the democratic electorate itself, we are told, with its short attention span, isolation, and desire for spectacle, that makes a long-term policy against adversaries impossible to sustain. While notions like these are now taken for granted by nearly all concerned they are nowhere as prominent as on the Right, where the weaknesses of open societies have been analyzed most seriously and where writings like Jean Francois Revel's *Why Democracies Perish* are most in vogue.

Yet as the presidential elections of the past twenty years suggest, ordinary voters who have only the national interest to weigh usually reveal a cooler judgment than they are commonly said to possess. At times, in fact, as in 1988, their whims are visibly superior to those of policy-makers who become gripped by a vision of "legacy" only to find that legacy eluding them, as in Gatsby's dream, the faster it is pursued.

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